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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines various issues of arbitration law and practice in relation to the 
Islamic Shari’a law and the law of Saudi Arabia in general, and for arbitration in 
conventional banking disputes in particular. The thesis found that the Shari’a 
regulates arbitration tightly compared to other contemporary developments as no 
fundamental differences were found to exist between the classical Shari’a arbitration 
rules and the Saudi arbitration regulations, which represent the codification of the 
Hanbali law of arbitration. Unlike other arbitration laws, almost all kinds of disputes 
can be settled by arbitration in Saudi Arabia, and these include family and some 
criminal disputes such as murder and personal injuries. Moreover, this thesis 
demonstrates the difference between Islamic law and Saudi law. The latter is more 
comprehensive as it includes Islamic law and the borrowed Codes and Acts of the 
laws of other nations. The legal status of banking interest under the Saudi law is not 
clearly defined and it is not clear whether riba contradicts with the public policy of 
Saudi Arabia or not. This uncertainty has an impact on arbitration related to banking 
disputes and has led me to conclude that arbitration is not the best method for settling 
disputes involving domestic conventional banking business. Although resorting to the 
Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes of SAMA might provide a better 
solution, the decisions of the Committee are not “strong” enough to be fully enforced 
and the payment of interest continues to be an avoidable obligation in Saudi Arabia; 
therefore, the thesis examined the alternative remedies for both domestic and 
international banking arbitration. The thesis also found that if the enforcement of an 
international arbitration award is sought in Saudi Arabia, the award will be subject to 
the mandatory application of Shari’a law, which in addition to the imposition of 
interest, prohibits also certain kinds of commercial contracts.  
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Introduction 
 
Human beings knew and practised arbitration prior to litigation and to the creation of 
civilised legal systems. Due to the absence of judicial systems and state power at 
some points in history, the use of force was the primary means of settling any 
disputes.1 Nonetheless, the peaceful nature of human beings did intervene in finding 
pacific solutions for conflicts. Through the passage of time, these practices developed 
to form a body of customs and traditions, or what is known in Arabic as Urf. In the 
light of these customs, people started to refer their disputes to the third parties that had 
been chosen by them. The custom of the ancient Arabs did set some general criteria 
for the choice of arbitrators, where they should be known for their impartiality, 
fairness and wisdom in addition to the social power. For instance, Monks can be 
appointed for their religious influence which can benefit the enforcement of the 
judgment. The same rule applies to the chief of the tribe where his social power can 
help in determining the dispute and enforcing the judgment.2 As a result, arbitration 
became the tool of individuals to reach a pacific and fair dispute settlement by a third 
party. After the creation and the development of judicial bodies, arbitration existed as 
an auxiliary dispute settlement mechanism, working under the supervision of the 
judicial authorities.3 
 
The Islamic law, or what we know as Shari’a, introduced a comprehensive set of 
arbitration rules giving arbitration a strength similar to that of official litigation. The 
Shari’a regulated all the steps of the arbitral practice, from the arbitration agreement 
till the enforcement of the final award. In Saudi Arabia, the first attempt to codify the 
Shari’a arbitration rules came with the provisions of the Code of Commercial Courts 
of 1931; however, the code was not the perfect arbitration law as Shari’a courts failed, 
at that time, to recognise arbitration clauses and because the enforcement of the 
arbitration awards was voluntary.4 The wrong interpretation of the law by the Shari’a 
                                                 
1 W. Ragib, ‘Is Arbitration a type of Litigation?’ University of Kuwait Law Journal, 17/1 (1993), pp. 
131-172. 
2 See in general, N. Albejad, Arbitration in Saudi Arabia (1st edn, Institute of Public Administration, 
1999). 
3 See the Code of Commercial Court ratified by Royal Decree No. 32 dated 15/01/1350 H. (1931) 
published in Umm Alqura Gazette, issue nos. 374-376 dated 22/03/1350 H. (1931). 
4 See the Code of Commercial Court ratified by Royal Decree No. 32 dated 15/01/1350 H. (1931) 
published in Umm Alqura Gazette, issue nos. 374-376 dated 22/03/1350 H. (1931). 
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courts with regard to the recognition of the arbitration clauses and the voluntary 
execution of arbitral awards affected arbitration in Saudi Arabia negatively and led 
arbitration to exist in theory only for many decades. The second attempt came in 1983 
when Saudi Arabia enacted the Arbitration Code of 1983 which overcame many of 
the problems of the first code, but it did not produce clear solutions to the crucial 
issue of arbitration in banking arbitration.    
 
In Saudi Arabia, a major problem with conventional banking disputes occurred as the 
principles of conventional banking contradict with the principles of the Shari’a, 
especially when it comes to some very sensitive issues such as interest. As a general 
rule, Saudi courts are not competent to settle disputes that arise out of banking 
activities as defined by the Banking Control Act of 1966. The competence is spread 
between two semi-judicial committees in addition to arbitration. Resorting to one of 
these Committees does not guarantee the full enforcement of interest provisions in 
any agreement for the reasons that the Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable 
Instruments Disputes applies the Shari’a law and does not award interest in its 
judgments. On the other hand, the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes 
does not have the full power to enforce its judgments if it provides for the payment of 
interest. Even though arbitration is a possible remedy for a banking dispute, it is faced 
with many obstacles that make disputes related to conventional banking amenable to 
arbitration in theory only. The Saudi law did not even give a clear answer to the 
question of arbitrability of disputes in general and of banking disputes in particular 
and referred the whole issue to the law on conciliation. The law on conciliation itself 
carries a great deal of ambiguity and conflict among the Fiqh Schools and that is 
added to the fact that there are no rules on conciliation in Saudi Arabia. In accordance 
with the Shari’a teachings on conciliation, banking interest disputes are arbitrable; 
however, does this apply in real life?  
  
This thesis examines various issues of arbitration law and practice in relation to the 
Islamic Shari’a law and the law of Saudi Arabia in general, and for arbitration in 
conventional banking disputes in particular. The study also aims at comparing the 
available remedies for the settlement of banking disputes in Saudi Arabia in order to 
suggest the most suitable one for such kinds of disputes in Saudi Arabia. This thesis 
will be divided into five chapters in addition to this brief introduction and the 
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conclusion. Chapter 1 will give a historical background about arbitration in this very 
specific geographical area where Saudi Arabia is located. The chapter will start with 
the law and practice of arbitration in the pre-Islamic period that ended by the time of 
Prophet Muhammad (570-632 AD). The chapter also shows how Islam upheld some 
pre-Islamic practices with regard to arbitration as well as how Muslim Scholars 
introduced the methodologies of Usul Alfiqh to allow Muslims to keep their laws 
updated through regulating the reasoning process and putting restrictions on law 
transplantation within the Muslim state through the use of the concept of Urf or local 
custom as the source of legislation to protect the special identity of the society. The 
evolution of Usul Alfiqh or the legal theories as an independent science led to the 
creation of four main schools of thought where each school adopted a different set of 
rules for reasoning, application and even different subordinate sources of law. The 
chapter also distinguishes between the three confusing concepts of Islamic law, 
Shari’a and Islamic jurisprudence on the one hand, and the Saudi law on the other 
hand.   
 
Chapter 2 discuss the next stage of the development of arbitration law of Saudi Arabia 
and examines the law of arbitration under the fully developed Islamic jurisprudence or 
what is known as fiqh. The arbitration laws discussed in this chapter are the basis of 
the Arbitration Act of 1983 in Saudi Arabia. The chapter starts with the difference 
between arbitration and litigation under Shari’a and is followed by comparing the 
definitions of arbitration. This chapter covers the arbitration rules of Shari’a, from the 
arbitration agreement till the enforcement of the final arbitral award, in a comparative 
way between the four Islamic schools, paying more attention to the Hanbali School as 
the official school in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the regulatory attitude toward international arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia as well as other relevant issues of the Saudi law in general. The chapter starts 
by giving a brief overview of the Saudi legal system and its institutions. The chapter 
then examines other related issues of the Saudi law in general such as Wahhabism, the 
role of the official Mufti and his influence on the legal system in addition to the 
foreign influence on the Saudi law. After that, the regulatory attitude toward 
international arbitration will be analysed in chronological order. This section will be 
divided into two main parts. The first part will discuss the regulatory attitude toward 
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arbitration from the creation of the Saudi state in the 1920s till the first oil boom in 
the 1970s. This part will examine the arbitration cases that the Saudi Government was 
party to, such as the Wahat Alburaimi Case of 1955 and the well-known case of 
Arabian American Oil Company v. Saudi Arabia “Aramco Award of 1958” and its 
impacts on the Saudi legal system. The second part will cover the period between the 
1970s and now; this period experienced a shift in the attitude in order to attract 
foreign investment and many important steps toward the reactivation of arbitration as 
an effective dispute settlement mechanism, such as the enactment of the Arbitration 
Act of 1983 and its Implementing Rules in 1985 and the ratification of the New York 
Convention of 1958.   
 
Chapter 4 is an evaluation of Saudi arbitration law and judicial practice. The chapter 
also links the arbitration act with the common practice, other relevant regulations and 
the Shari’a sources. For the reason that the arbitration act was too brief to cover all the 
related issues, the study relied on the Implementing Rules which explain the 
ambiguous aspects of the act in some detail. The chapter also discusses the issues of 
enforcement of arbitral awards, both domestic and international, and the public policy 
of Saudi Arabia, its sources and applications    
 
Chapter 5 will decide whether a dispute related to conventional banking business can 
be settled through arbitration or not. The chapter decides first on the issue of 
arbitrability of banking disputes which needs a reference to the Shari’a law on 
conciliation first. The chapter will also explore the Shari’a law on banking interest as 
the main motive in the banking sector and the main contradiction of the public policy 
of Saudi Arabia. After that, the chapter will compare the judicial treatment of banking 
interest in Saudi Arabia with some neighbouring countries such as Egypt and the 
UAE. The chapter will suggest the most suitable alternative remedy in the case of 
disputes involving elements contradicting Shari’a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
This study addresses the following main questions:  
 
What is Shari’a, its sources and application in arbitration?  
What is the difference between Shari’a and the Saudi law in general and the 
arbitration rules in particular, and to what extent does Saudi Arabia apply Islamic 
law?  
How has politics affected the regulatory attitude toward state arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia?  
What is the scope of public policy in Saudi Arabia, its sources and application in 
arbitration?  
What do banking disputes mean under the Saudi law and how can arbitration settle 
banking disputes when the subject matter contradicts with the public policy?  
What are the alternative remedies in the case when arbitration fails to serve its 
objectives in banking disputes?    
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis is mainly based on library research, involving an analysis and comparative 
study of a range of documents, publications, hard copy and online material, and legal 
materials from different jurisdictions both in Arabic and in English. Arabic books, 
periodicals, official documents and reports and other sources related to Saudi Arabia, 
Islamic law and Arabic countries had been collected from various libraries in Saudi 
Arabia, mainly the central library of King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, the 
central library of King Saud University in Riyadh and the library of Umm-Alqura 
University in Mecca. The Saudi Statutes were collected directly from Umm Alqura 
Magazine, which is the official press in Saudi Arabia; however, it should be noted that 
Saudi legislations are drafted in Arabic and there is no official English translation.  
 
In addition to some legal databases such as LexisNexis, HeinOnline, Westlaw, etc., 
materials relating to International and English law and practice had been collected 
from different libraries in the UK, mainly the libraries of Brunel University, 
University College London, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, SOAS and The 
British Library. 
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The collection of the Saudi case law was made by personal visits to Diwan 
Almazalim, the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, and the Supreme Shari’a Court of Jeddah. Unfortunately, it 
was not possible to get enough material regarding banking disputes from the official 
authorities, which led the author to seek assistance from the banking sector directly. I 
was given access to the legal archive of one of the leading commercial banks where I 
was given great assistance. In any event, the main requirement of the official judicial 
authorities and the legal staff of the bank was to delete all of the relevant information 
that may give indication of the personality of the parties to the dispute, which was 
their primary requisite for providing assistance. Although some PhD theses have 
referred to this topic that they are in fact shallow and I found no use for them.  
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1 The Law and Practice of Arbitration in Arabia from 
the Pre-Islamic Era till the Emergence of the Four 
Schools of Jurisprudence 
 
Traditionally, there has been a cultural preference in the Arabic mentality to resolve 
disputes privately through negotiation, mediation and conciliation rather than public 
litigation. In addition to the structure of the society, this trend has historical roots that 
go back to the pre-Islamic era or, what it is called in Arabic, al-jaheliyah. During that 
era, different types of tribal ruling systems controlled Arabia with the total absence of 
regulations and regulatory bodies. Even the chief of a tribe did not have absolute 
power to regulate and settle disputes between individuals. As a result, revenge and 
wars were the main means of settling any dispute; however, it has been reported that 
individuals and tribes referred to arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution 
mechanisms, but mostly after being exhausted by wars.5 According to Al-Ya’qoubi, a 
well-known Arab historian who lived in the 10th century: “As a result of not having 
religions or laws to govern their lives, pagan Arabs used to have arbitrators to settle 
their disputes. So when they have a conflict regarding blood, water, grazing or 
inheritance they used to appoint an arbitrator who carries the characters of honour, 
honesty, older age and wisdom”. Furthermore, many people were known for being 
arbitrators at that time such as Aktham bin Saifi, Hajjeb bin Zurarah, Al-akra’a bin 
Habis and Abdulmuttalib bin Hashim, the grandfather of Prophet Muhammad; even 
Prophet Muhammad himself acted as an arbitrator in many incidents. Despite the 
great deal of discrimination practiced against women in that era, the appointment of 
female arbitrators was a notable feature of arbitration in that era, and historians did 
not ignore the important roles played by women arbitrators at that time and quoted the 
names of many women arbitrators such as Hind bint Alkhas, Jam’a bint Habis and 
Sahar bint Loukman.6  
 
Prior to Islam, the recourse to arbitration was voluntary as well as the enforcement of 
the final judgment. The attendance of the parties in the dispute to the hearings was an 
important condition for the validity of the arbitral award. With regard to the 
procedural rules, arbitrators were not bound by any certain rules apart from a number 
                                                 
5 J. Ali, History of Arab before Islam (3rd edn., Dar Al Elm Lelmalayeen,1970), vol. 5, p. 65. 
6 Ibid.  
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of certain customs like the obligation to hear the disputing parties on an equal basis 
and to bear in mind the customary rules of the tribe when examining proofs presented 
by the parties.7 The procedural rules of arbitration under the Islamic law were inspired 
by some of the pre-Islamic procedural practices that went on to be the base of the laws 
of procedure in all Muslim countries today, such as the rule providing that the 
plaintiff bear the burden of proof; and if the defendant denies, the only thing that can 
be taken from him is the oath.8 At that time, the oath used to be taken in front of one 
of the sacred idols of the tribe or the village, or in some cases in front of one of the 
main idols of the Arabs at that time. If the defendant did not admit or defend himself 
and refused to take the oath, the arbitrator issued his decision in favour of the 
plaintiff.9 Such rules were the results of the accumulated experiences and practices of 
the ancient Arabs which were based on the common sense of some Elders which 
continued to be followed by the later generations and were partly adopted by Islam. 
The question that may arise now would be about the reasons that made Islam uphold 
such pre-Islamic practices. It will be seen below that Islamic law adopts the concept 
of local custom (Urf) as a source of regulation as long as it does not contradict with 
the main principles of Shari’a. It is not necessary for these customs to be of a Muslim 
society if it is not concerned with rituals and belief. This issue will be dealt with in 
detail when discussing the sources of the Islamic law.        
Lack of enforceability was one of the features of arbitration before Islam; however, in 
many cases the losing parties voluntarily execute the arbitral award either for moral 
reasons or because of the social influence, especially when refusing the enforcement 
of the judgment is considered a violation or a disrespect of the tribal rules which 
might lead the society to abandon them. In the worst case scenario, the voluntary 
execution of the judgment can prevent the spark of wars and revenge, as wars at that 
time used to spark from silly reasons and lasted for years or even decades.10  
                                                 
7 See in general, Z. Alqurashi, ‘Arbitration under the Islamic Shari’a’, Oil, Gas and Energy 
Intelligence, 1, Mar. 2003, pp. 30-44. 
8 This principle was developed and adopted by Shari’a, as will be discussed later on. 
9 A. Alahdab, Altahkeem Ahkamouh wa Masaderouh (1st edn., Naoufal Publications, 1990), vol. 1, p. 
37. 
10 P. Hitti, History of the Arabs (10th edn., Macmillan, 2002), p. 87-90. It was reported that a war 
between two tribes lasted for more than 40 years because of a dispute over the result of a camel race.  
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Most of the disputes before Islam were usually related to issues of honour, leadership, 
blood and aversion. One of the well-known disputes of that era is the dispute between 
Amir ibn Altufail and his brother Alqam’a bin Altufail after the death of their father, 
who was the Chief of the tribe of Bani Amir. The two brothers had a dispute over the 
leadership of the tribe and they agreed to refer the dispute to the Chief of another tribe 
to arbitrate between them, who proposed that they should have a duel with swords in 
front of him and other people. The Chief of the other tribe suggested that the one who 
beats the other would be the leader of the tribe; however, an entire year passed 
without an end to this fight. As a final award, the Chief of the other tribe decided that 
both should share the leadership of the tribe, which they did.11      
The story of the reconstruction of the Ka’bah in Makkah, around the year 605 AD, is 
an example of a typical arbitration procedure of that time. The story has been narrated 
by many historians and Hadeeth’s12 narrators: 
Once the walls of the Ka’bah were rebuilt, it was time to place the Black Stone 
(Alhajar al Aswad) on its south-eastern corner. Arguments went off about who would 
have the honour of putting the Black Stone in its place. A fight was about to break out 
over this issue, then Abu Umayyah, Mecca’s oldest man, proposed that the first man 
to enter the gate of the mosque the following morning would decide the matter. That 
man was Muhammad. The people were delighted "This is Muhammad". “We 
accepted him as arbitrator”, Muhammad came to them and they asked him to decide 
on the matter. He agreed. Prophet Muhammad proposed a solution that all agreed to 
place the Black Stone on a cloak; the elders of each of the parties to the dispute held 
on to one edge of the cloak and carried the stone to its place. The Prophet then picked 
up the stone and placed it on the wall of the Ka’bah.13 
 
The above incident shows the main features of arbitration in that era, which are:   
• Arbitration agreements were simple and spontaneous; 
• The agreement was not in writing; 
                                                 
11 E. Aljuhani, ‘The New Saudi Arbitration Act’, Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Magazine, issue 1 (1985), pp. 22.     
12 This term will be defined when talking about the sources of Shari’a.  
13 I. Hisham, Seerat Ibn Hisham (Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Saudi Arabia) <http://www.al-
islam.com>, accessed 21 May 2007.  
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• Arbitration was similar to conciliation because the purpose behind the whole 
process was to reach an agreement and settle the dispute by any amiable 
solution, not to give a binding judgment.   
In principle, arbitration agreements of the old Arabs do not differ from any modern 
arbitration agreement in the sense that they include all the essential elements of 
modern arbitration agreements. As seen above, the parties to the dispute stipulate to 
submit the dispute to arbitration; also the parties to the dispute identify the issue at the 
time of the dispute, agree on the time and the seat of the arbitration and nominate the 
arbitrators.14 Islam in its early stages adopted the concept of arbitration and 
emphasised on its validity on the basis of local customs and practices which were 
considered to be a source of law under Shari’a, as will be seen below.  
 
1.1 Arbitration in the Early Stages of the Development 
of Islamic Law 
1.1.1 Arbitration in the Quran  
 
The Quran is the sacred book of Islam, believed by Muslims to be the infallible words 
of God dictated to Prophet Muhammad. It should be noted that the essential nature of 
the Quran is that it is not a code of law; nonetheless, it gives general guidance and sets 
up broad concepts.15 The following Quranic verse supports this view and indicates 
that Muslims should follow the guidance of the Quran to regulate their lives even if 
there is no Quranic ruling on the very specific issue: “Now there has come to you a 
clear sign from your Lord, guidance and mercy”.16 There are only less than 500 
verses referring to legal issues in the Quran.17 It can be said that even in these verses 
there are both gaps as well as doubts as to whether the legal injunctions included in 
these verses are mandatory or permissive and as to whether it is subject to public or 
                                                 
14 Supra 2, Albejad, p. 23.   
15 D. Pearl, A Text Book on Muslim Law (1st edn., Croom Helm, 1979), p. 1.  
16 The Quran 6: 175. please note that the Quran cannot be translated literally. All references to the 
Quran hereinafter are references to the translation of the meanings of the Quran as understood by the 
translator. The English translations have been taken from the website of King Fahd Complex for the 
Printing of the Holy Quran,<www.qurancomplex.org>, accessed 12 July 2008. 
17 The exact number is disputed; however, the number ranges between 80 and 500. For a partial list of 
the verses and the related topics, see in general: I. Abd-Alhaqq, ‘Legal Injunctions of the Quran’, The 
Journal of Islamic Law, 2 Spring/Summer 1997.   
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private sanctions.18 The existence of these gaps can be regarded as an advantage that 
made the Quranic injunctions flexible and suitable for every time and every situation, 
as demonstrated in the conflicts between Scholars which are a result of the differences 
in the understanding of the Shari’a texts.   
 
Many of the usual pre-Islamic practices were abolished by Islam such as revenge, 
female infanticide, robbery, etc. However, the pre-Islamic methods of dispute 
settlement were recognised, confirmed and regulated. The validity of arbitration has 
been confirmed by the main sources of Shari’a at that time as the other sources 
developed some decades or even centuries later.19 The Quranic view regarding 
arbitration has two main lines; according to some verses of the Quran, arbitration is a 
form of conciliation, similar to “amiable composition”, which is not binding on the 
parties. According to these texts, the arbitrator’s decision is neither binding nor final, 
unless it is accepted by the parties. Thus, arbitration does not have any judicial 
nature;20 it is no more than conciliation.21 The second group of texts recognises 
arbitration as a binding dispute settlement mechanism that is similar to the modern 
arbitration.22 The Quranic verses regarding arbitration use the word Hokm, which 
means judgment or arbitral award, and the word Hakam, which means arbitrator.  
“Surely, we have revealed to you the Book with the truth, so that you may judge 
between people according to what Allah has shown you”. 23 
The applicable law under the Quranic provisions is the Quran itself and the Sunnah of 
Prophet Muhammad; and then the other sources of Shari’a as they have developed 
from the understanding of these two sources.24  
 
“If you fear a breach between them (the man and his wife), appoint (two) arbitrators, 
one from his family and the other from her family; if they both wish for peace, Allah 
will cause their reconciliation. Indeed Allah is ever all -knower, well acquainted with 
all things.”25 With reference to the latter Quranic verse, commentators emphasised on 
                                                 
18 Supra 10, Hitti, p. 95. 
19 The recognised sources of Shari’a law at that time were the Quran, Sunnah and ijtihad only as the 
other sources were developed at a later period.  
20 Supra 7, Zeyad.     
21 The Quran 4: 35.  
22 The Quran 4: 58. 
23 The Quran 4: 105. 
24 This point will be elaborated when talking about Islamic jurisprudence.  
25 The Quran 4: 35. 
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the appointment of the arbitrators in family disputes as one of the judge’s duties and 
as being a part of the usual procedure that should be resorted to after exhausting the 
primary remedies.26 In this verse, the Quran used the word eb a’tho which is an order 
to send rather than appoint, adding more strength to the arbitral award issued by the 
arbitrators. Ibn Qodamah, in his comprehensive work Almoghni, which is the main 
text book in comparative fiqh under the Hanbali School, cited two main arguments 
regarding the nature of the mission of the arbitrators in the light of the previous 
Quranic verse:  
 
1. Arbitrators are agents of the disputed parties 
 
According to this view, the acceptance of the arbitration and the appointment of the 
arbitrators are compulsory for the parties to the dispute because the appointment is 
established by a judicial order. However, the acceptance of the award requires the 
parties’ consent. The exception of the requirement of the parties’ consent is the case 
of having disqualified parties.27 In this case, the acceptance of the decision will be 
subject to the consideration of their guardian or to the judge. 28    
 
2. Arbitrators are judges 
 
According to this view, the reference to arbitration is compulsory as well as the 
acceptance of the award which is considered final and binding, similar to court 
judgments. The supporters of this view quoted the following Quranic verse: “appoint 
(two) arbitrators, one from his family and the other from her family; if they both wish 
for peace”.29 They added that the Quran calls them arbitrators not conciliators and 
arbitrators are judges. Thus, arbitrators have freedom in their judgment with no need 
for the disputed parties’ authority or consent. Ibn Qodamah added that the last 
sentence in the Quranic verse “if they both wish for peace” is directed to the 
arbitrators not to the couple.30    
 
                                                 
26 See generally A. Al-Kenain, Altahkeem fe Alshari’a Alislamiyah: Altahkeem Al’am, wa Altahkeem fe 
Alshiqaq Alzaouji (1st edn., Dar Alasimah, 2000). 
27 The general rules of disqualification will be discussed later on. 
28 M. Ibn Qodamah, Almoghni (1st edn., Hajar Publications, 1992), vol. 10, p. 263. 
29 The Quran 4: 35. 
30 See in general, supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14. 
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“Surely, Allah commands you to deliver trusts to those entitled to them, and that, 
when you judge between people, judge with justice. Surely, excellent is the 
exhortation Allah gives you. Surely, Allah is All-Hearing, All-Seeing”.31 “If they come 
to you, judge between them or turn away from them. If you turn away from them, they 
can do you no harm. But if you judge, judge between them with justice. Surely, Allah 
loves those who do justice”.32 
 
Although the above-quoted verses use the verb ‘to judge’, it distinguishes between 
arbitration and litigation by giving arbitration the voluntary nature in the sense that 
arbitrators are given a choice between accepting the position and rejecting it, which is 
exactly the same concept applied by modern arbitration. Unlike judges, who do not 
have the choice to decline jurisdiction over a case, if an arbitrator declines, there is no 
way to force him to accept the arbitration as a court judge cannot decline jurisdiction 
over a case without a valid reason.33 If the arbitrator accepts office, he has the duty to 
arbitrate with due observance of the rules of fairness and justice and he also has the 
right to resign at any time.34 
 
“And when you pronounce judgment, pronounce it with justice even if a near relation 
is concerned, and fulfil the covenant of Allah”.35 The Quran established the principle 
of impartiality of the arbitrators in this verse and the issue as a whole received a great 
deal of attention from Muslim scholars, as will be seen below.    
 
“O you who believe, do not kill game when you are in Ihram (state of consecration for 
Hajj or ‘Umrah’). If someone from among you kills it deliberately, then compensation 
(will be required) from cattle equal to what one has killed, according to the 
judgement of two just men from among you”.36 
 
                                                 
31 The Quran 4: 58.  
32 The Quran 5: 42.  
33 I. Alastal, Altahkeem fe Alshari’a Alislamiyah (1st edn., Maktabat Alnahdah Al Arabiyah, 1986), p. 
36. Such reasons vary from a fear of bias to being subject to actual duress.  
34 S. Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East A Study in Shari’a and Statute Law (2nd  
edn., Graham & Trotman, 2006), p. 16. 
35 The Quran 6: 152. 
36 The Quran 5: 95. 
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This verse of the Quran gave individuals the right to appoint someone to judge in 
estimating the amount of compensation without the supervision of a judge or the 
authority. In the light of this verse, the mistaken party should appoint two qualified 
arbitrators and execute their decision without resorting to the authority, which is 
evidence of the legality of ad-hoc arbitration in the Quran.37 The guidance provided 
by this Quranic verse is similar to the principles established by the UNICTRAL 
model law on International Commercial Arbitration in the sense that the parties to the 
arbitration administer the proceedings themselves without the supervision of a judicial 
body.38  
 
1.1.2 Arbitration in the Sunnah 
 
1.1.2.1 Definition of Sunnah 
 
As mentioned above, the Quran contains general guidance and broader concepts 
regarding all legal aspects. These principles have been illustrated in the Sunnah, 
which is the second source of Islamic law after the Quran. The Quran mentions: “And 
whatever the Messenger gives you, take it, and whatever he forbids you, leave it.”39 
The Sunnah can be defined as a collection of the sayings of Prophet Muhammad, 
examples of his behaviour, things he approved and things he condemned during his 
lifetime.40 The Sunnah can be divided into three types: Alsunnah al qawliah, which is 
the sayings and statements of the Prophet; Alsunnah al fi’liyah, which is the deeds of 
the Prophet; and Alsunnah al taqririah or the Prophet’s silence or tacit approval 
regarding deeds which occur with his knowledge. There was a dispute between 
Scholars on whether the Sunnah is a direct revelation of Allah or is just a reasoning of 
the Prophet. Some scholars argued that the Sunnah is not a direct revelation of Allah 
as is the Quran and it is just a reasoning of Prophet Muhammad. However, this 
opinion contradicts with the following verse of the Quran: “He, Prophet Muhammad, 
does not speak out of his own desire. It is but revelation revealed to him”.41 It is 
                                                 
37 The Quran 5: 95. 
38 See the UNICTRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, especially article 5.  
39 The Quran 7: 59.  
40 Supra 13, Ibn Hisham, ‘The Life of Prophet Muhammad in Medina’.  
41 The Quran 53: 3-4. 
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believed among the majority of Muslims that the Quran is the word of Allah literally, 
whereas the Sunnah was inspired by Allah but the wording and actions are of the 
Prophet's.42  
 
The Sunnah also contains the Hadeeth, which is a more specific term. Hadeeth refers 
to the direct report of the sayings and teachings of Prophet Muhammad. In the 
Sunnah, the reference was made to arbitration, and the administration of justice is 
mainly subjective, descriptive of judges’ (arbitrators’) ideal behaviour and generally 
in the form of broad thoughts and prescriptions. Saleh (1984) summarised the most 
cited references to arbitration in the Sunnah as follows: 
• The Prophet disliked endless litigation, especially litigation of an oral nature. 
• The Prophet’s continuous effort to conciliate between litigants and the swift 
procedure of conciliation reported to have been established by him between 
creditors and debtors. It has been reported that he discounted the claim of a 
creditor in order to reach a rapid payment.  
  
  "Reduce your debt to one half," gesturing with his hand. Kab said, "I have done so, 
O Allah's Apostle!" On that the Prophet said to Ibn Abi Hadrad, "Get up and repay 
the debt, to him."43 
 
• The stringent sanctions which would befall a litigant who did not abide by 
the ruling of the Prophet acting as a conciliator.  
• The determination of disputes according to the rules of the Quran with no 
room for innovation.  
• The repeated requirement that resources should be given to the Prophet as a 
judge (arbitrator) is authorised as a sign of faith.  
• The remuneration of the judge (arbitrator) is authorised as long as it is not 
excessive.  
• The important aspect of the Prophet’s realistic and transcendental view on 
litigation (also valid for arbitration) is worth quoting:  
 
                                                 
42 A. Hourani, A History of the Arab People (1st edn., Warner Books, 1991), pp. 59-71.  
43 A. Albukhari, Aljame’ Alsaheeh (Saheeh Albukhari) (1st edn., Dar Aljeel, 2005), vol. 3, Chapter 40, 
No. 600. 
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Allah's Prophet said, "I am only a human being, and you people (opponents) come to 
me with your cases; and it may be that one of you can present his case eloquently in a 
more convincing way than the other, and I give my verdict according to what I hear. 
So if ever I judge (by error) and give the right of a brother to his other (brother) then 
he (the latter) should not take it, for I am giving him only a piece of Fire".44 
It is true that this statement stresses the weakness of judges (arbitrators), but it also 
throws light on the transcendental ethics of the Islamic sense of justice beyond the 
judicial mechanism.45 
 
1.1.3 The Practice of Arbitration at the Time of Prophet 
Muhammad and his Companions 
 
Unlike the legal scholars of Rome and medieval Europe, Prophet Muhammad was not 
interested in developing a dispute settlement mechanism that was isolated from 
political control. On the other hand, Prophet Muhammad needed to control the legal 
system and, through that, control the development of the law itself.46 Arbitration was 
not isolated from the general improvement of the law. Practiced by Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions, arbitration was a successful and flexible dispute 
settlement mechanism. Arbitration at that time can be divided into two main sections, 
general arbitration and arbitration in political disputes.47 The general arbitration did 
not lose the voluntary character that it used to have during the pre-Islamic age; even 
Prophet Muhammad preferred to resolve disputes by proposing an amicable 
settlement (sulh) rather than imposing a judgment on unwilling parties; however, a 
decision can be imposed if the parties do not accept the proposed settlement.48 The 
latter type of dispute settlement has been reported in the following Hadeeth: 
“An Ansari man quarrelled with Azzubair in the presence of the Prophet about the 
Harrah Canals which were used for irrigating the date-palms. The Ansari man said to 
Azzubair, "Let the water pass" but Azzubair refused to do so. So, the case was 
brought before the Prophet who said to Azzubair, "O’ Zubair! Irrigate (your land) 
                                                 
44 Ibid. vol. 9, Chapter 89, No. 281.  
45 Supra 34, Saleh, p. 16. 
46 G. Sayen, ‘Arbitration, Conciliation and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia’, University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law, 9/2 (1987), pp. 211-227. 
47 Supra 34, Saleh, p. 17. 
48 Ibid.  
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and then let the water pass to your neighbour." On that the Ansari got angry and said 
to the Prophet, "Is it because he (i.e. Zubair) is your cousin?" On that the colour of 
the face of Prophet changed (because of anger) and he said, "O’ Zubair! Irrigate 
(your land) and then withhold the water till it reaches the walls between the pits 
round the trees." Zubair said, "By Allah, I think that the following verse was revealed 
on this incident: But no, by your Lord they can have No faith until they make you 
judge in all disputes between them"”.49 
 
Arbitration in war had a different character and circumstances from modern 
arbitration of a similar nature. This kind of arbitration refers to the settlement of 
political and military disputes inside and outside the territory of the state, between the 
state and other states or between the state and individuals who have military power.50 
Shortly after the foundation of Islam, the treaty of Medina of 662 AD, which was a 
security pact among the city’s Muslims, non-Muslim Arabs and Jews, included an 
arbitration clause. The clause provided that in the case of a dispute between the 
inhabitants of the city with regard to a political matter, the dispute should be settled 
through arbitration by Prophet Muhammad personally or, subject to the approval of 
the parties, by an arbitrator appointed by Prophet Muhammad.51 In accordance with 
the treaty of Medina, Prophet Muhammad resorted to arbitration in his dispute with 
the Jewish tribe Banu Qurayza.52 At that incident, the Jews agreed to name 
Muhammad as a sole arbitrator on the condition that he refer the decision of the case 
to another Muslim named Sa’ad ibn Moazz, who had once been an ally of the Jews. 
Even after Sa’ad rendered his decision, Muhammad formally ratified it, saying that it 
was in accordance with his own opinion.53 The procedure of the latter case was 
described by Sayen (1987) as follows:  
 
This is evidence that if the parties submit to the judgment of a certain man and he 
refers judgment to a third person with their acceptance, then that is lawful. He should 
not refer judgment to third persons without their acceptance because Sa’d, between 
the arms of the Prophet, took from them the oath that they would accept his 
                                                 
49 Supra 43, Albukhari, Chapter 40, No. 548.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Supra 13, Ibn Hisham, ‘The Treaty of Medina’. 
52 C. Brower and J. Sharpe, ‘International Commercial Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third 
Phase’, The American Journal of International Law, 97 (2003), pp. 643-656.  
53 Supra 46, Sayen. 
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judgement, and the prophet did not object to that. This is because people have 
different opinion regarding the law and this is a judgment that requires an opinion. 
So their acceptance for the judgement of one person is not acceptance of the judgment 
of another, and if he refers judgment to some one else without their consent and he 
judges in a certain way, then that judgment should not be enforced unless the first 
hakam approves it after he learns of it. Then it should be enforced because his 
approval gives it the same status as if he made it himself and because the judgment 
was in accordance with his opinion and they had accepted that.54    
 
As mentioned above in the case of family dispute arbitration, the two appointed 
arbitrators have to agree on the judgment. This method has been used in the famous 
incident of Tahkeem between Ali the fourth Caliphate and Mu’awiyah the governor of 
Syria in the year 659 AD. This arbitration was an effort to stop the civil war that 
erupted as an impact of the assassination of the third Islamic Caliphate Othman and 
lasted for more than two years. The dispute was submitted to arbitration by a written 
agreement; the two parties agreed to appoint two arbitrators in a written deed which 
stated the names of the arbitrators, the time limit for making the award, the applicable 
law and the place of issuing the award.55 The arbitrators had been given the full power 
to determine the dispute; however, the provision of the applicable law provided that 
the decision should be based on the Quran and the Sunnah. The two arbitrators agreed 
in private that both claimants be deposed and a new Caliphate be chosen by a general 
election. Ali’s arbitrator announced the decision first; however, when Mu’awiyah’s 
arbitrator followed, he said that he agreed that Ali should be deposed but affirmed 
Mu’awiyah’s claim to the Caliphate.56 The award was easily set aside on the grounds 
of violating the Quran and the Sunnah.57            
 
The above incident shows the main features of a political arbitration during the first 
few decades of the life of Islam. When looking at the story as narrated by different 
historians in comparison with modern arbitration agreements, it can be said that both 
agreements share many characteristics as both:  
                                                 
54 Ibid.  
55 Supra 7, Zeyad.  
56 Supra 46, Sayen, p. 229. 
57 Ibid.  
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• Define the disputing parties precisely by name, place of residence and 
occupation; 
• Identify the precise issue of the dispute; 
• Include the choice of the arbitrator(s); 
• Take the form of a written contract; 
• Determine a deadline for issuing the final award; 
• Determine the applicable law in the arbitration proceedings; 
• Determine the seat of the arbitration; 
• Define the supervisory authority; 
• Determine the authority responsible for the execution of the final award; 
• Determine the terms of reference of the arbitral tribunal.  
 
A few decades after this incident, Islamic jurisprudence started to develop as the 
understanding of the Shari’a texts to cover the development in various areas of law. 
Arbitration received a good deal of attention as a supplementary mechanism to the 
official litigation, as will be seen later on. The questions of what is Islamic 
jurisprudence and how it evolved and developed as well as the question of whether it 
can accommodate the modern commercial practices will be answered in the following 
part of the chapter before proceeding to examine arbitration rules under the different 
Schools of jurisprudence.    
1.2 Arbitration in the Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh) 
 
1.2.1 The Distinction between Islamic Law, Shari’a and Islamic 
Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and the Saudi Law 
 
Before examining the arbitration practices under Islamic law and Saudi law, we 
should distinguish between three important concepts. These concepts are used 
interchangeably especially by Western scholars and practitioners; the terms are: 
Islamic law, Shari’a, Islamic jurisprudence. On the other hand, we have the term 
“Saudi law” which we can describe as Islamic law for the reason that Saudi Arabia 
applies it; however, the distinction should receive more attention as Saudi Arabia 
apply Shari’a in addition to some transplanted Acts and Codes. These borrowed Acts 
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and Codes are Islamic in concept as they do not contradict with the Islamic law, but a 
few codes contradict with some of the Shari’a principles in some of its provisions and 
that is the point at which the distinction becomes important. Many Muslim scholars 
distinguished between Shari’a and Islamic jurisprudence or, what it is called in 
Arabic, fiqh as follows: The concept of Shari’a is broader than jurisprudence and the 
jurisprudence itself comes, as well as other concepts of Islam such as the Islamic 
creed, under the umbrella of Shari’a.58 
 
Generally speaking, Shari’a or Ash-Shari’a literally means the pathway or a way to be 
followed and a way that a Muslim has to tread. In its original usage, the term Shari’a 
meant the road to the watering place or the path leading to the water, i.e., the way to 
the source of life.59 From the latter point, Shari’a in the acceptation of the Arab 
Lexicographers has developed to mean “the law of water” and, by the passage of time, 
it was extended to cover all issues of life.60 In the Quranic context, the word Shari’a 
describes any religion or a principle that is followed by someone; “Then we put you 
on a Shari’a (a way of Religion); so follow that (way), and follow not the desires of 
those who know not”.61 “To each among you have we prescribed a law and an open 
way”.62 When the Quran mentioned the word Shari’a, it meant Shari’a in its broader 
context as applied to any human being. When describing Shari’a in relation to 
Muslims, Scholars usually use the narrow definition of the word Shari’a and refer to it 
as the religion of Islam. The scope of Shari’a can be expanded to encompass the way 
of life that Muslims should follow, which is wider than the mere formal rites and legal 
provisions.63 The broader definition of Shari’a suits the nature of the rulings of 
Shari’a as it is not restricted to laws, regulations or beliefs and rituals only; it covers 
all aspects of the private and public life of Muslims as individuals and as groups and it 
includes the totality of Allah’s commandment.64 Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, 
                                                 
58 I. Abd-Alhaqq, ‘Islamic Law; an Overview of its Origin and Elements’, The Journal of Islamic Law, 
1/1 (1996), pp. 26-31.  
59 Ibid.  
60 C. Mallat, ‘From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field (Part 1)’, The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 51 (2003), pp. 699-719. 
61 The Quran 45: 18. It should be noted that the reference to the Quran hereinafter is made to the 
translation of the meaning of the Quran from Arabic to English. The translation was taken from the 
website of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs of Saudi Arabia and it is available at <http://www.al-
islam.com>, accessed 11 March 2008.     
62 The Quran 5: 48. 
63 S. Ramadan, Islamic Law, Its scope and Equity (1st edn., Macmillan, 1960), p. 62. 
64 Ibid.   
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developed at a later stage as reasoning became necessary to allow the Islamic system 
to regulate new circumstances. The word fiqh literally means understanding and 
Islamic jurisprudence is an understanding of the Shari’a texts consisting merely of the 
applied knowledge of the Quran and Sunnah.65     
 
The concept of Islamic law was not in use at the time of the Classical Muslim scholars 
as it started to develop as a reaction to the western influence on Muslim Scholars and 
philosophers, especially after the French occupation of Egypt. The French occupation 
influenced Egypt in various ways but the creation of modern statutes represented in 
the import of the Napoleonic Code and the formation of the Constitution of Egypt 
were the most notable benefits in the areas of law development and codification of 
Islamic law.66 It can be said that after the French occupation of Egypt, many Muslim 
Scholars started to take initiatives to modernise the Shari’a by taking the Napoleonic 
Code as a model for the Shari’a reform. 
 
 At the present time, Islamic law is recognised as the entire system of law and 
jurisprudence associated with the religion of Islam, including: 
• The primary sources of law (Shari’a) which are the Quran and the Sunnah; 
• The subordinate sources of law and the methodology used to deduce and 
apply the law (Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh).   
 
It has been noticed that Western scholars mainly use the terms Shari’a and Islamic 
jurisprudence interchangeably and in many cases, do not distinguish between them 
which might lead to some confusion, as the Shari’a never changes and what changes 
is the fiqh or the jurisprudence. The distinction between Shari’a and jurisprudence 
should receive more attention as Shari’a is the foundation of all doctrines formulated 
and developed under fiqh, and fiqh is the understanding of the sources of Shari’a.  
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was united officially in 1931 but the term Saudi law 
started to appear in the mid-1960s, as the law in Saudi Arabia experienced 
comprehensive reforms represented by issuing a number of basic laws. Despite very 
                                                 
65 H. Motki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh before the Classical Schools (1st edn., 
Brill Publications, 2002), p. 4.  
66 J. Harold, Bonaparte in Egypt (1st edn., Hamish Hamilton Publications, 1963), p. 374.   
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few Codes issued before the 1960s, the law was totally dependent on the individual 
reasoning of judges as well as Ministerial Circulars and Royal Decrees concerning 
very specific issues.67 For outsiders, Saudi Arabia might be seen as a place in which 
Shari’a is the law of the country, which is partly true. Nonetheless, the missing fact is 
that the term Saudi law is more comprehensive than Islamic law or Shari’a in the 
sense that the Saudi law encompasses the Islamic law and the Codes and Regulations 
adapted from other laws within the sphere of the Shari’a principles. Saudi regulators 
bear the duty of not violating the Shari’a and the duty of keeping up with the 
economic, social and political interests. The main dilemma faced by the Saudi 
regulators is the regulation of some prohibited activities under Shari’a, especially 
when such activities are so important to promote the economic growth such as some 
banking activities. For instance, the Banking Control Law of 1966 is an example 
showing the way in which the Saudi regulators deal with prohibited activities under 
Shari’a. The Law is totally silent about banking interest as legalising it clearly in the 
Act is a violation of the Constitution of the Country; however, the law left room for 
the practice to regulate such activities, as will be seen in the last chapter.      
 
1.2.2 The Evolution of Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh) 
 
Islamic jurisprudence (hereinafter fiqh) has been described by Schacht (1959) as the 
Canon Law of Islam and the “common law” of the whole Islamic world. Under 
Shari’a, the Monarch is bound by the same duty of respect and obedience as are his 
subjects. The interpretation of the rules of the fiqh, their extension or limitation when 
confronted by new cases and the judgment on how they can be adapted to new social 
needs are matters to be decided by Ulama.68 
 
Fiqh literally means deep understanding; terminologically, the term fiqh means the 
process of deducing and applying Shari’a principles and injunctions in real or 
hypothetical cases or situations. The same term is used to refer to the collective body 
of laws deducing from Shari’a through the use of fiqh methodologies. The only 
                                                 
67 Examples of laws issued in that period and still in effect: The Banking Control Law of 1966, The 
Companies Law of 1965, and The Law of Commercial Agency of 1962. 
68 J. Schacht, ‘Islamic Law in Contemporary States’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 8 
(1959), pp. 133-136. Ulama are scholars in theology and law. 
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fundamental difference between fiqh based injunctions and Shari’a based injunctions 
is that Shari’a injunctions are not amendable or even negotiable, whereas injunctions 
established under fiqh should be flexible and amendable in accordance with the 
different circumstances and customs and plays an important role in the application of 
such injunctions provided that such customs do not contradict with the Shari’a. This 
difference can be observed when following the root of a controversial issue in 
contemporary life that used to have a different legal status in the past, such as some 
kinds of banking interest. Due to the economic necessities, the legal status of banking 
interest has been modified and the prohibition was relaxed in some Muslim countries. 
Even in Saudi Arabia, which is known for a degree of strict adherence to Shari’a 
rulings, banking interest became more acceptable in the recent years.69 The objective 
of fiqh is to demonstrate the practical application of Shari’a. The scope of the 
application of fiqh is very wide; it applies to all areas of law and life, including 
religious, political, civil, criminal, constitutional and procedural law; the 
administration of justice; and the conduct of war.70 One of the main conditions that 
should be provided in a fatwa is conformity with the real life of the recipients of that 
specific ruling which means that in many cases the spirit of the law should prevail 
over the strict wordings.71 Classical Scholars during the 8th and the 9th centuries AD 
divided the fiqh as a science into two broad divisions; the first is called Usul Alfiqh 
(the roots of fiqh), which refers to the systemised methodology and principles of 
interpretation used in ascertaining the law. The second is called foru’ alfiqh, the 
branches of fiqh, which is similar to the actual practice of law and deals with 
rendering decisions that derive from the application of usul alfiqh.  
 
1.2.2.1 Usul Alfiqh  
 
There is an independent field under the study of Islamic law that is called usul alfiqh 
or the science of source methodology in Islamic jurisprudence. Although Alshafi’e, 
the founder of the Shafi’e school, was the first scholar to introduce Usul Alfiqh as an 
                                                 
69 See generally Chapter 5 below. 
70 Supra 63, Ramadan, p. 64.  
71 Fatwa is an Arabic term to describe a legal opinion of a Muslim Scholar concerning issues of 
religion, law or legal interpretation.  
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independent science, Usul Alfiqh needed a few decades to develop.72 There are many 
definitions for this term; Alghazali, a classical scholar, defined it as the fundamental 
sources or roots from which Islamic law (fiqh) can be derived.73 Another scholar, 
Alrazi, defined it as the aggregate, considered per se, of legal proofs and evidence 
that, when studied properly, will lead either to certain knowledge of a Shari’a ruling 
or to at least a reasonable assumption concerning the same; the manner by which such 
proofs are adduced, and the status of the adducer.74 
 
There is a debate between Muslim scholars regarding the number of these sources; 
however, there is an agreement among all of them on five sources, which are: 
• The Quran, which is the ultimate source  
• The Sunnah, which has been defined above along with the Quran 
• Alijtihad 
• Alijma’  
• Al Qiyas75 
1.2.2.1.1 Al Ijtihad 
 
Ijtihad can be translated from Arabic as a “human activity”, and refers in legal usage 
to the endeavour of a scholar to derive law on the basis of evidence found in the 
Shari’a texts. The result of Ijtihad or the discovery or the formulation of a new legal 
rule is to be reached through the interpretation of the Shari’a texts and the application 
of the Qiyas. By the interpretation of the Shari’a texts, a Muslim scholar can discover 
the reason for an expressed legal rule, and by analogical deduction, he extends a given 
rule to cases of a similar nature.76 There is a general impression that the use of Ijtihad 
was blocked around the 11th century when some scholars declared the gate of Ijtihad 
                                                 
72 See generally M. Alshafi’e, Alrisalah (1st edn., Dar Alkotoub Al Ilmiyah, 2001). 
73 F. Mitha, Algazali and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reasoning and Authority in Medieval Islam (1st 
edn., Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2001), p. 10.        
74 F. Al Razi, Al Mahsul Fi 'Ilm Usul al Fiqh, ed. Dr. Taha Jabir al 'Alwani (1st edn., Imam Muhammad 
ibn Saud Islamic University, 1979), vol. 1, p. 94. 
75 H. Khan, ‘Nothing is Written: Fundamentalism, Revivalism, Reformism and the Fate of Islamic 
Law’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 24 (2002/2003), p. 273. 
76 B. Al-Muhairi, ‘Islamisation and Modernisation within the UAE Penal Law: Shari’a in the pre-
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closed, but it can be said that Muslim scholars have been using it in various legal and 
religious issues.77  
 
1.2.2.1.2 Al Ijma’ 
 
Alijma’ refers to the consensus of qualified Islamic scholars of a given generation on 
particular points of Islamic law. On points where the Quran and the Sunnah do not 
give particular guidance on an issue, the scholars’ community should reach an 
agreement to determine on that disputed matter.78 This methodology has its reference 
in the Quran in the following verse: “O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the 
Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among 
yourselves, refer it to God and His Prophet, if ye do believe in God and the Last Day: 
That is best and most suitable for final determination”.79 The qualification of those 
scholars who are able to participate in ijma’ are set in the fiqh’s text books; however, 
each one of the participants should resort to individual reasoning in his or her right. 
Some groups of scholars require judges to have the ability to participate in such a 
process, as will be seen when talking about the qualification of the arbitrators. 
Theoretically, some scholars describe ijma’ as the most important legal notion in 
Islam; through it, they believe, Islamic societies should be able to establish permanent 
legislative institutions.80 In practice, there has not been any successful ijma’ since the 
time of the companions of Prophet Muhammad due to the political divisions and 
cultural differences.81 Despite the fact that absolute Ijma’ cannot be practically 
reached, a sort of limited Ijma’ can be attained by scholars in a certain geographic 
area or within a certain Mathhab.    
1.2.2.1.3 Al Qiyas 
 
Al Qiyas can be considered as the source of continuity of the fiqh. Al-Qiyas or Qiyas 
was defined as the process of analogical reasoning from a known injunction to a new 
                                                 
77 W. Hallaq, ‘On the Origins of the Controversy about the Existence of Mujtahids and the Gate of 
Ijtihad’, Studia Islamica, 63 (1986), pp. 129-144. 
78 Supra 76, Butti.  
79 The Quran 4: 59. 
80 I. Abd-Alhaqq, ‘Islamic Law An Overview of its Origin and Elements’, The Journal of Islamic Law 
and Culture, 7/1 (2002), pp. 27-54. 
81 Ibid. 
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injunction. Qiyas involved analogical reasoning based on the primary sources of 
Shari’a, the Quran and the Hadeeth. According to this method, the ruling of the Quran 
and Sunnah may be extended to new problems provided that the precedent (asl) and 
the new problems (far’) share the same operative or effective cause (illah).82 An 
example of this would be when the established prohibition of alcohol (from the 
Quran) is used to prohibit the use of drugs which causes effects similar to the 
intoxication of alcohol, even though there is no mention of drugs in the Shari’a 
texts.83 As mentioned above, the Quran is not a collection of laws and codes; 
however, when reading the Quran, the first impression is that everything is lawful 
unless prohibitive injunctions exist either in the Quran or in the Sunnah.  
 
Ijma’ is ranked higher than Qiyas in the order of fiqh methodology. To participate in 
ijma’ involving a matter, the scholars or fuqaha’ must have a deep knowledge of the 
Quran and the Sunnah and their related sciences, most notably the Arabic language. 
The requirement of the Arabic language knowledge is very important as Arabic as a 
language differs from other languages and a scholar needs a deep understanding of the 
Arabic language in order to grasp the intention of the Shari’a texts.84 Qiyas was 
originally a fluid concept of reasoning from prior sources through argument by 
analogy, argument a fortiori, argument a majore ad minus, argument a minore ad 
majus or argument a contrario Reasoning through Qiyas was broad enough to provide 
for flexible development in the law; it permitted limitations and extensions of pre-
existing rules by all its techniques. Through the passage of time, Qiyas was restricted 
through a misunderstanding of its real sense, to a strict or literal interpretation of the 
law, which led to the development of the istihsan to remedy this later restriction by 
promoting the spirit and essential social end of the law which was to assure the 
satisfaction of human interests.85 The above five sources are the agreed-upon sources 
of fiqh among all the Schools of fiqh; the disputed sources will be discussed below. 
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83 Ibid.  
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1.2.2.1.4 Istihsan   
 
The term Istihsan can be translated as juristic preference;86 another author translated 
Istihsan as the public’s interest. Istihsan can be defined as the process of selecting one 
acceptable alternative solution over another because the former appears more suitable 
for the situation at hand, even though the selected solution may be technically weaker 
than the rejected one. Istihsan has also been defined as a process of selecting the best 
solution for the general public’s interest in the form of Ijtihad.87 Istihsan allows 
judges and scholars some flexibility in interpreting the law to allow for something that 
is useful. In other words, Istihsan is the permission to allow the spirit of the law to 
prevail over the wording of the law.88 Scholars of different Schools gave this concept 
a different name; the Hanbali scholars call it istislah, which can be translated as 
equity or public interest; meanwhile, the Maliki scholars call it Almasaleh 
Almursalah, which is more like a departure from strict adherence to the texts for the 
public’s welfare.89 Istihsan can be called the hidden Qiyas, as opposed to the apparent 
Qiyas which requires a strict application of the law.90   
 
1.2.2.1.5 Istihab or Istis’hab 
 
Istihab or istis’hab is best defined as the presumption of continuity. This concept is 
well-known in western laws which provide that things or situations continue to exist 
until the contrary is proven. This principle has been introduced by Alshafi’e, the 
founder of the Shafi’e Mathhab, and it is considered to be a limited principle. It only 
applies to cases where there is no evidence available, and at best, establishes the 
continuance of a fact in existence, which has already proven to have existed. 91 
Examples for the use of the istis’hab are: 
 
• The presumption that a missing person is still alive until his or her death is 
confirmed; 
                                                 
86 H. Fadel, ‘The Islamic Viewpoint on New Assisted Reproductive Technology’, Fordham Urban Law 
Journal, 30 (2002), pp. 148-150. 
87 Supra 82, Makdisi, p. 92. 
88 Supra 86, Fadel, p. 150. 
89 Supra 82, Makdisi, p. 73. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Supra 84, Aghndies, p. 104. 
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• The marriage continues unless dissolution is proved; 
• The fundamental Islamic Law principle that a person is innocent until proven 
guilty. 
 
1.2.2.1.6 Urf “Local Custom”  
 
Islamic jurisprudence recognises a local custom as an important source of law only 
when such practices do not breach the Islamic principles, even if it relates to a non-
Muslim society. Custom can be defined as that which is practiced by the people more 
often than in a particular geographic area.92 Islam considers custom unwritten laws 
formed by the practice of people throughout generations. Custom is incorporated into 
the law through the procedure of judges, court judgments and Ijma’. When a judge is 
unable to find an applicable text from the Quran or Sunnah, or cannot find an Ijma’ or 
an accurate Qiyas on a case, he will turn to the custom of the community to determine 
on the issue.93 As a simple example, if an agreement does not determine the 
commission in a sale contract, the judge will turn to the practice of the place of the 
conclusion of the contract and issue his judgment on that basis. Custom can serve as 
persuasive evidence or as the basis for legal presumption; however, even when the 
case requires reference to the local custom, judges rely on experts and notaries to 
indicate the acceptable form of the local customary practice.94  
 
As a final remark about Usul Al fiqh, it is appropriate to add this quote from Professor 
Hallaq concluding that “usul alfiqh as a mixed product of human reasoning was 
articulated in a double edged manner as it was both descriptive and prescriptive. It 
expounded not only the method of modus operandi of juristic construction of the law 
as the later Scholars carried them out, but also the proper and sound ways of dealing 
with the law. Moreover, usul al fiqh provided the jurists with a methodology that 
allowed them not only to find solutions for a new case, but also to articulate and 
                                                 
92 Ibid.  
93 S. Heynman, Islam and Social Policy (1st edn., Vanderbilt University Press, 2004), p. 102. 
94 L. Rosen, The Justice of Islam: Comparative perspectives on Islamic law and society (1st edn., 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 16. 
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maintain the existing law. Even old solutions to old problems were constantly 
rehabilitated and reasoned anew”.95     
 
1.2.3 The Branches of Fiqh “Foru’ Al Fiqh”  
 
The result of applying the methodologies of Usul Alfiqh on the Shari’a texts is what is 
known in Arabic as foru’ Al fiqh, which translates literally as branches of fiqh. Foru’ 
Al fiqh are the actual laws or the legal interpretation of the Shari’a texts that can be 
found in the fiqh textbooks which we refer to as fiqh. Scholars categorised foru’ Al 
fiqh into different categories in accordance with the subject matter; however, there is a 
disagreement over the classification and each group of scholars classified it in a 
different way in accordance with their own discretion. First of all, Classical Scholars 
divided Al fiqh into two broad divisions, which are Ibadat and Muamalat. Ibadat is 
the part of the teachings regarding the relationship between a human being and Allah, 
whereas Muamalat regulates the relationships among people. The most common 
classifications for fiqh Al-Muamalat are:   
  
• Family  
• Food  
• Wills, Trusts, Estates and Inheritance 
• Contracts, Trade and Commerce 
• Property 
• Criminal 
• Evidence 
• Administrative procedure 
• Administration of justice (Al-Qada) 
• Zakat96  
• Domestic Relations 
• Relations with Non-Muslims 
• War 
                                                 
95 W. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (4th edn., Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 148. 
96 Zakat is one of the five Pillars of the religion of Islam. Zakat is similar to the Christian tithing.    
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• Ethics  
1.3 The Emergence of the Islamic Schools of Thought 
(Mathahib) 
 
The differences in the backgrounds, circumstances and personal understanding of the 
Shari’a texts and the application of Usul Alfiqh have a great influence on the legal 
interpretation in practical life. Some Muslim Scholars stopped at the clear wording of 
the Quran and the Sunnah when some others went further, attempting to achieve a 
deeper understanding using analogies, reasoning or even their personal opinion. When 
talking about the Sunni Islam, there are four main developed schools of thought or, 
what it is called in Arabic, Mathahib.97 The differences between these Schools are 
noticed in very minor practical differences which are due to the differences in the 
interpretation of the Shari’a texts; otherwise, the four Schools are basically one for the 
reason that Sunni Muslims do not identify themselves according to their Mathhabs.  
 
The four main schools in existence nowadays are: 
• Hanafi School; 
• Maliki School; 
• Shafi’e School; 
• and Hanbali School. 
 
The above schools existed because they had their teachings maintained and developed 
by their followers, which gave them the potential to spread around the Muslim world 
and allowed them to keep up with the changes in daily life. In the pre-Islamic times, 
Arabs used to rely on their memories to remember their events, stories and poetry. 
The same concept was applied to the Quran, the Sunnah and the teachings of the 
religious Scholars, especially in the early stages of the development of Islam. During 
the first two centuries of the life of Islam, the Quran and the Sunnah were transferred 
between generations by narration, following the same methodology applied by the 
Arabs before Islam. By the 9th Century, a few attempts were made to collect the 
Sunnah and the teachings of the Scholars and other intellectual works. The results of 
                                                 
97 For a deeper understanding of the emergence of Mathhabs, please see generally P. Bearman, R. 
Peters and F. Vogel, The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Development and Progress (1st edn., 
Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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that movement were represented in the spread of the works of some Scholars more 
than the others. These ways of thought established by some Scholars were followed 
by some other Scholars and as a result, people started to refer to the followers of a 
particular School of thought by the name of the founder. 
 
1.3.1 Hanafi School 
 
The Hanafi School is the oldest of the four schools of Islamic law; it has been named 
after its founder, Abo Hanifa, Annu’man Bin Thabit (699-767), also known as 
Alimam Ala’azam “the greatest imam” in Kofa “Iraq”. Although, this school is the 
oldest among the Islamic schools of thought, it can be considered as the most open to 
modern ideas and more liberal in certain matters. The Hanafi School is characterised 
by the use of subjective opinions (ra’i) and that gave it the name of the school, ahl ar 
ra’i. Under the teachings of this School, the priority is always given to the Quran, 
then to the Sunnah and then to Abo Hanifa’s opinion. New problems are examined 
and often anticipated by the use of Qiyas. Urf or local custom is not a source of law 
but it can be a dependable reference in the case of a lack of other sources.98 The 
Hanafi school is also known for giving legal opinions or fatwa in proposed, or 
sometimes imaginative, cases that did not exist at the time of discussing the matter. 
The Hanafi School was the official school of the Ottoman Empire and a selected part 
of the Hanafi teachings was embodied in the Majalla as an attempt to codify the 
financial provisions of the Hanafi teachings.99 The followers of this school spread to 
Iraq, the region of the Caucasus and the South Asian countries such as Pakistan, India 
and Bangladesh.  
1.3.2 Maliki School 
 
The Maliki School was founded in Medina, Saudi Arabia, by Malik Bin Anas (713-
795). His major work, Almuwatt’a, was the first comprehensive work in Islamic 
history and includes a collection of the Sunnah in addition to a selection of the Ijma’ 
of the Scholars of Medina in his time. This Ijma’ is mainly based on the Quran, 
Sunnah and Qiyas. In addition to the main sources of Shari’a, Malik added the 
                                                 
98 A. Aljaziri, Ketab Al Fiqh Ala Almathahib Al Arba’a (1st edn., Dar Alkutob Alilmiyah, 2003), p. 28.  
99 See generally M. Alatasi, Sharh Almjallah (1st edn., Maktabah Haqqaniyah, 1949). 
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practices of the people of Medina at the time of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
companions as a source of legislation.100 A draft code in French, based on Maliki 
teachings, was prepared by M. Morand in Algeria in 1916 but this work remained in 
draft form.101 The Maliki School is widely spread in North and West Africa.       
1.3.3 Shafi’e School 
 
The Shafi’e school was founded by Muhammad bin Idri’s Alshafi’e (769-819). 
Alshafi’e was a student of Malik bin Anas, the founder of the Maliki School, and also 
influenced by the Hanafi scholar Muhammad ibn Alhasan Alshaibani, but he soon 
founded his own school. The Shafi’e teachings are mainly eclectic, borrowing from 
both the Maliki and Hanafi schools, because Alshafi’e himself had been inspired by 
both schools. Alshafi’e was the first scholar to address the concept of usul alfiqh 
(legal theories) in his book Alresalah. The Shafi’es do not recognise the concept of 
istihsan but they emphasise on the concept of istislah.102 The Shafi’e school is the 
official school in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, and it is widely spread 
among the Kurds (Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq), Egypt, Yemen and the entire East 
Asia.         
1.3.4 Hanbali School 
 
The Hanbali School is the official school in Saudi Arabia which makes it the most 
relevant School for this study. The Hanbali school was founded by Ahmad bin 
Muhammad bin Hanbal (780-855), who was a narrator of Sunnah and a Shafi’e 
student. The teachings of ibn Hanbal are quite conservative because they are strongly 
based on the Quran and the Sunnah with a little room for Qiyas and other methods of 
reasoning. Although the Hanbalies are relatively strict in religious ritual, they are the 
most tolerant and flexible in commercial and financial transactions.103 As mentioned 
above, the Hanbali is the official school in Saudi Arabia; it is also widely spread in 
some parts of Syria and in some of the Gulf States. In 1927 King Abdul-Aziz Al Saud 
declared his intention to draft a code embodying the teachings of Hanbali scholar Ibn 
                                                 
100 M. bin Anas, Almuwatt’a, ed. Muhammad Fouad Abdulbaqi (1st edn., Dar Alkotoub Alilmiyah, 
2000), p. 3. 
101 Supra 34, Saleh, p. 5. 
102 Supra 72, Alshafi’e.    
103 See generally S. bin Hanbal, Sirat Alimam Ahmad bin Hanbal, ed. Muhammad Alzali (1st edn., 
Almaktab Alislami Lel Tiba’a wa Annashr, 1997).  
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Taymiyyah.104 Although this plan was opposed by traditional religious scholars and 
the proposal was eventually given up, Ibn Taymiyyah’s teachings are still one of the 
main pillars of the Saudi legal system. Non-Saudis in general use the term 
Wahhabism or Wahhabiya when describing the Saudi legal system or the official 
religious school in Saudi Arabia, which is a misunderstanding of the political history 
of that country as will be seen below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 Supra 34, Saleh, p. 6. 
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2 Arbitration in the Fully Developed Islamic Law 
 
By the end of the third century of the life of Islam, fiqh and Sunnah books started to 
take the form that we have nowadays. Scholars realised the importance of arbitration 
as an alternative for litigation and an essential step in the procedure of solving family 
disputes. This chapter analyses the arbitration rules under Shari’a as the base for the 
current arbitration rules in Saudi Arabia and many other Muslim countries. The 
chapter will start by showing the difference between arbitration and litigation. After 
that, arbitration will be defined and then the chapter will compare between the 
arbitration rules under the four schools of fiqh. The comparison will cover all the 
aspects of arbitration under Shari’a from the arbitration agreement till the 
enforcement of the final arbitral award.      
    
2.1 The Difference between Arbitration and Litigation 
 
The Islamic law of arbitration regulated the arbitration proceedings from the 
arbitration agreement till the enforcement of the final award. Some scholars did not 
distinguish between arbitration and litigation at all to the extent that they described 
arbitration as litigation and some others gave arbitration many features of litigation, as 
will be seen below. Before examining the arbitration regulation under the classical 
Islamic law, the difference between arbitration and litigation should be clarified. 
According to different fiqh sources, there are five main differences between 
arbitration and litigation that can be stated as follows: 
• Unlike litigation, the submission of a case to arbitration needs the disputants’ 
acceptance.105 
• The arbitrator’s jurisdiction does not exceed to any issue other than the 
stipulated case in the arbitration agreement. Meanwhile, the judge has the 
authority to adjudicate in any case brought before him without the requirement 
of a prior agreement.106  
                                                 
105 Z. Ibn Nujaim, Albahr Alraeq Sharh Kanz Aldaqaek (2nd edn., Dar Alma’refah, 1993), vol. 7, p. 27. 
106 Supra 99, Alatasi, Article 1842.  
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• An arbitrator has no authority to make an injunction on any party other than 
the parties to the dispute.107 
• An arbitral award against a guardian of an incapacitated person is not valid if 
it provides for any damage against his interest unless approved by a judge.108 
• Unlike a judge, an arbitrator has the authority to deal with disputes even if one 
of the parties domiciles in another country. Unlike court judgments, arbitral 
awards can be enforced extraterritorially.109  
 
2.2 The Differences between the Judge and the Arbitrator 
 
There are some differences between a judge and an arbitrator even in the opinions of 
the scholars who consider arbitration as a form of litigation, give arbitrators the same 
authority as court judges and give the arbitral award the same power as a court 
decision. First of all, an arbitrator does not have immunity and if it is proved that he is 
corrupted, he will be punished like any ordinary man. A witness summons of an 
arbitrator is not compulsory and witnesses are not obliged to attend, or as some 
classical jurists explained by the following statement, “An arbitrator cannot force 
someone to attend the hearing either as a witness, expert or as a party to the dispute”.  
An arbitrator does not have the authority to imprison anyone because it encroaches on 
the competence of the court. An arbitrator cannot refer the dispute to another 
arbitrator without the approval of all the parties to the dispute. An arbitrator does not 
have the power to enforce an award and his duty ends by issuing the final arbitral 
award. Finally, an arbitrator cannot change his decision after issuing the award and if 
he does, the latter award is void.110   
2.2.1 Definition of Arbitration 
 
Although arbitration is recognised by all sources of Shari’a, it does not receive 
exclusive attention in the treatises and doctrinal literature of the four schools of fiqh 
for the reason that many scholars dealt with arbitration as a branch of litigation. 
                                                 
107 Supra 26, Al Kenain, p. 37. 
108 Ibid.  
109 Supra 99, Alatasi, p. 28. 
110 See in general supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14 and see supra 26, Al Kenain, pp. 123-129. 
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Reference to arbitration is often made in chapters dealing with administration of 
justice “Al-Qada”. This might also be due to the fact that the Islamic judiciary was 
sufficient and flexible enough to provide suitable solutions to all types of problems 
which arose from social life during that time.111 There are many different definitions 
for arbitration under the Islamic fiqh; each definition gives arbitration a different 
scope and even a different nature from the others. It is difficult to find a 
comprehensive definition for arbitration in the classical Shari’a texts as each school 
defines it in accordance with the scope that it gives to arbitration. The Hanafi School 
defined arbitration as the process of choosing a person to settle a dispute. On the other 
hand, the Maliki School referred to arbitration in a fairly specified manner and defined 
it as the process of choosing a person to settle a dispute between two or more other 
parties. Arbitration requires both parties to agree on the arbitrator and the decision 
taken by the arbitrator.112 The Shafi’e School defined it differently and did not put 
restrictions on the choice of the arbitrator, and their definition reads as follows: 
arbitration is the process of choosing a person among the community to judge 
between disputants and settle their differences.113 The Hanbali School defined 
arbitration as choosing an individual for the purpose of settling a dispute between two 
other parties and enforcing the judgment on them.114 
 
When looking at the above-quoted definitions, we can see that the four Schools 
defined arbitration in a very similar way. It can also be seen that arbitration under 
Shari’a is not restricted to commercial disputes only as Scholars left room for 
arbitration to encompass almost all kinds of disputes. At a later stage, arbitration was 
described as a spontaneous, and more or less ad hoc, move by two or more parties to a  
dispute to submit their case to a third party called Hakam or Muhakkem (arbitrator). 
The most comprehensive definition formulated by a modern author is: “Arbitration is 
the submission by two or more parties to a third party of a dispute to be adjudicated 
according to Shari’a”.115   
                                                 
111 Y. Al-Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1st 
edn., Dar Alandalus for Publication and Distribution, 2000), p. 248. 
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114 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 11, p. 843. 
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2.2.2 The Legal Status of Arbitration under Shari’a 
 
As a general rule, the arbitrator is an ordinary man; however, the conflict here is about 
whether the arbitrator is required to possess all the qualifications of a judge “Qadi” or 
not. The disagreement regarding the latter point led to arbitration having a different 
scope and characteristics. Moreover, scholars from different schools disputed over 
arbitration, whether it is litigation, agency, a combination of both, or a conciliation of 
the four main opinions; 
  
• Arbitration is litigation; this opinion was reported by the Malikies, some 
Shafi’es and the Hanbalies. They justified that the arbitrator adjudicates on 
the dispute, and that is litigation. The Hanbalies added that the arbitral 
award is a binding judgment on all the parties.116 
• Arbitration is an agency contract; this opinion has been reported by some 
Malikies; they added that the arbitrator is a private judge in a specified 
dispute so needs the disputants’ approval and acceptance in order to render a 
valid judgment.117 
• Arbitration is conciliation; according to the Hanafies, arbitrators are  
appointed with the disputants’ acceptance and each party can decline and 
deny the arbitration before the issuance of the award, exactly like 
conciliation.118  
• Arbitration is a combination of litigation and agency; this is one of the 
Hanafies’ opinions. They justified that arbitrators act on behalf of the parties 
so they are agents; on the other hand, the award is binding, so it is 
litigation.119 This opinion can be seen as contrary to the doctrine of 
impartiality of the arbitrators for the reason that arbitrators are appointed to 
give a just judgment, not to act on behalf of the parties.  
 
Following the above opinions, some Hanafies emphasise on the contractual nature of 
arbitration and compare it with contracts of agency (wakalah).120 In other words, they 
                                                 
116 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 11, p. 484. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Supra 35, pp. 19-20. 
119 Supra 99, Alatasi article 1850. 
120 Supra 113, Almawardi, pp. 247-259. 
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assume an arbitrator to act as an agent on behalf of the disputants who appoint him. 
They also stressed on the close connection between arbitration and conciliation (sulh). 
Accordingly, an arbitral award, which is closer to conciliation than a court judgment, 
is of a lesser force than a court judgment but the losing party is obligated to abide by 
the award because the arbitration agreement binds the parties like any other 
contract.121 The interesting part of the arbitration under the Hanafi teachings is in 
rendering the arbitral award. The award must be rendered unanimously, otherwise 
every arbitrator would be considered to have made his award separately, and this 
would be inconsistent with the will of the disputing parties to have an award decided 
by the arbitrators together.122 This constitutes a major obstacle to arbitration as an 
effective method of dispute settlement. Under article 1847 of the Majalla, a disputant 
may revoke the appointment of the arbitrator at any time before the issuance of the 
final arbitral award unless the appointment of the arbitrator is confirmed by a judge, 
because in this case the arbitrator will be regarded as the judge’s representative and 
therefore cannot be revoked during the arbitration proceedings.123   
 
Under the Maliki School, a disputing party can be chosen to arbitrate by the other 
disputing party in the same dispute that he is a party to. The Malikies have a different 
opinion regarding the revocation of the appointment of the arbitrator as according to 
them, the appointment of the arbitrator cannot be revoked after the commencement of 
the arbitration proceedings.124 
The Shafi’es consider arbitration an inferior system compared to the judiciary. This is 
because the appointment of the arbitrator can be revoked at any point up to the time of 
the issuance of the final award, which shows that an arbitrator is at a lower grade than 
a court judge. The Hanbalies consider arbitration as litigation; therefore, an arbitrator 
must possess the same qualifications as a court judge and arbitral awards should carry 
the same strength as a court judgment.125  
 
The above examples of the conflict between the Schools can be regarded as 
advantages for arbitration under the Shari’a as parties can apply any opinion that 
                                                 
121 Ibid.  
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125 Ibid.  
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belongs to any of the four Schools on an equal basis without violating the law, for the 
reason that all the opinions are correct and the difference is merely in the 
interpretation of the legal texts.     
 
From the above-quoted definitions, we can see that there are five main elements in 
any arbitration agreement under Shari’a, which are: 
 
• The disputants, whether they are legal or natural persons with clear 
intentions and the full capacity to enter into the arbitration agreement.  
• The arbitration agreement.  
• A dispute. 
• Arbitrator(s).  
• Applicable law.   
   
The arbitration regulations under the different Schools of Islamic law, as are found in 
the classical treatises, are the basis of the current arbitration acts in many Muslim 
countries in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular. This following section 
examines the legal rulings on arbitration under Islamic Shari’a from the arbitration 
agreement till the enforcement of the final arbitral award.  
 
2.2.3 The Capacity of Parties to Enter into an Arbitration Agreement 
 
2.2.3.1 Types of Legal Capacities 
 
Similar to other types of contracts, parties to the arbitration agreement should possess 
all the qualities of a capable personality. Such a person should also be competent 
enough to enter into the arbitration agreement as well as being able to execute and 
accept the arbitral award. Under Shari’a, the legal capacity or, what it is called in 
Arabic, alahliyah to enter into an arbitration agreement does not differ from the legal 
capacity to enter into any other agreement. In order to be able to enter into a 
contractual relationship, the parties to the contract should each be  
• A person that is defined as an entity who is able to bear the legal aspects of 
Shari’a;   
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• Able to acquire rights; 
• Able to bear obligations; and 
• Able to conduct legally effective actions and transactions.126 
 
A Legal personality can be either a natural personality or legal personality. A Natural 
personality corresponds to the living status of a human being as it starts at birth and 
ends at death. Nonetheless, a natural personality can be a presumed legal personality 
which might be present before birth or after real death.127 A Legal personality is a 
presumed personality in entities that have a separate existence from the individuals 
who establish them but do not have human qualities.128 
 
Alahliyah can appear in several forms depending on the age and the mental ability. 
Muslim scholars identified two main sub-concepts of the legal capacity divided into 
five different levels, and each level represents a different form of alahliyah.129 The 
first sub-concept of alahliyah is ahliyat aluojoup or the eligibility for the capacity 
which concerns the minimum requirements of an entity in order to be qualified as a 
natural or legal person. Ahliyat aluojoup can be defined as the ability of a person to 
acquire rights and bear obligations. Ahliyat aluojoup has been divided into full 
kamilah and restricted naqisah. Restricted capacity imposes limitations on the 
person’s ability to acquire some rights and bear certain obligations. The latter level of 
capacity is restricted to the foetus and embryo during pregnancy as an unborn human 
being has the full right to inherit.130 Full capacity is attributed to every living human 
being from the moment of birth till death.131  
 
The second sub-concept of the legal capacity in Islamic law is ahliyat al adaa’; the 
possession of ahliyat al adaa’ qualifies the person to conduct and execute his own 
affairs on his own. It has also been defined as the “ability of a person to initiate 
                                                 
126 See in general, M. Zahraa, ‘The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law’, Arab Law Quarterly, 11 
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actions, the considerations of which depend on a sound mind”.132 Ahliyat al adaa’ can 
be obsolete, restricted or full. Obsolete ahliyat al adaa’ was referred to by Muslim 
scholars as the state of non-existence of the capacity or In’idam. Alahliyah is 
associated with people who have not yet reached the age of discernment or reached it 
but for some reason can not satisfy its requirements, such as children under the age of 
seven and insane people. Restricted ahliyat al adaa’ applies to persons who satisfy 
some of the discernment requirements but have not yet attained a sufficient level of 
mental and physical maturity; discerning children can be a good example.133 Ahliyat 
al adaa’, mainly, concerns the presence of a sound mind, intellectual capacity and 
discernment. Any person who lacks one of these qualities is presumed to have a 
restricted ahliyat al adaa’ provided that such a person reaches the age of discernment. 
Any human being will be presumed to have full ahliyat al adaa’ upon reaching the 
age of maturity and satisfying its requirements. 
 
It has been alleged that Islamic law does not recognise the concept of legal 
personality. Such a view can be generally rejected as incorrect. Although classical 
Muslim scholars did not apply this concept to partnerships, this fact has been 
explained by the social and economic conditions of their time, when partnerships 
generally comprised a limited number of individuals. In contrast, the concept of the 
legal personality is well established under Shari’a with respect to such institutions as 
the public treasury, the waqf “charitable trust”, schools, hospitals and mosques, all of 
which are recognised as having the capacity to hold and exercise rights and liable for 
obligations independent of their administrators. Parties to the arbitration should have a 
full capacity in order to be able to exercise their rights.134 Alahliyah as represented 
above is only the theory as when it comes to the actual application, the law 
summarises Alahliyah in two main issues only: majority and prudence. In the next few 
paragraphs, the requirements of majority and prudence under Shari’a as applied in 
Saudi Arabia will be examined. 
 
                                                 
132 Ibid.  
133 Shari’a scholars distinguish between the age of maturity and the age of discernment. Scholars 
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134 A. Lerrick and Q. Mian, Saudi Business and Labor Law (2nd edn., Graham &Trotman, 1987), pp. 
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2.2.4 The Legal Capacity Requirements for Natural Persons 
 
In addition to satisfying the requirement of the Shari’a contract law, a valid arbitration 
agreement requires the parties to the agreement to satisfy the requirements of legal 
capacity, i.e. to have reached a certain age and have a certain level of mental ability at 
the time of concluding the contract. Classical Islamic scholars tend to treat every case 
on its own merit, identifying the criteria according to age, sign of puberty and also on 
the attainment of a defect-free physical and mental maturity with which the person 
can reach a reliable standard in transactional matters.135 A general legal competence 
to engage in legal transactions requires two basic qualifications: majority and 
prudence.  
2.2.4.1 Majority  
 
  “Make trial of orphans until they reach the age of marriage; if then ye find sound 
judgment in them, release their property to them.”136   
 
The majority age is not exactly fixed under Shari’a law, neither by classical Scholars 
nor today; however, the above-quoted verse indicates that it is around the age of 
puberty. Unlike most western legal systems, the Shari’a did not fix an exact age of 
majority. Some early Muslim scholars such as Abo Hanifa fixed the age of majority at 
18 for males and 17 for females.137 The most general support was given to the age of 
15 for both males and females by the reason of the act of Prophet Muhammad. The 
Prophet did not allow anyone under the age of 15 to join the army during his lifetime. 
The Islamic fiqh rejected the fixing of any definite age for legal majority and adopted 
the principle that legal majority is attained with physical puberty. In Saudi Arabia 
nowadays, the majority age is a matter of dispute between different public authorities. 
The Ministry of Justice follows the teachings of the Shari’a and follows the age of 
physical puberty, which varies from one to the other.  
A Saudi national can apply for a national identity card at the age of 15. Before the age 
of 15, a person needs to obtain permission from his guardian in order to perform a 
                                                 
135 Ibid.  
136 The Quran 4: 6. 
137 Y. Haddad and B. Stowasser, Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity (1st edn., Altamira 
Press, 2004), pp. 222-224. 
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valid action. In this case, the father of a minor is his guardian by default, following 
the Hadeeth of the Prophet when he said: “you and your property belong to your 
father”. If the father is not present, the testamentary guardian appointed by him should 
have priority over anyone else. In the absence of the father and testamentary guardian, 
the paternal grandfather and the guardian appointed by court will follow 
respectively.138 On the other hand, a person will have some restrictions on his actions 
till the age of 18, like the ability to work in the public sector. The restriction might 
also extend to the age of 21 for travelling outside the country.  
2.2.4.2 Prudence 
 
The Arabic legal term for prudence is rushd and a prudent person is called rashid. Ibn 
Qodamah described a prudent person as the person who shows protective 
safeguarding of his property and soundness in the ordering of his income.139 The 
general trend restricts the scope of prudence to it being required in financial matters 
only, whereas some scholars argued that prudence means sound judgment with regard 
to religion as well as property so that a sinful or religious hypocrite may not be 
qualified as rashid, just as he may not qualify as the witness. The latter argument has 
been generally rejected in favour of the view that an impious Muslim might lack 
prudence in matters of religion, but if he has prudence in property dealings, then he 
has the full competence to transact.140   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 J. Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status (2nd edn., Graham & Trotman Ltd, 1990), p. 215. 
139 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 6, p. 610.   
140 N. Coulson, Commercial Law in the Gulf States: The Islamic Legal Tradition (1st edn., Graham & 
Trotman, 1984), pp. 32-36. 
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2.2.5 Incapacitated Persons 
 
Muslim scholars identified several mental and physical defects that constitute 
impediments to legal capacity; and consequently, those who suffer such defects have 
a restricted legal capacity. These defects can be either natural or incidental defects.  
2.2.5.1 Natural Defects 
 
2.2.5.1.1 Minority and Insanity  
 
Infants and insane people are not allowed to conclude any kind of contract and they 
must be represented by their guardians. The actions of infants and insane people are 
null and void and not capable of ratification. The incompetence of the insane does not 
require the prior issue of a judgment to the effect that the party is insane, except in the 
Maliki teachings.141  
 
Mental derangement is a weakness of mental faculties causing a person to have a 
limited ability in understanding, mixed reasoning and a defective ability of execution. 
Mental derangement could be severe, similar to insanity, and in this case such 
mentally deranged persons will have the legal status of insane persons, causing their 
ahliyat al adaa’ to be obsolete; or it could be slight mental derangement, and in this 
case mentally deranged persons can have a restricted capacity similar to discerning 
children.142   
2.2.5.1.2 Mortal Illness 
 
Mortal illness “maradh almout” has been defined in article 1595 of the Majalla as “a 
sickness where in the majority of cases, death is very likely to happen, and, in the case 
of a male, such a person become unable to deal with his affairs outside his home, and 
in the case of a female, she is unable to deal with her domestic duties, death having 
occurred before the expiration of one year by reason of such illness whether the sick 
                                                 
141 Supra 34, Saleh, p. 27.  
142 Supra 127, Zahraa, p. 253. 
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person has been confined to bed or not”.143 Mortal illness might deprive the individual 
from the capacity to contract; the concept of mortal illness is an original concept of 
Shari’a. From the above-quoted definition, for a person to be declared incapacitated, 
four requirements should be fulfilled: 
• A hopeless illness such as cancer or AIDS; 
• The patient’s awareness of his illness; 
• The death of the patient as a result of his illness is expected within one year; 
• A detrimental act to the patient’s heirs or creditors.  
An arbitration agreement can be annulled by the patient’s heirs or creditors if it 
contains a present or a harmful action against their interests.144 The annulment of the 
arbitration agreement requires a court order.   
 
2.2.5.2 Incidental Defects 
 
2.2.5.2.1 Intoxication  
 
As a general rule, a person under the influence of alcohol or drug loses his legal 
capacity as long as he is under its influence. The incapacitated person under this 
category, as it has been defined by Abo Hanifa, is a person who is not able to 
distinguish the earth from the sky.145 The Hanafi School holds a radical position 
regarding intoxicated people. According to the Hanafies, the legal competence of a 
man is not affected when intoxication results from a voluntary act. It is affected only 
when alcohol is taken by accident or for medical reasons. At a lesser degree, the 
Malikies give an intoxicated person the option to ratify his action after regaining his 
consciousness. The Shafi’es and the Hanbalies deny the legal competence of an 
intoxicated person and disregard his acts.146 
 
 
                                                 
143 A. Arrawi, ‘Principles of the Islamic Law on Contracts’, The George Washington Law Review, 36 
(1953), pp. 32-36.  
144 Ibid.  
145 Supra 34, Saleh, p. 28.  
146 Supra 138, Nasir, p. 47.  
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2.2.5.2.2 Insolvency  
 
An insolvent “Moflis” is a person whose debt exceeds his assets and who is thereby 
unable to discharge his liability for such debts. It has been argued that a person may 
be regarded insolvent if he attempts to place his assets beyond the reach of his 
creditors, or even in some cases when he delays payment, a judge may, upon the 
petition of the creditors or heirs, issue an injunction forbidding the insolvent person 
from disposing of his assets.147 This anticipatory restriction in the legal capacity is 
called hajr; scholars have based it on the practice of Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions. All forms of commercial conduct of the insolvent are not valid unless 
approved by a judge or by the creditors.148 
 
2.3 Shari’a Contract Law in Relation to Arbitration 
Agreements and Arbitration Clauses 
 
Parties to the dispute should agree to arbitrate as a prerequisite for the commencement 
of the arbitration proceedings. Such an agreement takes the form of either an 
independent agreement or a contractual clause incorporated within the main contract. 
Unlike arbitration under the Code of the Commercial Court of 1931, the Arbitration 
Act of 1983 regards arbitration agreements and clauses as binding and enforceable. 
As a general rule, we can say that all contracts and transactions are lawful and binding 
unless someone finds a clear evidence to the contrary. The prohibition of the contract 
should be established by a clear Shari’a text or through accurate reasoning.149 The 
Shari’a maintains the freedom of the parties to contract and in relation to the Hanbali 
School, Ibn Taymiyyah concluded that a contract cannot be revoked without the 
mutual consent and satisfaction of all the parties, except if it provides for an obvious 
violation of the Shari’a law i.e. it prohibits a lawful issue or legalises a prohibited 
one.150 The important aspects of Shari’a contract law in relation to arbitration 
agreements and arbitration clauses will be examined with reference to the fiqh 
treatises and the common practice in Saudi Arabia for the reason that there is no code 
                                                 
147 Supra 84, Aghndies, pp. 215-216.  
148 See Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 60/D/4 of 1989.  
149 S. Mahmoud, Arbitration Codes: Comparative study between the arbitration codes of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Egypt (2nd edn., Dar Alkotob Alqanoniyah, 2007), p. 56. 
150 Ibid.  
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or act to regulate commercial contracts, as the practice is totally based on the tradition 
of the Shari’a. 
2.3.1 Contract under Shari’a 
 
2.3.1.1 The Meaning of “Contract” 
 
Shari’a recognises a contract as a legally valid activity and encourages the parties to 
any agreement to perform their obligations in accordance with the terms of the 
contract, as the Quran states: “You who believe, fulfil any contracts you may make”.151 
The Arabic term Aqd is translated into English as a contract; however, it carries, 
literally, a more deeper meaning than a normal contractual relationship. When looking 
at the literal meaning of the word Aqd, we can see that it means “tie” or “bond”; 
therefore, there is no precise equivalent of the technical term contract in Western 
jurisprudence, as a contract under common law involves, in addition to the intention 
to create a legal relation, the basic requirements of the offer, acceptance and 
consideration. On the other hand, under Shari’a contract law, a contract does not 
necessarily require the agreement of all the parties because the term Aqd may describe 
a unilateral action which is binding and effective without the consent of the other 
parties in some events. For instance, a gift contract and the dissolution of a marriage 
by the husband are valid actions with no need for the acceptance of other parties.152 
The juristic use of the word Aqd might lead to a presumption that scholars have been 
using the word in its etymological sense i.e. following the root of the word rather than 
its technical use.153 
 
Unlike other legal systems, a contract under Shari’a covers all kinds of obligations in 
all aspects of life such as religious obligations to Allah, the political obligations 
expressed in treaties, the obligation of Bay’ah to the political leader and commercial 
obligations.154 The following Quranic verse supports the view that a contract involves 
                                                 
151 The Quran 5: 1.  
152 Supra 140, Coulson, p. 18. 
153 M. Hamid, ‘Islamic Law of Contract or Contracts’, Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law, 3 
(1969), pp. 1–11. 
154 N. Mohammed, ‘Principles of Islamic Contract Law’, Journal of Law and Religion, 6 (1988), pp. 
115-116. Bay’ah is an Arabic term that describes the oath of allegiance to the political leader. Bay’ah 
has been in practice since the time of Prophet Muhammad.   
 71
all aspects of life including faith and personal religious affairs: “Fulfil the covenant of 
God when you have entered into it, and break not your oaths after you have confirmed 
them”.155 There is no precise definition for contracts in the Shari’a treatises but most 
of the classical scholars defined it as “offer and acceptance”. Some scholars require 
the intention to enter into the contract except in issues related to personal status i.e. 
marriage and divorce where the contract will form even if there is no intention.156 
Some Western scholars assume that a contract in Islamic law is merely a legal 
undertaking with there being a dispute among the different schools of fiqh over the 
essentials, which are different from the Western definition of a “binding promise”.157 
2.3.1.2 The Formation of a Contract  
 
To form a contract under Shari’a, a number of conditions have to be fulfilled. First of 
all, for a contract to be valid, it should not contradict with the Shari’a principles. This 
means that the contract should not involve any prohibited subject matter and it should 
be procedurally valid in the sense that there should be no uncertainty or, what it is 
called in Arabic, “Gharar”. Moreover, a commercial contract is of no value without 
satisfying the essential conditions of the offer and acceptance.158 The Shari’a contract 
law is far easier than modern Western laws; however, this simplicity may turn into 
complexity in modern commercial contracts, especially when the contract is to be 
concluded by a means other than the traditional way of having the parties to the 
contract physically gathered and conclude the contract with the witness of other 
qualified persons. In addition to the requirements of the legal capacity of the parties to 
join the contract, the Shari’a requires that the parties should sustain mutual agreement 
during the session of the transaction, or what is known as Khiar Almajlis.  
2.3.1.3 Mutual Consent  
 
The most important condition for the validity of any contract is the mutual consent of 
the parties of the contract. The legal basis of this rule is the following Quranic verse: 
“O you who believe! Transfer not unjustly the property of one another among 
                                                 
155 The Quran 16: 91.  
156 A. bin Gasim, Hashiyat Alraoud Almourbi’ Sharh Zad Almostaqna (1st edn., Almatba’a Alahliyah 
Liloffset, 1976), vol. 4, p. 327. See also, supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 4, p. 271.  
157 Supra 140, Coulson, p. 18.  
158 A. Alkhenain, ‘Contracts Involving Uncertainty’, Ministry of Justice Journal, Saudi Arabia, 13 
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yourselves except by your mutual consent”.159 In accordance with the teachings of the 
latter Quranic verse, a contract concluded under duress is null and void. Consent 
should be voluntary and the parties should freely choose to make the promise. In 
addition to the mutual consent, the Shari’a requires mutual satisfaction as contracts 
concluded against the will of one of the parties can be revoked if one of the parties 
challenges it. Classical Shari’a scholars distinguished between consent and 
satisfaction as the consent might be obtained without satisfaction like in the case of 
hard bargaining, which is considered to be a sort of duress. The only exception to this 
requirement is contracts made by the authority against insolvents to pay off the 
creditors which do not require consent or satisfaction.160 
 
Mutual agreement is the foundation of most kinds of contracts under Shari’a. Mutual 
consent happens when one party gives an explicit offer or, what it is called in Arabic, 
Ijab. The party who receives the offer should give an unequivocal acceptance or 
qoboul. If these two steps are taken correctly, the contract will be legally binding as 
long as the parties do not change their minds before leaving the place at the 
conclusion of the contract. In normal circumstances, if a contract has been concluded 
in conformity with all relevant provisions of the Shari’a, this means not only that the 
contract is valid and binding on the parties, but that its conclusion is permissible and 
certain performances have become obligatory for them.161  
 
2.3.1.4 Khiar Almajlis 
  
Khiar Almajlis is another important doctrine under the Shari’a contract law. Khiar 
Almajlis is the option of cancelling the contract after its conclusion without bearing 
any liability. This cancellation method is available in the period between the moment 
of concluding the contract and the time of leaving the place at the conclusion of the 
contract. Khiar Almajlis is an option available to all the parties to the contract and 
when one of them decides to use it, the contract will be annulled without bearing any 
liability. The concept of Khiar Almajlis is similar, to some extent, to the cooling-off 
                                                 
159 The Quran 4: 29.  
160 Supra 156, bin Gasim, vol. 5, p. 332. See also, I. Algari. ‘The Formation of the Contract in Islamic 
Shari’a’, Ministry of Justice Journal, Saudi Arabia, 11 (2001), pp. 1-13. 
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period in Western laws and the basis for this doctrine came from the following 
Ahadeeth of Prophet Muhammad, where he said: “The buyer and the seller have the 
option to cancel or to confirm the contract before they separate from each other”.162  
 
With regard to a conditional sale, the Prophet said: “No deal is settled and finalized 
unless the buyer and the seller separate, except if the deal is conditional”. In this case, 
the validity of the contract will depend on the conditions stipulated in the contract.163 
Furthermore, Khiar Almajlis is not the only cancellation method under Shari’a 
contract law as there are some other forms of Khiar which apply to some cases such 
as conditional sales, fraud, defects, mistakes and misrepresentations.164  
 
In circumstances where one of the parties to the agreement wishes to cancel or amend 
the contract on one of the cancelling grounds, the damaged party will have the option 
of cancelling the contract without bearing any liability toward the other parties.165 
After the end of the cooling-off period i.e. leaving the venue after concluding the 
contract, the contract is final and ready for execution.   
 
2.3.2 Nominate and Innominate Contracts 
 
Unlike other laws, the Shari’a law pays very little attention to the distinction between 
nominate and innominate contracts. The Shari’a established the rule that in matters of 
civil and commercial dealings, any agreement not specifically prohibited by the 
Shari’a is valid and binding on the parties and could be enforced by the court. In the 
Aramco Award of 1958, the arbitration tribunal stated “Aramco’s Concession must be 
considered as an innominated contract sui generis”. Moreover, the law gives full 
                                                 
162 Supra 43, Saheeh Albukhari, vol. 3, Chapter 34, Hadeeth No. 320.   
163 Ibid., Albukhari, vol. 3, Book 34, Hadeeth No. 326. 
164 In addition to Khiar Almajlis, there are a few types of options mentioned in the Shari’a treatises, 
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165 See generally, supra 140, Coulson, pp. 56-74. 
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recognition to the rule Pacta Sunt Servanda with a few moral and religious exceptions 
in cases where the execution of the contract leads to a violation of the Shari’a.166  
The nominated commercial contracts under Shari’a law are: 
• Bai’: a sale, which is the transfer of the subject matter of the contract for 
consideration. 
• Hibah: a gift, which is the transfer of the subject matter without consideration.   
• Ijara: a lease, which is the transfer of the right of using the subject matter for 
consideration.  
• Ariyyah: a loan, which is the transfer of the right of using the subject matter 
without consideration.  
• Salam: Salam contracts can be equivalent to futures contracts.  
Contracts other than these five are innominated and they are permissible as long as 
they do not violate the principles of the Shari’a and the public order.   
 
2.3.2.1 Special Conditions “Shorout” 
 
Fiqh treatises defined special conditions as conditions that are irrelevant to the 
fundamental nature of the contract. Some scholars do not accept special conditions if 
they are irrelevant in the essence of the contract. Such an attitude shows that Shari’a 
law tries to keep commercial contracts as simple as possible; however, such simplicity 
works as an impediment in some modern transactions.167 In this sense, a loan 
agreement should not involve a sale or a lease agreement as, if the parties wish to 
stipulate something else other than the main subject matter of the contract, they 
should do it in a separate agreement. For instance, hire-purchase contracts were a 
subject of long debate in the last decade because the condition of an obligatory sale of 
the subject matter after the termination of the lease period was not relevant to the 
lease contract. Scholars who opposed such contracts argued that having two different 
kinds of obligations, i.e., sale and lease, under the same contract may create a degree 
of uncertainty. Hire-purchase contracts were eventually legalised under the condition 
that the provisions related to the sale of the subject matter after the termination of the 
                                                 
166 See generally, S. Habachy, ‘Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law’, Columbia Law Review, 
62 (1962), pp. 450-473. 
167 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 4, p. 224.  
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lease period change to be a non-binding promise; otherwise, such contracts are null 
and void.168  
 
With regard to banking transactions, the known practice of Altawarrouq has been the 
subject of continuous debate among scholars nowadays as some of them have 
prohibited it and some have allowed it with restrictions. An Altawarrouq transaction 
is a contract whereby a customer requests a bank to acquire a specific commodity, 
usually one with a stable price such as metals, on his behalf. The customer will repay 
the bank the cost of the commodity plus an agreed margin in instalments. The 
customer then requests the bank to sell the commodity right away in the commodity 
spot market.169 An Altawarrouq contract involves three main irrelevant obligations as 
the bank will be a seller, broker and an agent at the same time. First, the bank will act 
as a broker and seller in the credit sale of a commodity from the bank to the client. 
Second, the bank will act as an agent for the client in the second sale of the 
commodity. When looking at the nature of an Altawarrouq transaction, the reasoning 
of the scholars who prohibited it is obvious as the purpose behind this transaction is 
not an interest in the commodity at issue but to acquire immediate financing without 
getting a loan with interest. Although such transactions do not involve interest, it 
involves a great deal of prohibited Gharar or uncertainty as a result of having two or 
more different irrelevant obligations in one contract.170  
 
It was noticed that prior to the enactment of the Arbitration Act of 1983, Shari’a 
courts used to fail in recognising arbitration clauses as valid dispute settlement clauses 
for the reason that judges regarded them as conditions that were irrelevant to the 
nature of the contract.171 However, there is no doubt that arbitration agreements and 
arbitration clauses are valid agreements as long as the dispute is solvable through 
conciliation.  
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2.3.3 Termination of the Contract 
 
Shari’a contract law shares many of the common grounds for the dissolution of a 
contract with Western laws. Similar to English law, a contract will be discharged 
when both parties have satisfactorily performed their contractual obligations. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of freedom of contract, parties to the 
contract can terminate it by mutual agreement in the same way as establishing it.172 
Under the Saudi law, the mutual agreement to terminate the contract will be treated, to 
some extent, in a way similar to a conciliation award for the reason that the law does 
not provide any teachings with regard to remedies and liabilities in such instances. 
However, the Shari’a introduced the principle of Aloqoud Aljai’za. There is no exact 
equivalent to this term in Western laws as the direct translation of this group of 
contracts can be “permissible contracts”, which is meaningless for the reason that 
entering into most kinds of contracts is permissible; however, the term may be used to 
describe non-binding contracts. The most popular forms of non-binding commercial 
contracts are wakalah “Agency” and Mudarabah Company.173 The most important 
feature of these kinds of contracts is the unilateral termination, except in Mudarabah 
where the only condition is to give notice to the other party unless the terms of the 
contract provide for certain obligations. Shari’a scholars restrict the principle of 
freedom of contract by the doctrine established by the Hadeeth of Prophet 
Muhammad that reads as follows: “La Dharar wa La Dhirar”. The Hadeeth can be 
translated as “there shall be neither unfair loss nor the causing of such loss”; it could 
also mean that a person should not harm others and should not be harmed by others in 
return. This doctrine is important not just in the field of contracts, it can be considered 
as one of the main bases of fiqh teachings in all aspects of life. Accordingly, the 
principle of La Dharar wa La Dhirar allows any party to annul the contract if they 
have experienced serious prejudice as a result of the execution of the contract.174   
In relation to arbitration, some fiqh schools consider appointing arbitrators for non-
binding contracts as the parties can revoke them at any time during the arbitration 
                                                 
172 See generally G. Samuel, Contract Law: Cases and Materials (1st edn., Sweet and Maxwell, 2007), 
pp. 475-505.  
173 A Mudarabah Company is a form of commercial partnership where one partner gives money to 
another for investing it in a commercial activity.  
174 See generally S. Alsadlan, Alqawaid Alfiqhiyah Alkubra wa Matafarra’ Minha (1st edn., Dar 
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proceedings. On the other hand, the arbitration agreement is a binding agreement as 
will be seen when discussing the arbitration law of Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.4 The Arbitration Agreement and Arbitration Clause in the 
Islamic Law 
 
2.4.1 Arbitration Agreement 
 
There is no mention of a model arbitration clause or agreement in the classical Shari’a 
treatises; however, the general rules of Shari’a contract law are applied to arbitration 
agreements. An arbitration agreement can be formed by an offer and an acceptance or 
any word or action that indicates the intention of the parties to refer the dispute to 
arbitration.175 The Majalla set a few conditions for the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, which are: 
• The dispute must already have arisen and be clearly defined; 
• The parties must have agreed to arbitration by a reciprocal offer and 
acceptance and they must say the following to the arbitrator “arbitrate between 
us because we have appointed you as an arbitrator”;  
• The arbitrator must be appointed by name; 
• The arbitrator must have the capacity to be a witness.176 
 
With the exception of the Maliki School, which considers the appointment of the 
arbitrator as irrevocable, the appointment of the arbitrator is revocable up to the point 
of the issuance of the award, except if the appointment has been confirmed by a court 
or if the arbitration agreement contains a provision for the non-revocation of the 
arbitrator. The Maliki School stresses on the irrevocability of the appointment of 
arbitrators and the arbitration agreement in the light of the following Quranic verse: 
“O you, who believe, fulfil the contracts”.177 This verse calls for a fulfilment of all 
contractual obligations, and the arbitration agreement is a binding contract. In 
                                                 
175 M. Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmou’ Alfatawa (2nd edn., The Ministry of Islamic Affairs of Saudi Arabia, 
1995), vol. 29, p. 20.  
176 Supra 9, Alahdab, p. 26.   
177 The Quran 5: 1. 
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addition, assuming that the arbitration agreement is not a binding obligation, it will 
undermine the strength of arbitration as an effective dispute settlement mechanism. 
The Arbitration agreement should be documented in writing as a recommendation to 
prevent any future disputes regarding the arbitration.178 Islamic law encourages the 
writing to record all debts and contracts, as the Quran stated: “When you deal with 
each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of time 
reduce them to writing. Let a scribe write down faithfully as between the parties”.179  
 
2.4.2 Arbitration Clause  
 
One of the conditions of the validity of an arbitration agreement is to have an existing 
dispute; therefore, the legality of the arbitration clause is controversial. Under Shari’a, 
there are two grounds on which to challenge the legality of the arbitration clause. 
First, the submission of a non-existing dispute to arbitration might involve uncertainty 
(gharar) which is prohibited in the Shari’a contract law. Under Shari’a, a contract 
whose subject matter did not exist at the time of the conclusion of the contract is not 
acknowledged and it is similar to the prohibited contracts of selling unborn 
animals.180 Second, the enforcement of the arbitration clause is suspended on the 
occurrence of disputes between the contracting parties and this is contrary to the fact 
that contractual obligations under the arbitration clause are among the obligations 
which cannot be conditional, according to the four schools. 181 
 
On the other hand, the previous view counters the basic principles of Shari’a contract 
law; according to the principle of freedom of contract, parties to the contract are free 
to include any term or condition as long as these terms and conditions are not contrary 
to the mandatory principles of the Islamic law, such as those providing for the 
payment of interest, resulting in a risk or any practice involving any kind of 
speculation where the parties become unable to predict the result of the contract.182   
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181 Supra 111, Alsamaan, pp. 253-254. 
182 Supra 9, Alahdab, pp. 28-30. 
 79
 
When looking at the sources of Islamic jurisprudence, especially the doctrine of 
istihsan and Urf, it is found difficult not to allow the use of arbitration clauses for the 
following reasons: 
• They are necessary in commercial contracts in general and in international 
commercial contracts in particular as they enable justice to be achieved more 
quickly. 
• They are commonly used in commercial transactions. 
• They do not really involve uncertainty or risk because arbitration clauses 
provide that the contracting parties should choose an authority other than the 
court to resolve their disputes. 
 
Although the teachings of the Hanbali school are very strict in matters that relate to 
rituals and beliefs, it is very flexible in commercial and financial transactions. 
According to the Hanbali teachings, contractual clauses are valid as long as they are 
not contrary to the purpose of the contract. Ibn Taymiyyah added that a contractual 
clause is valid even if it is not necessary, appropriate or even relevant to the contract. 
Al-Sanhury made the following comment: 
 
“With the renewal brought about by Ibn Taymiyyah, the Hanbali doctrine made a 
great step forward on the way of evolution. It has shed the prohibition of double 
contracts and restricted the number of defect clauses as it is held that a clause is only 
defected if it is contrary to the object of the contract or the provisions of Shari’a, i.e. 
the law public order or good morals. In this, the Hanbali doctrine has come quite 
close to the western doctrines: any clause which accompanies the contract is valid 
unless it is impossible or contrary to public order or good morals. Said clause is then 
set aside but the contract remains valid unless this clause condition is the 
determinating motive of the contract: in this case, the contract is also set aside”.183    
 
To sum up, arbitration clauses are recognised as valid by all the schools as long as 
they are not contrary to public order and do not permit a prohibited action under 
                                                 
183 A.Al-Sanhury, The Sources of Truth in the Muslim Fiqh (1st edn., Maktabat Alhalabi Alhoqouqiyah, 
1998), vol. 2, p. 102. Cited by Alsamaan, supra 111, p. 254.          
 80
Shari’a. Risk and uncertainty make a transaction void and it is obvious that an 
arbitration clause does not involve any risk.184  
 
2.5 Scope of Arbitration 
 
Unlike western laws, Shari’a does not restrict arbitration to commercial matters only. 
It gives arbitration the full competence to work as a real alternative to the judiciary. 
The scope of arbitration in Islamic law is a matter of disagreement between the four 
schools; the differences in the scope of arbitration given by each school are a result of 
the different natures given by each one of them; nonetheless, arbitration in its 
narrowest scope under Shari’a is wider and more comprehensive than arbitration in 
Western legal systems. The scope of arbitration under each School of fiqh will be 
examined in the following few paragraphs.  
2.5.1 The Hanafi School 
 
The Hanafies have two opinions regarding the scope of arbitration. The first opinion 
permits arbitration in all subject matters except Hodoud and Qissas; some scholars 
permit arbitration in the case of murder by error.185 They justified that Hodoud are 
crimes against God and they have fixed punishments that have been set by him and 
are found in the Quran and the Sunnah. The second opinion does not allow arbitration 
to cover Hodoud but allows it in Qissas. The supporters of this division argued that 
Hodoud are crimes against God so there is no way to arbitrate in them. On the other 
hand, Qissas are crimes committed against other human beings and those victims or 
their heirs have the right to decide on the punishment, on whether to execute it or not. 
It has been added by them that if the family of a murdered person took revenge on the 
murderer prior to taking the case before the court, their action would be acceptable 
and they would have no criminal liability.186  
  
                                                 
184 Ibid. 
185 The term Hodoud describes crimes which are punishable by a pre-established punishment found in 
the Quran, and the execution of the punishment is definite; examples are rape, theft and terrorism. 
Qissas is a term to describe revenge crimes; in Qissas crimes, the victim or his family has a right to 
seek retribution and retaliation. In Qissas crimes, the victim or his family has the right not to execute 
the judgment, like in the case of murder and injury.  
186 Supra 142. 
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2.5.2 The Maliki School 
 
The Malikies restrict the application of arbitration to commercial matters only; they 
said that cases involving any issue other than money must be decided by a judge. In 
their view, the arbitrator has a limited jurisdiction on the given case and the disputed 
parties only and subjects other than money are of the competence of the judicial 
authority. The Malikies did not put limitations on the terms of reference of the arbitral 
panel, like if an arbitrator rendered a correct judgment on a case that is outside his 
jurisdiction, the judgment would be valid subject to the ratification of a court judge; 
nonetheless, he would be warned not to do it again.187   
2.5.3 The Shafi’e School 
 
The Shafi’es have three main opinions regarding the scope of arbitration; some of 
their scholars deny the validity of arbitration if there is a court in the town as that 
might weaken the power of the court. Another group of scholars give arbitration the 
same scope and power as litigation; they argue that the appointed arbitrator has the 
same power as the appointed judge as both have been appointed; and the validity of 
arbitration is not restricted to commercial disputes. The third group of scholars allow 
arbitration to proceed in all subject matters except in criminal disputes.188  
2.5.4 The Hanbali School 
 
The Hanbalies mainly give arbitrators the same jurisdiction as court judges. Some 
scholars do not allow arbitration in criminal matters because it has a different nature 
than commercial disputes. Ibn Taymiyyah does not restrict the scope of arbitration 
and he gives it the same scope as litigation; however, according to him, an arbitral 
award has no value without judicial review, which is the same concept followed by 
the Saudi legal system nowadays.189                
   
                                                 
187 Supra 112, Ibn Farhoun, p. 145.    
188 Supra 26, Al Kenain, p. 49. 
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2.6 Applicable Law 
 
The concept of conflict of laws under Shari’a has different dimensions in contrast to 
modern Western laws. All four schools of fiqh insist on the mandatory application of 
procedural and substantive Shari’a rules; the application of any law other than Shari’a 
or any custom or practices that are not in compliance with the Shari’a on a dispute 
between Muslim parties within the Muslim state is totally prohibited. The ban has 
been brought about by the following Quranic verses: “Those who do not judge 
according to what Allah has sent down, they are the unjust”.190 “Those who do not 
judge according to what Allah has sent down, they are the sinners”.191 
 
Islamic law pays no attention to states, borders and other concepts such as nationality 
and domicile; it only recognises two main categories of legal subjects, which are 
Muslims and non-Muslims. With regard to Muslims, Shari’a is a personal law by 
being applicable regardless of whether the Muslim travels or resides in or outside 
Islamic territory. In other words, Shari’a applies extraterritorially to Muslims. 
Regarding non-Muslims, Shari’a is a territorial law by being applicable to anyone 
travelling or residing in Islamic territory, with the exception of family law and 
religious affairs. 192 In the latter cases, Islamic conflicts law adheres to the personality 
of laws by allowing non-Muslims a relative legislative and judicial autonomy. If a 
Muslim party is involved in any dispute, Shari’a will be the applicable law; however, 
there are some cases where the dispute involves non-Muslims only, which will be 
given more attention when discussing the qualifications of arbitrators.   
 
The conflict of laws under Shari’a arises to some extent between the rules of the 
different Shari’a Schools, but it should be noted that the problem of conflict of laws is 
not so material in arbitration as each party will nominate its arbitrator, which can be 
considered as an implied choice of school. Article 1803 of the Majalla provides that 
the defendant in judicial proceedings is allowed to choose a judge from his own 
school if he has been brought before a judge from another school of law. The choice 
                                                 
190 The Quran 5: 45. 
191 The Quran 5: 47. 
192 M. Berger, ‘Conflicts of Law and Public Policy in Egyptian Family Law: Islamic Law Through the 
Backdoor’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 50 (2002), pp. 555-556. 
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can be made if the application of the other school’s teachings will result in a 
substantial change in the award or the judgment.193 To overcome this problem, there 
were four judges or judges belonging to the four schools of fiqh in major Muslim 
cities. Similar to that, judges in Saudi Arabia have the right to apply the teachings of 
the four schools on an equal basis. As a final remark, the application of the different 
Schools results in a very minor difference and in many cases, the four schools 
incorporate the opinions of each other within their teachings as different ways of 
interpreting the same legal text.   
2.7 Arbitrators 
 
2.7.1 Qualifications of Arbitrators 
 
An important condition for the validity of arbitral awards is that they be awarded by a 
qualified arbitrator. Also, having an arbitrator that lacks one of the qualifications can 
be solid ground for challenging an arbitral award not just under Shari’a, but as a 
recognised concept in all civilised arbitration rules. There has been a dispute between 
the four Schools of fiqh with regard to the required qualifications of arbitrators. There 
are two main views on whether the arbitrator should possess the qualifications of a 
judge or not. The difference in the requirements is based on the nature of the 
arbitration and whether it is similar to conciliation, agency or litigation. The first view 
does not require the arbitrator to possess all the qualifications of a judge. According to 
this view, the arbitrator should be a Muslim man only. This opinion has been reported 
by some Malikies and by Ibn Taymiyyah from the Hanbali School; they justified that 
arbitration is a kind of agency. For this reason, Ibn Taymiyyah held that an arbitral 
award is of no affect without judicial review.194 The second opinion represents the 
view of the majority of Muslim scholars which requires the arbitrator to possess all 
the qualifications of a judge.195 There are nine qualifications of a judge under the four 
schools’ law, which will be elaborated in turn. 
 
                                                 
193 Supra 99, Alatasi, Article 1803. 
194 Supra 175, Ibn Taymiyyah, vol. 35, p. 355. 
195 Supra 26, Al Kenain, p. 58. 
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2.7.1.1 The Arbitrator should be Muslim 
 
There is no doubt between all the scholars that a non-Muslim is not allowed to 
adjudicate in any dispute involving a Muslim element if the dispute concerns an 
action done within Muslim territory. According to the Malikies, the Shafi’es and the 
Hanbalies, arbitration proceedings in Muslim territory must be adjudicated by a 
Muslim arbitrator and non-Muslims should not serve as judges or as arbitrators, even 
to arbitrate between non-Muslims.196 However, the ban of non-Muslim arbitrators to 
arbitrate in a totally non-Muslim dispute might contradict the following Quranic 
verse: “So let the People of the Gospel judge according to what God has sent down 
therein”.197 On the other hand, the Hanafies have no restrictions on this issue and 
permit non-Muslims to arbitrate between non-Muslims in all subject matters in 
accordance with the above-quoted Quranic verse.198 
 
There are a lot of opinions regarding this point, each Scholar or group of scholars 
within the Hanbali School evidenced for their view; though the issue can be summed 
up as follows: 
Apart from settling their personal status disputes, non-Muslims are not allowed to 
serve as arbitrators inside Islamic territory. If the arbitration agreement provides for 
the settlement of the dispute by conciliation, then the arbitrators/conciliators can be 
non-Muslims because the agreement is considered to be an agency agreement which 
can be executed by them. Moreover, oral testimony and expert opinion from non-
Muslims are assumed to be valid.199 
 
2.7.1.2 The Arbitrator should be Mature 
 
Muslim Scholars did not doubt that maturity is one of the important qualifications of 
judges and arbitrators if it is not the most important one. Shari’a law assumes 
underage people to be under the authority and guardianship of others so they cannot 
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197 The Quran 5: 47. 
198 Supra 26, Al Kenain, p. 59. 
199 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14, p. 170. 
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have authority over other people.200 The Hanafies, Malikies and the Hanbalies 
expressed the prohibition of child arbitration because his testimony is not accepted 
and because he lacks the technical qualifications and experience. Some Malikies 
approve the arbitration of a child if he renders a correct judgment.201  
 
2.7.1.3 The Arbitrator should be Prudent  
 
As an essential condition for the acceptance of a testimony and oath, prudence is also 
a required quality that should be found in arbitrators.202 The four schools require the 
arbitrator/judge to be prudent. It is not sufficient for a judge/arbitrator to use his five 
senses like any ordinary man. He must have the ability to understand, analyse and 
solve complicated problems. Some Maliki Scholars do not prefer too much 
cleverness.203 Prudence and Adalah share many common aspects but Adalah seems to 
be more comprehensive as it includes prudence in addition to some other issues with 
regard to religion and behaviour. 
 
2.7.1.4 The Arbitrator should be Knowledgeable of the Shari’a Law        
 
An arbitrator must have enough understanding of the Shari’a law, especially the four 
agreed-upon sources of Shari’a, “the Quran, the Sunnah, the ijma’ and the Qiyas”, and 
a judgment without reference to one of these sources will be null, void and it will not 
be approved by the judge for enforcement. The Shafi’es, Hanbalies, and some 
Malikies and Hanafies require a judge/arbitrator to be a mujtahid i.e., have the ability 
to exercise the above-mentioned method of ijtihad.204 The majority of the Hanafies, 
some Malikies and some Hanbalies do not require him to be so. Ibn Taymiyyah from 
the Hanbali School argues that arbitrators should be specialists, and they are supposed 
to have enough knowledge in their areas of specialisation only. He added that a 
general knowledge of Islamic law should be obtained by the arbitrator in order to 
enable him to render a valid judgment that does not contradict with the main 
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principles of the Islamic Shari’a. The Malikies allow non-specialists to arbitrate 
provided that they seek specialists’ consultation and the award is totally based on the 
expert’s testimony, otherwise the award will be void.205  
 
2.7.1.5 The Arbitrator should Possess the Characteristics of 
AlAdalah  
 
The word adalah is a comprehensive term to describe a person’s character. Honesty, a 
stable mind, decent behaviour, good moral values, avoidance of forbidden things and 
major sins can constitute the character of an adl person.206 In contrast, the term fasiq 
is used to describe the opposite qualities and it is usually reserved to describe 
someone whose moral character is corrupt. According to the Malikies, the Shafi’es 
and the Hanbalies, if the authority appoints a judge who is not adl, he will have no 
valid authority and judgments.207 The Hanafies and some Malikies do not require a 
judge to be adl; they added that a non-adl person can have a valid authority and 
judgment if he has been appointed by the authority. In addition, some Malikies, 
Shafi’es and the Hanbalies have the concept of “necessity judge” which describes 
either an appointed judge who does not possess all the required qualifications or a 
powerful person with no legal authority to help run peoples’ daily lives.208  
 
Having decided on the issue of adalah as a requirement for a court judge, the question 
of whether an arbitrator has to be adl is a matter of dispute. Some Hanafies, the 
majority of the Malikies and the Hanbalies do not recognise the appointment and the 
judgment of a fasiq arbitrator because arbitration is equivalent to litigation. The other 
view recognises the appointment and the judgment of a non-adl or a fasiq if he is 
professionally qualified.209 It can be said that if a person’s testimony is accepted, his 
arbitration should be recognised.  
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2.7.1.6 The Arbitrator should be Male 
 
The Shari’a requires the arbitrator to be a man; according to Shari’a, the appointment 
of a woman as a judge/arbitrator is null and void even if she gives a correct 
judgment.210 Scholars have evidenced this opinion with the following Hadeeth: When 
the Prophet heard the news that the people of Persia had made the daughter of 
Khosrau their Queen, he said, "Never will succeed such a nation as makes a woman 
their ruler."211 They also applied the general principles of the following Quranic 
verse: “Two men shall serve as witnesses; if not two men, then a man and two women 
whose testimony is acceptable to all. Thus, if one woman becomes biased, the other 
will remind her”.212 According to this verse, a male’s testimony is equal to two 
women; therefore, it can be understood that women are not as competent as men to be 
in some positions, and the judiciary and arbitration are examples. The Hanafies do not 
require a judge/arbitrator to be a man and they permit woman’s arbitration except in 
crimes. The Hanafies’ practice contradicts with their opinion as the Hanafies ruled the 
Islamic countries for centuries during the Ottoman Empire and a woman had never 
been appointed as a judge. The vast majority of Muslim Scholars do not recognise the 
appointment of women arbitrators because women are not qualified to be judges.213   
 
2.7.1.7 The Arbitrator should not be Blind, Deaf or Mute 
 
A judge should not be blind, deaf or mute as such disabilities can impede him from 
rendering accurate judgments. Partial hardness in sight and hearing can be tolerated as 
long as it does not affect the arbitration.214 With regard to hearing and sight, scholars 
have three opinions; the Hanafies, the Shafi’es and some Hanbalies require the 
arbitrator not to be deaf or blind as one of these disabilities nullifies his appointment 
and it can be grounds for challenging the judgment.215 The second opinion was 
reported by the Maliki School; they said that sight and hearing are very important 
conditions that should be met in an arbitrator; however, if deafness or blindness 
                                                 
210 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 11, p. 380. 
211 Supra 43, Albukhari, vol. 9, Chapter 88, Hadeeth No. 219. 
212 The Quran 1: 282. 
213 Supra 26, Al Kenain, pp. 77-79.  
214 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 11, p. 381.  
215 Supra 209, Ibn Maza, vol. 4, p. 61. 
 88
occurs during the course of his appointment, the arbitrator should be replaced as soon 
as possible, but if he renders a judgment, it will be valid; they also apply the same 
conditions for talking disability. The third view has been reported by some Hanbalies 
who do not see blindness and deafness as obstacles to the appointment of the 
arbitrator. A Mute person cannot be appointed at all except in the view of some 
Shafi’es that requires him to be able to communicate by understandable sign 
language.216 
2.7.1.8 The Arbitrator should be Impartial 
 
Muslim Scholars paid a great deal of attention to the principle of impartiality of 
judges and arbitrators. The reasons behind such regulations are to promote justice and 
to give confidence in the legal system. There are a few issues that might harm the 
impartiality of the arbitrator and might prevent his appointment or serve as grounds 
for challenging the arbitral award. The first impediment is hostility; the Shafi’es see 
no problem if the award is in favour of the arbitrator’s opponent, but if it is not in his 
favour, they have two opinions; some of them do not allow the appointment on the 
ground of hostility because enemies are not allowed to be witnesses against each 
other. On the other hand, some other Shafi’e Scholars said that the ratification is 
subject to the disputant’s permission. The second impediment is dispute, which means 
any normal dispute even if it does not reach the level of hostility.217 There is a great 
deal of conflict regarding this issue but it can be summarised as follows: If the 
arbitrator is in dispute with both parties, some scholars reject his appointment and do 
not recognise his awards, and some allow him to arbitrate without conditions. If the 
arbitrator is in dispute with one of the disputants, there is unanimity on banning his 
arbitration.  
 
If the arbitrator is one of the parties to the same dispute, there are four views 
regarding the validity of his appointment. The first view allows one of the parties to 
the dispute to act as an arbitrator as long as he is adjudicating in equity. The second 
one does not allow a party to the dispute to serve as an arbitrator; the Hanafies 
justified this opinion by saying that a party to the dispute is not allowed to be a 
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witness against the other party so he is not allowed to arbitrate. The third opinion does 
not encourage one of the parties to be an arbitrator in the dispute, but if this happens 
the award is valid. The fourth one does not allow one of the parties to serve as an 
arbitrator in the same dispute unless he is willing to issue an award in favour of his 
opponent, as it will be considered as a form of admission (iqrar).218 The main view 
encourages the parties to avoid any suspicion with regard to the impartiality of the 
arbitrators; if they both agree on an arbitrator, his award will be valid.    
 
The third impediment to the impartiality of the arbitrator is kinship. The kinds of 
relationship that annul the appointment are fatherhood, motherhood including 
grandfathers, grandmothers, great-grandfathers and great-grandmothers or, what it is 
called in Arabic, “alosoul”. This category also includes children, grandchildren, and 
their children as well as the wife and husband in the Hanafi teachings. Scholars have 
two opinions regarding kinship; some Shafi’es and Hanafies allow kin to judge 
against his family members only; the others allow family members to be chosen as 
arbitrators.219    
 
2.7.2 The Appointment of the Arbitrators 
 
The appointment of an arbitrator is a contractual act entered into by two or more 
parties involved in a judicial or extra-judicial dispute.220 All parties should consent to 
the appointment of the arbitrator; there are some differences of opinion among the 
four schools as to whether the consent of the parties is required at the time of the 
appointment only or whether it should continue until the arbitrator makes his award. 
The appointment should be made in the arbitration agreement subject to the 
acceptance of the arbitrator as mentioned above.221 The Hanafies require an arbitrator 
to be known to the parties to avoid uncertainty; however, if a person arbitrates 
between two parties, without an appointment, and they accept his award, his 
appointment will apply retroactively.222 Some modern texts deny the institutional 
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appointment under Shari’a and argue that arbitration is an independent mechanism for 
settling disputes and it should not fall under the influence of any official institution.223 
This argument contradicts the Quran where the appointment of the arbitrators in 
family disputes should be done through the court judge as seen above.  
 
2.7.3 Number of Arbitrators 
 
Due to the circumstances of the pre-Islamic time, multiple arbitrators’ proceedings 
were unknown. Traditionally, arbitrators had to settle disputes alone, acting as single 
judges.224 All four schools permit the parties to have more than one arbitrator; the 
Shafi’es expressed their permission for having two arbitrators; the Hanafies, the 
Hanbalies and the Malikies allow parties to have more than two arbitrators.225 Some 
Hanbalies do not recommend the appointment of an even number of arbitrators for 
the sake of reaching unanimity when issuing the award, as it cannot be reached if the 
number of arbitrators is even. This approach was adopted by the Arbitration Act of 
1983 in Saudi Arabia, which will be seen below.   
 
2.7.4 Remuneration of the Arbitrators and Administration Fees 
 
The remuneration of judges has been recognised by all four schools which have 
recommended that a suitable remuneration be drawn from the public treasury to 
ensure their impartiality. The case is different with arbitration as it is a private dispute 
settlement method. Under all the Schools, the parties to the arbitration agreement 
should bear the fees of the arbitrators. The Hanbali scholar Ibn Qayem Aljaoziyah set 
two conditions for the arbitrator’s remuneration:  
First, an arbitrator should not receive any money from the public treasury for 
arbitration. The second, the money should be deposited with an impartial party before 
the commencement of the arbitral proceeding in order to guarantee the payment of the 
fees.226 Classical Shari’a treatises did not mention anything regarding administration 
                                                 
223 Supra 34, Saleh, p. 39. 
224 This effect can be seen in article 4 of the Arbitration Regulation of Saudi Arabia. 
225 Supra 26, Al Kenain, pp. 105-106. 
226 Ibn Qayem Aljaoziyah, Bada’I Alfawaid, ed. Hisham Ata, Adil Adawi and Ashraf Ahmad (1st edn., 
Nizar Mustafa Albaz Publishers, 1996), vol. 3, p. 146.     
 91
fees and experts’ remuneration. It seems that if the arbitration agreement does not 
state that the parties are going to bear the administration fees, such fees should be paid 
by the parties.   
 
2.7.5 Termination of the Office of the Arbitrator 
 
Under Shari’a, the arbitrator’s appointment may end before or after the settlement of 
the dispute. The appointment of an arbitrator may end by issuing the arbitral award; 
scholars mention that the issuance of the final award puts an end to the dispute or, 
what it is called in Arabic, “raf’ alneza’”, as the parties to the dispute are no longer in 
need of the services of the arbitrators.227 The second reason for the termination of the 
appointment is reaching a settlement outside the arbitral tribunal or what can be 
described as compulsory termination; reaching an amiable settlement outside the 
tribunal, exemption or rescheduling of a debt can be examples for the latter 
circumstance.228  
 
The appointment of an arbitrator can be terminated before reaching a settlement. The 
termination in this case can take the following forms: 
• Disqualification of an arbitrator: losing one or more of the required 
qualifications of an arbitrator disqualifies him from continuing in office and 
annuls the arbitration and the award. The concept of the continuity of the 
qualifications requires an arbitrator to be qualified throughout the arbitral 
procedure, from the date of the arbitration agreement until the issue of the 
award.229  
 
• The Absence of the Arbitrator: if the arbitrator’s absence affects the parties to 
the dispute, they have the choice to annul his appointment.230   
 
• The expiration of the arbitrator’s appointment: the parties to the dispute have 
the choice of appointing an arbitrator for a limited period of time. The 
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arbitrator has no jurisdiction over the dispute after the designated date unless 
the parties to the arbitration extend it, which will be considered as a new 
appointment.231  
 
• Termination by the arbitrator’s death or insanity: it is obvious that an 
arbitrator’s appointment terminates at the moment of his death or insanity.232  
 
• Revocation of the arbitrator’s authority: the arbitrator is not authorised to 
exercise his function without the continuing consent of either of the parties to 
the arbitration. The consent must continue until the issue of the arbitral award; 
the Malikies do not recognise the concept of revocability of the appointment 
made by the parties as they consider the appointment irrevocable.233  
 
The issue of revocability of the appointment of the arbitrator can be summarised as 
follows: The parties to the dispute can terminate the appointment of the arbitrator at 
any time and if the arbitrator issues an award after the revocation, the award will be 
considered void. On the other hand, if the appointment has been made through a judge 
(or in an institutional arbitration of nowadays), the revocation must be done through a 
judge again.234 If one party revokes the appointment of the arbitrator and the other 
denies, there are three views; each party to the dispute has the right to revoke the 
appointment of the arbitrator unilaterally at any time without any limitations because 
the arbitrator is an agent. The revocation is permissible before the commencement of 
the arbitration only. Parties to the dispute cannot revoke the appointment of the 
arbitrator after they accept it. A party to the arbitration cannot revoke the appointment 
unilaterally because that might be used fraudulently by the party that see the 
proceeding going not in their favour. 235 
 
Resignation of the arbitrator: Malikies do not accept the arbitrator’s resignation after 
the commencement of the arbitration without the parties’ approval. Other schools 
have various opinions; some scholars allow the arbitrator to resign at any time. If the 
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arbitrator refuses to perform his duty, either party can revoke the appointment without 
any remuneration.236          
2.8 Rules of Evidence 
 
The law on evidence in the Islamic Shari’a did not experience much change in the last 
10 centuries, which has left it out of date to some extent nowadays. Evidence can be 
defined as anything that tends to prove or disprove a fact at issue in a legal action.237 
There is a link between the concept of evidence and the definition of plaintiff in 
Islamic law. A plaintiff is not just the litigant who commences the judicial or arbitral 
proceedings. The plaintiff is the litigant who, by issuing the claim before the judge or 
the arbitrator, disrupts an apparently normal state of affairs by alleging that this state 
of affairs does not conform to his rights. The defendant is the party who admits or 
denies the plaintiff’s claim. Shari’a places the burden of proof on the plaintiff which 
can be justified on two grounds:  
• The existing situation is presumed to be the original and the normal state of 
affairs, and it is up to the plaintiff to establish the contrary. 
• A person summoned before the judge or the arbitrator is presumed to be free 
of liability.238 
  
There are six types of evidence under Shari’a; these rules have been set out firmly, 
leaving no room for the judge/arbitrator to choose the most convincing one as all of 
them have the same power. Apart from family disputes, the typical procedure before 
any Shari’a court consists of three stages. First the plaintiff lodges the claim which 
should be precise in all its details. The claim can be in writing or verbal at the time of 
the trial. At the second stage, the judge invites the defendant to answer the plaintiff’s 
claim. At this stage, the defendant will either admit the claim “iqrar” or denies it 
“nokoul”. If the defendant denies the claim, the judge will ask the plaintiff to adduce 
the evidence “baiyenah”. The final stage starts if the plaintiff fails to provide the court 
with the testimonial evidence; he may administer the oath “yameen or qasam”. If the 
defendant swears that the claim is groundless, the claim will be dismissed; however, if 
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the defendant refuses to take the oath, the case will be decided in favour of the 
plaintiff. 239 This is the normal procedure applied since the time of Prophet 
Muhammad till today in all Shari’a courts anywhere in the world.  
2.8.1 Admission “Iqrar”  
The iqrar or admission was ranked at the top by the Shari’a Scholars as there is a rule 
saying that “admission is the master of all types of evidence”. Iqrar has been defined as 
an admission on the part of a person that he owes an obligation to another person. There 
has been a dispute on whether the scope of the term would include a confession, either 
judicial or extra-judicial, or not. A recognisable admission is one that has been made by 
an adl defendant provided that he is not under duress; a valid admission should be 
precise with regard to the very specific facts and the circumstances in order to enable the 
arbitrator to issue a correct award.240 
2.8.2 Oral Testimony “Shahadah/Baiyenah” 
 
In Shari’a, oral testimony or “shahadah” is the primary means of evidence, prevailing 
over all other forms of evidence. The classical juridical reading of the Quranic verses 
privileges the oral testimony “shahadah” of two male witnesses over the written deed, 
as the primary form of legal proof in general.241   
 
  “The witnesses should not refuse when they are called on (to give their 
testimony).”242   
 
The Quran gives oral testimony a sacred character and obliges witnesses to perform it 
as a religious duty. Moreover, Shari’a sets a strict punishment for giving a false 
statement with intention. The punishment for giving a false statement ranges between 
seven and 75 lashes in a public place. In addition to the physical punishment, the false 
witness would be slandered and he would lose his credibility before courts forever; in 
other words, his testimony would not be accepted before any court or arbitration 
                                                 
239 See generally supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14.   
240 R. Peters, Crimes and Punishment in Islamic Law (1st edn., Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 
82. 
241 O. Arabi, ‘Orienting the Gaze: Marcel Morand and the Codification of Le Droit Musulman 
Algerien’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 11/1, pp. 43-72. 
242 The Quran 1: 282. 
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tribunal for the rest of his life.243 The punishment for a false witness was determined 
in principle in the following Quranic verse: “And those who launch a charge against 
chaste women, and produce not four witnesses “to support their allegations” lash 
them with eighty stripes; and reject their evidence ever after”.244 The interpretation of 
this principle in cases other than the accusation of adultery depends on the discretion 
of the court. The qualifications of a witness vary from one school to another; 
however, a witness should be a trustworthy Muslim person who has reached the age 
of puberty and he should not be subject to any incapacity. The testimony of non-
Muslims is accepted in all subject matters except in Hodoud. The four schools of fiqh 
require a thorough investigation of the witness’ trustworthiness because if there is any 
doubt about it, the witness will not be heard. The oral testimony is to be administered 
on the spot by the arbitrator and according to the Hanafies, at the request of the 
witness. Disqualified witnesses are the same people who are not allowed to participate 
as arbitrators in a dispute.245 According to the Quran, a male’s testimony is equal to 
two women’s; the Quran justified that one woman may forget the incident so the other 
one reminds her.246  
2.8.3 Oath “Qasam/Yameen”          
   
According to the reported practice of Prophet Muhammad, the oath is the final step in 
any court proceeding. Arbitrators resort to giving an oath by a special request from 
the plaintiff in case he became unable to adduce evidence of his rights or he did but 
his evidence was incomplete, like if he has one male and one female witness or two 
females only. The qualifications of a party to be able to give a credible oath are the 
same as those of the witness. If the defendant takes the oath, the arbitrator may decide 
on the case in his favour; however, some Hanafies consider the oath as a second-class 
form of evidence and allow the plaintiff to challenge the oath.247 On the other hand, 
scholars of other schools require an additional oath to be taken by the plaintiff, subject 
to a request from the defendant, in case the arbitrator decides the case in favour of the 
plaintiff.248 The Quran gives the oath a sacred nature and warns parties about lying 
                                                 
243 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14, p. 262. 
244 The Quran 24: 4. 
245 Look at the impartiality of the arbitrator. 
246 The Quran 1: 282. 
247 Supra 34, Saleh, p. 64 and supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, p. 145. 
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under oath as in the following Quranic verse: “surely, those who take a small price by 
(breaking) the covenant of Allah and their oaths, for them there is no share in the 
Hereafter, and Allah will neither speak to them, nor will He look towards them on the 
Day of Judgment, nor will He purify them. For them there is a painful punishment”.249  
A Muslim party taking the oath has to swear on the Quran; in the case of a non-
Muslim party, he should swear on something sacred for him such as the Bible for 
Christians and the Torah for Jews.250       
2.8.4 Written Evidence  
 
The Quran encourages parties to any contract to write it down. This principle was 
disputed between classical Scholars over whether it is a binding condition for the 
validity of a contract or it is just a recommendation. The division in the opinion is due 
to the understanding of the following verse, which is the longest verse in the Quran: 
  
“O you who believe, when you contract a debt for a fixed time, write it down. And let 
a scribe write it down between you with fairness; nor should the scribe refuse to write 
as Allah has taught him, so let him write. And let him who owes the debt dictate and 
he should observe his duty to Allah, his Lord, and not diminish anything from it. But if 
he who owes the debt is unsound in understanding or weak, or (if) he is not able to 
dictate himself, let his guardian dictate with fairness. And call to witness from among 
your men two witnesses; but if there are not two men, then one man and two women 
from among those whom you choose to be witnesses, so that if one of the two errs, the 
one may remind the other. And the witnesses must not refuse when they are 
summoned. And be not averse to writing it whether it is small or large along with the 
time of its falling due. This is more equitable in the sight of Allah and makes 
testimony surer and the best way to keep away from doubts. But when it is ready 
merchandise which you give and take among yourselves from hand to hand, there is 
no blame on you in not writing it down. And have witnesses when you sell one to 
another. And let no harm be done to the scribe or to the witnesses. And if you do (it), 
                                                 
249 The Quran 2: 77. 
250 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, p. 145. 
 97
then surely it is a transgression on your part. And keep your duty to Allah. And Allah 
teaches you. And Allah is Knower of all things.”251 
 
2.8.5 Presumptions (Qara’en) 
 
It has been reported that Prophet Muhammad and his companions had decided on 
some cases on the basis of presumptions or the legal method of istis’hab. The use of 
presumptions in giving judgments has been given a wider scope by Hanbali Scholars; 
according to them, the refusal of the defendant to take an oath is a presumption in 
favour of the plaintiff and the presumption of ownership if a property is in possession 
of one of the parties for a long time with no proof to the contrary.252  
 
2.8.6 Personal Knowledge of the Judge or the Arbitrator 
 
Giving a judgment on the basis of the judge/arbitrator’s personal knowledge is 
prohibited in all the schools except the Hanafi School. Basing a judgment on the 
judge’s/arbitrator’s own knowledge raises suspicion of bias and can be the grounds to 
challenge the award. The Hanbalies left no room for the arbitrator’s own knowledge 
of the fact of the dispute as he is totally not allowed to rely on it in rendering the 
award without evidence.253    
 
2.9 Rules of Fair Trial 
 
Islamic law established its own rules of fair trial to guarantee justice and equality. 
Some of these rules were derived from the practices of Arabs before Islam and upheld 
by the Shari’a. In the Shari’a view, the choice of a qualified and impartial judge is the 
first step to achieve justice. Thus, the Shari’a concentrated first on the impartiality of 
judges and arbitrators; therefore, Shari’a governs their social lives. A judge as well as 
any official is not allowed to accept gifts, while he is at office, from someone he did 
                                                 
251 The Quran 1: 282. 
252 See in general supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14, p. 156. 
253 Ibid.  
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not exchange gifts with before his appointment as such an act might raise the 
suspicion of bias.254 The Hanafi scholars discouraged judges from receiving gifts 
while some other scholars considered a mere gift to a judge as a bribe.255 Prophet 
Muhammad gave the prohibition of accepting gifts a religious character as in the 
following Hadeeth: “What is wrong with the employee whom we appoint that he 
returns to say, 'this is for you and that is for me?' Why didn't he stay at his father's 
and mother's house to see whether he will be given gifts or not? By Him in Whose 
Hand my life is, whoever takes anything illegally will bring it on the Day of 
Resurrection by carrying it over his neck”. 256 Moreover, Hanbali Scholars do not 
allow judges to conduct business. Bribery is totally prohibited by the Quran and the 
Sunnah; the punishment expands to cover the corrupter and the corrupted and all 
persons in connection with it.  
  
The principle of equal treatment of the parties to the dispute has various forms under 
Shari’a. All litigants, without exception, must be granted reasonable access to the 
place of hearing. The procedure must be carried out with equal speed; no priority 
should be given except in some cases where a delay might harm the litigants like in 
the case of travellers and ill people. In the course of the hearing, the judge/arbitrator 
should address each litigant in an equally composed tone; the equality should also be 
reflected in the way that the litigants are seated. The judge/arbitrator should not greet 
one litigant with undue warmth and have a personal conversation as it might create a 
feeling of unjust with the other litigant.257 If one of the parties to the dispute does not 
speak Arabic and the judge/arbitrator does not know his language, two translators, 
only one is required by the Hanafies and some Hanbalies, must attend the hearing to 
translate between the litigants and the judge/arbitrator. The translators should possess 
the characters of adalah as he will be considered as a witness to the statement of that 
party.258 
 
Under Shari’a, the arbitrator is not allowed to decide on a dispute without hearing all 
the parties and giving them the chance to present all their evidence. There are strict 
                                                 
254 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14, p. 58. 
255 Ibid. p. 59. 
256 Supra 43, Albukhari, Chapter 8, Hadeeth No. 162.  
257 See generally The Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, Litigation in Saudi Arabia, History, 
Institutions and Principles (1st edn., The Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, 1999).   
258 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14, p. 84. 
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conditions for issuing a judgment in absentia as such a judgment requires judicial 
review before its execution because the defendant might have a defence against the 
claim; however, according to the Malikies and some Hanbalies, a judge/arbitrator is 
not allowed to issue a judgment in absentia at all.259  
   
The Shari’a understood that parties have different abilities in representing their cases; 
therefore, Shari’a assumes that substantive truth should prevail over procedural 
technicalities as embodied in the following Hadeeth: “You people present your cases 
to me and some of you may be more eloquent and persuasive in presenting their 
argument. So, if I give some one's right to another (wrongly) because of the latter's 
“tricky” presentation of the case, I am really giving him a piece of fire; so he should 
not take it”.260 This Hadeeth affects the res judicata aspects of a judgment/award but 
only to a limited extent and no more than the western concept of retrial would affect 
the award.261  
2.10 Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under Shari’a 
 
2.10.1 The Nature of the Arbitral Award 
 
The objective of an arbitral award is to settle the dispute and to put an end to the 
conflict between the parties or, what it is called in Arabic, raf’ alneza’. Arbitration 
loses its objective of settling disputes if arbitral awards lack enforceability.262 Despite 
some Scholars who require the disputants’ approval, an award is enforceable and 
binding on the parties from the moment it becomes final and it has the same effects 
and power as a court judgment. The arbitrator has no right to decline his award, and 
even if he declines and issues another award in favour of the other party, the latter 
award will be void. No third party would be affected by the arbitral award because the 
arbitrator has no jurisdiction over anyone but the parties to the dispute who agreed to 
obey the arbitrator’s decision and execute it on themselves. The Hanbali Scholars 
require ratification from a judge before enforcing any arbitral award.263 
                                                 
259 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14, p. 96. 
260 Supra 43, Albukhari, Chapter 3, Hadeeth No. 845. 
261 Supra 34, Saleh, pp. 70-71. 
262 Supra 26, Al Kenain, pp. 141-145. 
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2.10.2 The Content of the Arbitral Award 
 
The content of an arbitral award does not differ from any ordinary court judgment. 
The award should include a sufficient description of the merits of the dispute at issue, 
then the findings of fact substantiated by the Shari’a rules of evidence, the reasoning 
under usul alfiqh with references to the Shari’a sources and finally the decision. An 
award that lacks the findings of fact under Shari’a rules of evidence or a valid 
reasoning according to Shari’a substantive rules will not be accepted. The arbitrators 
have the right to correct material errors in the award from the time of issuing the 
award until referring to the court for an enforcement order.264   
2.10.3 Challenge of the Arbitral Award 
 
Parties to the dispute may accept the arbitral award and execute it, and they may ask 
for further judicial review. Each school has its own view regarding the ability of 
parties to challenge the arbitral award, which can be summarised as follows: The 
Maliki scholars consider arbitral awards as unchallengeable, and the judge cannot 
revoke it as long as it does not contradict with the main sources of Shari’a except if it 
entails serious prejudice. According to the Hanbali Scholars, an arbitral award carries 
the same influence as a court decision and it can be revoked under the same 
conditions that revoke a court judgment. The Hanafies see the possibility of revoking 
an arbitral award in the case when the award is not in compliance with the appellant’s 
Mathhab or school; however, the revocation is not mandatory, it is up to the judge 
who should pay attention to the relevant circumstances when reviewing the award. 
The Shafi’es have two opinions with regard to the strength of the arbitral award; one 
of them gives the arbitral award the same strength as a court judgment where the 
judge has to treat the arbitral award in the same way that they treat other judges’ 
judgments. The other view requires the parties’ consent to accept the award or reject 
it. In such a case, there is no challenge of the arbitral award because the award is not 
binding; therefore, there is no need to challenge it. 265 
                                                 
264 See generally A. Al Kenain, Tasbeeb Alahkam Alqadaiyyah fe Alshari’a Alislamiyah (1st edn., Al 
Kenain, 1999). 
265 Supra 105, Ibn Nujaim, vol. 7, p. 26; see also supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 11, p. 484. 
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2.10.4 Judicial Remedies 
 
After the issuance of the arbitral award, the parties to the arbitration have two options 
available in case they are not satisfied with the outcomes of the arbitral award. 
2.10.4.1 Revocation 
 
Parties to the dispute may ask for the revocation of the arbitral award. This issue takes 
us back to the nature of arbitration under the teachings of each school; if arbitration is 
similar to conciliation or to agency contract, the award can be revoked on the same 
grounds of revoking any normal contract. If the arbitration has a judicial nature, the 
revocation cannot be done without an obvious error in the award or at any stage of the 
arbitral procedure. If the judge revokes the arbitral award, he is not obliged to decide 
on the case again unless he has been asked to do so by one of the parties to the 
dispute. On the other hand, if the judge upholds the arbitral award, his judgment will 
be treated as an enforcement order.266 
2.10.4.2 Appeal 
 
The parties to the arbitration may appeal to the arbitration panel or to the court. In this 
situation, the judge will revoke the arbitral award and issue a new award if he accepts 
the appeal. 267 
2.11 Miscellaneous Issues 
 
2.11.1 The Seat of the Arbitration 
 
The seat theory did not receive any attention from the classical Muslim Scholars 
because it has no affect on the arbitration. None of the classical treatises mention 
anything with regard to the seat of the arbitration; however, the seat of the arbitration 
is to be decided according to the parties as a clause in the arbitration agreement.  
 
                                                 
266 Supra 3, Saiyed, p. 74. 
267 Ibid.  
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2.11.2 The Rights of Third Parties 
 
Generally speaking, the effect of the arbitral award must not extend to anyone other 
than the parties to the dispute. If a third party has got an interest in the enforcement of 
the arbitral award, they can send their request to the court.268  
2.11.3 The Unanimity of the Award  
 
If the arbitration proceeds by a sole arbitrator, the problem of conflict of opinions 
with regard to the final decision between the arbitrators will not exist as the task of 
making the award is an individual process; however, scholars agreed that if each 
arbitrator has got a different opinion, the award will be void. The award should 
comply with the opinion of the majority of the arbitrators in order to be fair and just. 
The Hanbali treatises suggested that there are four methods of issuing the arbitral 
award if the arbitrators do not reach an agreement: 
First, when drafting the arbitration agreement, the number of arbitrators should be 
odd. Second, the assistance of an external arbitrator should be sought and the case 
should be decided according to his opinion. The external arbitrator is not allowed to 
come up with a new opinion; his job is to choose one of the available decisions only. 
Third, if the arbitrators fail to issue the award, the dispute can be decided by another 
tribunal or by a sole arbitrator.269 This option may lengthen the dispute, which 
contradicts with one of the main objectives of choosing arbitration as a swift dispute 
settlement mechanism. Fourth, if unanimity cannot be reached, and the parties to the 
dispute have exhausted the above-mentioned methods, they can refer the dispute to 
litigation as a last resort.270     
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2.12 Conclusion 
 
  
This chapter represented the way in which the Islamic Shari’a regulated arbitration 
proceedings in a comprehensive way that covered all its important aspects from the 
formation of the arbitration agreement to the enforcement of the final arbitral award. 
The chapter also showed a great deal of attention and support for arbitration to be a 
real alternative to litigation in all subject matters. When comparing the Shari’a 
arbitration rules with any current rule, no substantial difference can be found. The 
above rules are the basis for most arbitration regulations in most Muslim countries 
nowadays. Before continuing to the arbitration regulations in Saudi Arabia, which are 
codifications of the Hanbali teachings as introduced by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn 
Qodamah, the next chapter will examine the regulatory attitude toward arbitration in 
Saudi Arabia.      
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3 Arbitration in the Saudi Legal System from 1920s 
till Now 
 
Commercial arbitration has existed in the Saudi legal system since the enactment of 
the Code of Commercial Courts in 1931. Nonetheless, International arbitration was 
not always welcomed by the Saudi government. At first, the Saudi Government did 
not oppose resorting to International Arbitration; however, due to some unexpected 
circumstances at that time, the Government restricted resorting to International 
arbitration. This restriction started to relax in the mid-1970s; yet, the openness to 
international arbitration took its steps in a very slow mode. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the regulatory attitude toward International arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia. This chapter starts by giving a brief overview of the Saudi legal system and 
the structure of the judicial bodies in Saudi Arabia in accordance with the recent 
amendments to the law of the judiciary and the law of Diwan Almazalim. It will then 
move to talk about a few other related issues such as the issues of Wahhabism and the 
Saudi legal system, the roles of women in the Saudi legal system, the role of the 
official Mufti in protecting the Shari’a tradition as well as the foreign influence on the 
Saudi law. After that, the regulatory attitude toward international arbitration will be 
examined. This section will be divided into two main parts. The first part will discuss 
the regulatory attitude toward arbitration from the creation of the Saudi state in the 
1930s to the first oil boom in the 1970s. This part will examine the arbitration cases 
that the Saudi Government was a party to such as Wahat Alburaimi and the well-
known case of Arabian American Oil Company v. Saudi Arabia “Aramco Case” and 
its impacts on the Saudi legal system. The second part will cover the period from the 
mid-1970s till now; this period experienced a shift in the attitude to attract foreign 
investment. 
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3.1 The Establishment of the Legal System in Saudi 
Arabia 
 
3.1.1 The Foundation (1920s-1960s) 
 
The modern state of Al Saud was established in 1932, when The King of Hejaz and 
the Sultan of Najd, Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
with himself as absolute monarch. Since his first days as the King of Hejaz, King 
Abdul-Aziz was concerned with establishing a modern independent legal system 
based on the principles of the Islamic Shari’a. In issue No. 64 of Umm Alqura, the 
official gazette, dated 5/9/1344 H (18/03/1926), King Abdul-Aziz issued the first 
provisional regulation for the judiciary; according to that royal decree, the act had the 
title of Provisional Act to Reform the Shari’a Courts. The act consists of 15 articles, 
in its very simple wording; the act gave general guidance and established the 
framework of the Shari’a courts. In his speech at Majlis Alshura,271 King Abdul-Aziz 
held the Shari’a principles as the main source of legislation in the kingdom. He also 
added that all legislations should be approved by the Shura Council before they 
become effective in order to enhance transparency and public participation in the 
process of decision making.272 In the next year, another royal decree called for the 
establishment of two summary courts in Mecca in addition to the Shari’a Supreme 
Court “Almahkamah Alshar’iyah Alkobra”. The decree also called for establishing 
summary courts and Shari’a courts in Jeddah and Medina.273 The same royal decree 
established a committee to be in charge of appeals and judicial supervision under the 
name of “Hay’ at Almuragaba Alqada’iyah”; the name of the committee changed 
later on to be “Hay’at Altadqeqat Alshar’iyah”. The committee used to serve as a 
court of appeal as well as a regulator and supervisor for all the judicial bodies in the 
Kingdom at that time.274 A few weeks later, the King gave his order to establish 
ketabat alad’l “the notary public”.275 The provisional law of 1926 was replaced in 
                                                 
271 It is a consultative body equivalent to parliament; it was founded in 1924 under the name of Almajlis 
Alahli (The National Council).    
272 The speech dated 9/03/1349 H. (1930).   
273 Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 140 dated 21/02/1346 H. (1927). 
274 Ibid.  
275 Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 143 dated 13/03/1346 (1927) and issue No. 144 dated 20/03/1346 
(1927). 
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1931 by nizam sair almuhakamat alshar’iyah, which was more comprehensive than 
the previous one and it was more concerned with the procedural issues of judicial 
proceedings. The new act came with 36 articles only; the act was amended in 1936 to 
142 articles under the title of nizam almurafa’at. In 1938, another act established the 
competence of judges and their responsibilities. The latter two acts were redrafted in 
1952 under the titles of “nizam tarkeez almasoliyat alshar’iyah and nizam tanzeem al 
a’amal al idariyah fee aldawa’er alshar’iyah”. By a royal decree dated 23/10/1381 
(1962), the old committee for judicial supervision or Hay’at Altadqeqat Alshar’iyah 
was replaced by Mahkamat Altamyeez or the court of appeal which opened in Mecca 
in the same year. The court of appeal worked under a provisional regulation till the 
approval of its law by Royal Decree No. 24836 dated 29/10/1386 H (1967); the new 
regulation gave Mahkamat Altamyeez an exclusive duty to serve as a superior court 
instead of the load of duties of the old committee which included the revision of the 
regulations, legal consultation, a commercial court in some situations in addition to its 
duty as a court of appeal.276 The above regulations established the foundation of the 
Saudi judicial system which was followed by many Royal Decrees and Ministerial 
decisions, and administrative circulations in many fields of activity such as 
commerce, banking, labour, social security, arbitration, etc. Such legislations intend to 
complement the Shari’a, not to replace it, and they can also be considered as updates 
to the existing Shari’a principles.                                                                                                                                                 
 
3.2 The Judicial Bodies in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the competence for the settlement of disputes was generally divided 
between different judicial and semi-judicial bodies. These bodies are supervised by 
different Ministries in accordance with the subject matter of the dispute. The Judicial 
bodies in Saudi Arabia are:    
• The Judicial bodies under the Ministry of Justice, Shari’a Courts, Court of 
Appeal, etc 
• The Independent judicial authorities: the Board of Grievances “Diwan 
Almazalim”  
                                                 
276 See supra 257, Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, p. 89. 
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• The Semi-judicial committees such as The Committee for the Settlement of 
Negotiable Instruments Disputes of the Ministry of Commerce, The 
Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes of SAMA, The 
Committee for the Settlement of Labour Disputes of the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs, etc.  
  
3.2.1 The Ministry of Justice 
 
In 1962, King Faisal gave his order for establishing the Ministry of Justice; however, 
it was another eight years before the ministry started its activities. The first judiciary 
law was issued by Royal Decree No. (M/64) of 1395 H (1975); this law experienced a 
major amendment in 2007. The recent amendments will change the face of the Saudi 
judicial system considerably, as for the first time there will be specialised courts for 
each branch of legal practice in Saudi Arabia. Prior to these amendments, the judge 
who decided on criminal matters now might settle an inheritance dispute 30 minutes 
later. The Ministry of Justice was allowed a transition period of two years before the 
new law became effective. Similar to the previous law, the new law contains several 
sections covering various issues related to the judicial system, such as provisions 
securing the independence and impartiality of the courts, the types of courts and their 
jurisdictions, judges, their appointments and promotions, the role of the Ministry of 
Justice, etc. Interestingly, the Law comprises 85 articles on eight A4 pages only.  
 
In the foreseeable future, there will be three main divisions for the Shari’a courts in 
Saudi Arabia. According to article 9 of the judiciary law of 2007, the Shari’a courts 
shall consist of: 
• The High Court, Almahkama Al’olia   
• The Court of Appeal, Mahkamat Alisti’naaf 
• The Courts of First Instance, Mahakim Aldaraja Al’oula. This class of 
courts was subdivided into: 
o General Courts 
o Courts of Personal Status 
o Commercial Courts 
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o Labour Courts.277  
 
3.2.1.1 The High Court, Almahkama Al’olia   
 
The High Court will be constituted to replace the Supreme Judicial Council or Majlis 
Alqada’ Al A’ala, which in its current structure is a result of many decades of 
development from the committee of judicial supervision in the 1920s till the 
enactment of the previous Law of Judiciary of 1975. The new High Courts will have 
legislative, administrative and judicial powers. The High Court as a successor to the 
Supreme Judicial Council will be the highest judicial authority in the Kingdom which 
makes it the final court of appeal. The duties of the High Court in accordance with 
article 11 of the Law of Judiciary of 2007 are: 
 
• Giving legal opinions with regard to issues related to the judiciary upon 
request of the Minister of Justice; 
• Examining questions referred to it by the King to issue Shari’a guidance with 
regard to it; 
• Reviewing death, amputation or stoning sentences; 
• Reviewing cases in which one of the parties is not satisfied with the decision 
of the court of appeal in case the decision of the Court contradicts with the 
Shari’a or the decision is issued by a court that lacks the competence to 
decide on the issue at dispute;    
• Examining Shari’a questions that, in the opinion of the Minister of Justice, 
require a statement of general Shari’a principles. 
 
Similar to the Supreme Judicial Council, the High Court’s decisions on cases referred 
to it from the court of appeal are binding upon all other courts including the court of 
appeal. As a result, the High Courts have a powerful influence on the development of 
the Law in the country.  
 
With regard to the publication of judicial decisions and court decisions, Diwan 
                                                 
277 The Law of the Judiciary of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. (M/78) dated 19/09/1428 H. Umm 
Alqura Gazette, issue No. 4170 dated 30/09/1428 H. (12/10/2007).  
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Almazalim’s decisions are not yet available to the public which contradicts with the 
basic rules of transparency and justice. The previous Law of Judiciary of 1975 
provided for the publication of a selection of judicial decisions regularly; however, 
the first volume of the judicial decisions report of the Saudi courts was issued 32 
years later in 2007 under the title of Modawanat Alahkam Alqada’iyah with a small 
selection consisting of 39 court decisions and nine of the Supreme Judicial Council’s 
resolutions.278  
3.2.1.2 The Court of Appeal  
 
The court of appeal was established in 1927, under the name of Hay’at Altadqeqat 
Alshar’iyah. After the enactment of the Law of Judiciary of 1975, the same 
Committee functioned under the name of Mahkamat Altameez. The new law added a 
new division to this court and divided it into five departments: the Civil Division, 
Criminal Division, Personal Status Division, Commercial Division and Labour 
Division.279  
3.2.1.3 Courts of First Instance  
 
The general courts were established by the same Royal Order that established the 
court of appeal in 1927. The judge in these courts sits alone except in cases of 
executions, stoning, amputation, kidnapping, armed robbery and other serious 
criminal offences specified in the Judiciary Act that must be decided by three 
judges.280 These courts have civil and criminal jurisdiction as they deal with more 
cases than other judicial bodies in the Kingdom. Saudi Courts in general assume 
jurisdiction over all cases brought before them except in cases in rem involving real 
estate located outside the Kingdom.281 The general courts have the authority to deal 
with all civil and criminal cases regardless of their nature and financial value, unless 
the case falls under the competence of other judicial bodies that have been given 
exclusive jurisdiction, such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Ministry of 
                                                 
278 See generally The Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, Modawanat Alahkam Alqada’iyah (1st and 
2nd edn., Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, 2007).  
279 See the Law of Judiciary of 2007, article 16.  
280 Article 10.4, the Judiciary Act of 2007. 
281 See the law of procedure before Shari’a Courts, Royal Decree No. (M/21) dated 20/05/1421 
(19/08/200). Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 3811 dated 17/06/1421 (15/09/200). 
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Commerce, Ministry of Information, etc.282 The new Law of Judiciary provides that 
such courts should be divided into five different departments, which are: the Civil 
Division, Criminal Division, Personal Status Division, Commercial Division and 
Labour Division.283 The law joined some of the semi-judicial committees in the new 
courts. With the exception of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes, 
all the semi-judicial committees will be incorporated in the new courts in two years’ 
time. 
3.2.2 Independent Judicial Bodies 
 
The Shari’a courts have general jurisdiction over civil disputes; however, the judicial 
regulation takes into account the constitution of specialised courts. The word 
independent means that there is a dichotomy between these bodies and the authority 
of the Ministry of Justice. The jurisdiction of these bodies is defined both in terms of 
the subject matter and of the parties to the dispute.284 The rule is that these 
commissions do not usually have the jurisdiction to adjudicate cases that the Saudi 
government or any of its entities is a party to because such disputes should fall under 
the competence of the Board of Grievances, hereinafter Diwan Almazalim. The next 
few paragraphs will give a brief overview of the authority most connected with 
arbitration in Saudi Arabia in general and to banking disputes in particular. It should 
be noted that some of these Committees will either disappear or be incorporated in the 
courts of first instance in the next two years.   
 
3.2.2.1 Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments 
Disputes 
 
The Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes is also known 
as The Negotiable Instruments Office. The Committee falls under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Established by the Law of Negotiable 
Instruments, the Commercial Paper Committee, also known as the Office for the 
Settlement of Commercial Papers Disputes, has the jurisdiction to hear claims 
                                                 
282 Ibid.  
283 Article 20 of the Judiciary Act of 2007. 
284 Supra 134, Lerrick and Mian, p. 222.  
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concerning bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques. The Negotiable 
Instruments Law provides the substantive legal provisions applied by the Commercial 
Paper Committee.285 The law largely reproduces the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes of 
June 7, 1930 and for Cheques of March 9, 1931, even though Saudi Arabia has not 
become a party to the conventions themselves. As Shari’a forbids the payment and 
charging of interest, provisions in the Conventions relating to interest were omitted 
from the Negotiable Instruments Law. In practice, this position has been applied by 
offsetting interest payments voluntarily made by the debtor, against the principle of 
the debt. The procedure before the Committee is subject to the provisions of the Code 
of Commercial Courts of 1931. Decisions may be appealed to the Minister of 
Commerce.286 The competence of settling negotiable instruments disputes will move 
to the Commercial Courts by 2009 and as a result, this Committee will disappear.  
 
3.2.2.2 The Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes of the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency “SAMA” 
 
The Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes was established under the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) for the purpose of settling disputes between 
banks and their clients arising from contracts and transactions which do not concern 
commercial papers such as bills of exchange which should be settled through a 
different Committee. In exercising its powers, the Committee may decide to freeze a 
party’s assets or restrict parties from travelling outside of Saudi Arabia.  
 
The Committee consists of three members who are appointed by the Ministry of 
Finance upon the recommendation of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency governor. 
There is only one Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes in the Kingdom, 
which is located in Riyadh. The Committee is under the umbrella of SAMA and all its 
members are SAMA employees. All members are equal. The working mechanisms of 
the Committee will be examined in detail in the last chapter.  
 
                                                 
285 The Law of Commercial Papers, Nizam Alawraq Altejariyah. Issued by Royal Decree No. 37 dated 
11/10/1383 H. (1963). Umm Alqura Gazette issue No. 2010 dated 15/10/1383 H. (1963).  
286 Ibid.  
 112
3.2.2.3 The Board of Grievances Diwan Almazalim 
 
The Board of Grievances, hereinafter Diwan Almazalim, was created in 1955 as a 
department of the Council of Ministers Majlis Al wuzara’.287 The Board was later 
reconstituted as an independent entity.288 At first the Board served as a general 
clearing house for complaints in the public domain; it has since evolved into the most 
important administrative and judicial body outside the Shari’a courts.289 Some authors 
argued that Diwan Almazalim is a sort of Conseil d’Etat that has been borrowed by 
the Egyptians from the Code of Napoleon; however, the principle of Qadi Almazalim 
was well known in the Shari’a treatises many centuries prior to the foundation of the 
Napoleonic Laws.290     
 
Upon its establishment, Diwan Almazalim’s competence was limited to receiving and 
investigating complaints that the government or a governmental entity was a party 
to.291 Due to the rapid economic growth following the oil boom in the 1970s and the 
trend to reduce the load of cases on the Shari’a courts as well as founding a 
specialised legal body for settling commercial matters where the application of strict 
Shari’a rules may be seen as an impediment to the flow of foreign investment, the 
settlement of commercial and investment disputes has been added to the competence 
of the Diwan.292 Another important step in that direction came when the Diwan was 
given the power to entertain applications for the execution of foreign judgments when 
questions of public policy usually arise.293 The Diwan remained as a commercial and 
administrative court until the issuance of the new Law of Diwan Almazalim, which 
changed the structure of the Diwan considerably.294 The Competence of the Diwan 
was restricted by the new law which transferred the competence of settling 
                                                 
287 See the Royal Decree No. 02/13/8759 of 1374 H. (1955). 
288 See the Royal Decree No. (M/51) of 1402 H. (1982). 
289 G. Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 36 
(1988), pp. 729-744.   
290 See generally M. Hanson, ‘The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi 
Arabia’, Arab Law Quarterly, 2 (1987), p. 272.   
291 Ibid.  
292 Ibid. See also the Royal Decree No. (M/51) of 1402 H. (1982). This opinion proved to be not 
accurate for the reason that the Board of Grievances functions in the same way as Shari’a courts, as 
will be seen in chapter 5 of this study.  
293 K. Roy, ‘The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy 
Defence to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?’, Fordham International Law 
Journal, 18 (1994-1995), p. 922.  
294 The Law of Diwan Almazalim of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. (M/78) dated 19/09/1428 H. 
Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 4170 dated 30/09/1428 H. (12/10/2007). 
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commercial disputes from the Diwan to the new courts of first instance. With regard 
to arbitration, the Diwan is still the competent authority for the supervision of the 
arbitration proceedings in Saudi Arabia. The Diwan is also competent for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, both foreign and domestic, in addition to the 
enforcement of foreign judgments subject to the Riyadh Convention of 1983.295  
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
3.3 Wahhabism and the Saudi Law 
3.3.1 Foundation and Origin 
 
After September 2001, the Western world started to talk about something called 
Wahhabism when describing the Saudi state, law and the religious institution in Saudi 
Arabia. The term Wahhabism or Wahhabiya has been used to describe the Islamic 
revival and reform movement in the 18th century in the centre of Arabia. The 
movement mainly concentrated on restoring the correct Islamic rituals and belief as 
polytheism spread widely as a result of ignorance of Shari’a, especially among 
Bedouins and people of remote villages and oases. Unlike some other reform 
movements of that era, the movement of Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab (1702-1791) 
did not start as a response to an external factor such as European imperialism, 
hostility against the Turkish or the desire for political independence. The Wahhabi 
movement arose in response to internal conditions, notably the perceived deterioration 
in Muslim beliefs and practices.296 What is called Wahhabism is no more than a 
socio-religious reform movement without any major contribution to the Islamic fiqh 
because Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab was following the teachings of the late 
Hanbali scholars, especially Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Alqayem.297 The name 
Wahhabiya has been given to the movement of Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab 
by its opponents as the followers of ibn Abdulwahhab used to call themselves 
Almuahhideen (the Unitarians).298 
 
                                                 
295 The Arab League Convention for Judicial Co-operation (Riyadh Convention). Signed in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia on 4/04/1983.   
296 See generally M. Kurdi, Altareekh Alqaweem Le Mecca Wa Bait Allah Alkareem (1st edn., Albaz 
Publications, 1962), vol. 5.  
297 Ibid.  
298 N. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam from Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (1st edn., Oxford 
University Press), p. 8. 
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The movement of Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab, or the Sheikh as his followers call 
him, has been described outside Najd as “Islamic Orthodoxy”. The opponents of the 
movement inside Najd and within the Islamic world tried to stop it by attacking the 
Sheikh himself and his movement by, for instance, alleging that the Wahhabi school 
displays an extreme hostility to intellectualism, spirituality, and any sectarian 
divisions within Islam. The previous alleges were the main topics of a long debate 
between the Ulamas of Najd and Hejaz during the 18th and 19th centuries. The 
Wahhabi movement also faced military attacks from outside the Arabian Peninsula. 
The military attacks started in 1811 and led to the collapse of the first Saudi state in 
the year 1818. The war between the Egyptian force of Muhammad Ali by the 
command of his son Ibrahim Pasha succeeded in stopping the “political” Wahhabism 
but it failed in defeating the faith of its followers. Some Scholars of that time adopted 
an extreme position against the Sheikh to the extent that they described him and his 
students as apostates.299 Meanwhile, the western understanding of Wahhabism came 
to the conclusion that Wahhabism is a “new Islamic sect” that encourages intolerance 
and extremism.300 Nowadays, Wahhabism in the western context refers to the form of 
Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia that carries the characteristics of extremism, 
intolerance and supporting terrorism.301 
 
The main objectives of the Wahhabi movement was summarised in the following 
quotations: “Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab perceived the religious, social and 
political problems of his society and the critical conditions through which the Najdi 
people were passing. Thus he dedicated his life and enthusiastic energy to bringing 
about a comprehensive solution to the various problems of the Najdi society through 
the establishment of a strong central government that would enforce the Shari’a and 
impose peace and order in the land. Ibn Abdulwahhab was prepared for the great 
task by his own education and training, and was assisted by the particular religious 
and political conditions of Najd in his time”.302 
                                                 
299 Ibid.    
300 See generally supra 298, Natana J. Delong-Bas and supra 289, Sfeir, p. 731.   
301 C. Blanchard, The Islamic Tradition of Wahhabism and Salafiyya (Congressional Research Service 
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 “Ibn Abdulwahhab aimed at renewing and reforming the faith and the practice of his 
people and both concepts are fundamental components of Islam’s worldview, 
embedded in the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet and both concepts, renewal and 
reform involve a call for the return to the fundamentals of Islam, the Quran and the 
Sunna”.303    
3.3.2 Wahhabism and Politics 
 
Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab was initially persecuted by some local religious 
scholars and political leaders who viewed his teachings as a threat to their power and 
influence. The Sheikh, who had been expelled from his hometown Al O’yainah, 
looked for protection in many neighbouring towns but he couldn’t get it, either 
because the governors opposed him and his movement or because they feared his 
opponents. Eventually the Sheikh got a warm welcome in the town of Diriyah, which 
was ruled by Muhammad bin Saud.  
 
Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab and Muhammad bin Saud formed an agreement to 
dedicate their lives to restore the pure teachings of Islam to the Muslim community. 
The agreement was the Constitution of the first Saudi state; Muhammad bin Saud “the 
Imam” was required under this agreement to give the political and military protection 
to “the Sheikh”. Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab, in his turn,304 gave spiritual guidance 
to the newly formed state under the political rule of Muhammad bin Saud. By 1788, 
the Saudi State ruled over the entire central province of Saudi Arabia, or what is now 
known as the central province of Saudi Arabia. Since that time, the term Wahhabiya 
was used outside Najd to describe the Saudi State. The fame and success of the 
Sheikh’s movement and the newly formed state stimulated the hostility as well as the 
panic of the Ottoman Empire, the dominant power in the Middle East and North 
Africa at the time. The Ottoman Empire and its allies in the region tried, as mentioned 
above, to break the Sheikh and the Saudi state in various ways. From then on, the 
term Wahhabiya started to be used for the people of the specific geographic area i.e. 
                                                 
303 J. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (1st edn., Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 114–118. 
304 The agreement has had its effect on the Saudi religious institution until now as the Sheik’s 
descendants are still in its top positions such as the Minister of Justice, Minister of Islamic Affairs and 
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the central region of Saudi Arabia, and after that for the people who followed the 
teachings of Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab anywhere else, especially the Saudis.305        
 
3.3.3 Wahhabism and the Saudi Law 
 
The Saudi legal system is totally based on the Shari’a “the Quran and the Sunna”. 
There is no reference to the word Wahhabiya in any of the Codes, Royal Decrees and 
court decisions, or even in the curriculum of the Shari’a Colleges in Saudi Arabia. 
The term Wahhabiya has been given to the country, its Law and its people by 
outsiders and it is in use outside the country only. Article 1 of the Basic Law of Saudi 
Arabia states that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state; its 
Constitution is the Quran and the Sunnah.306 Article 1 of the Law of the Judiciary 
states clearly that the “Shari’a” rules are the only source of legislation in Saudi Arabia 
with no mention of Wahhabiya or Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab. It can be 
said that Wahhabiya exists only in the minds of the opponents of Saudi Arabia who 
transferred their inaccurate understanding to the world in a way that represents the 
movement of Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab as a new Islamic School or Mathhab.  
 
3.4 The Roles of Women in the Saudi Legal System 
 
Due to some cultural controversies, the participation of women in the Saudi legal 
system is very limited. In accordance with the Shari’a ruling, women cannot be 
appointed as judges or arbitrators. This issue is not a matter of discussion in Saudi 
Arabia as the Shari’a requires the arbitrator to be a man; according to Shari’a, the 
appointment of a woman as a judge/arbitrator is null and void even if she gives a 
correct judgment.307 Scholars have evidenced this opinion with the following 
Hadeeth: When the Prophet heard the news that the people of Persia had made the 
daughter of Khosrau their Queen, he said, "Never will succeed such a nation as makes 
a woman their ruler."308 The vast majority of Muslim scholars do not recognise the 
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appointment of women arbitrators because women are not qualified to be judges.309 
Scholars supported their argument with the fact that a male witness is equal to two 
women. The legal basis for this practice is the following Quranic verse: “Two men 
shall serve as witnesses; if not two men, then a man and two women whose testimony 
is acceptable to all. Thus, if one woman becomes biased, the other will remind 
her”.310  
However, there have been some speculations on whether women will be allowed to 
practice law as licensed lawyers and this issue is still under consideration by the 
Ministry of Justice. At the moment, women are only allowed to work as in-house 
legal advisors. 
 
3.5 The Influence of the Mufti on the Application of Shari’a in 
the Saudi Judiciary 
 
The role played by the official Mufti in the Islamic state is very important for the 
reason that the Mufti is the highest religious authority in the state and because the 
Mufti occupies an intermediate position between the law, religion and real life. The 
main duty of the official Mufti is to give opinions concerning matters of Shari’a law 
and social affairs; in other words, the Mufti is the authority who gives guidance on the 
practical ways of applying the Shari’a rules in legal and social matters.311 It cannot be 
denied that the Saudi judiciary falls under the influence of the General Mufti or 
Almufti Al’am who works side by side with the Monarch as a final resort after the 
Committee of the Senior Scholars or what is known as Hay’at Kibar Al Ulama’. For 
the reason that the Grand Mufti belongs to the Hanbali School, the influence of the 
Hanbali School on the reasoning of judges and the application of Shari’a in the 
Shari’a courts is very clear. The late General Mufti Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Baz 
(1910-1999), who served as a judge for many years, rejected the idea of basing legal 
opinions solely on the teachings of one school. Sheikh bin Baz instructed judges and 
scholars to liberalise their thinking from the strict adherence to one school and to 
develop a mechanism to allow judges to decide on the case not on the basis of the 
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School of thought, but on the basis of equity and mercy. It has been noted from his 
fatwa that Sheikh bin Baz tried to find the easier solution for any problem; in other 
words, he attempted to make life easier and his judgments in the areas of family and 
criminal law are clear evidence of his approach.312 Nowadays, it can be argued that 
the fatwa of Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Baz is one of the strongest legal sources before 
any Saudi court.313 Despite Sheikh bin Baz, General Muftis of Saudi Arabia are 
known for their strict observance of the Hanbali teachings in accordance with the 
teachings of the Scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. 
 
The reasons behind the strict adherence of the General Muftis of Saudi Arabia to the 
Hanbali School under the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah are obvious and they can be 
summarised as follows: 
• The Hanbali School is the School followed by the Royal Family of Saudi 
Arabia since the time of the agreement between Muhammad Ibn Saud and 
Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab around the 18th century AD; 
• The vast majority of judges and the senior Scholars follow the Hanbali School 
either because of education or due to the family background, especially the 
Mufti and the Minister of Justice who are the direct descendents of Sheikh 
Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab. The descendents of Sheikh Muhammad bin 
Abdulwahhab are known nowadays as “Al-Ash-Sheikh” and they have been 
occupying almost all of the highest religious and legal positions in the 
Government of Saudi Arabia.314  
 
The importance of the role of the General Mufti with regard to the judiciary is 
represented when the Ministry of Justice refers a question to him, asking for legal or 
religious guidance on a very specific issue. The answer of the Mufti will be 
                                                 
312 For more details, see Sheik Abdul-Aziz bin Baz’s fatwa concerning divorce No. 2157 dated 
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considered a sort of binding precedent before any court in Saudi Arabia. With regard 
to arbitration, the guidance of the General Mufti is very important in determining the 
rules of public policy and the application of Shari’a in Saudi Arabia.       
 
3.6 The Influence of Foreign Laws on the Saudi Law 
 
Due to the lack of legal experience at the time of the creation of Saudi Arabia, King 
Abdul-Aziz had to rely on the existing Ottoman Codes as a base for the legal system 
and as a supplement to the Shari’a rules. The newly formed state had to work further 
to develop a suitable body of legislation depending on the available bodies of law and 
on foreign expertise. That trend was established by his order to the attorney general of 
Hejaz to adhere to the Ottoman regulations until further notice.315 The Code of 
Commercial Courts of 1931 was extensively inspired by the Ottoman Code of 1850. 
With many amendments since that time, the code is still in existence today; it includes 
a lot of Turkish terms and it can be considered as a direct translation from the Turkish 
Code.316 Moreover, King Abdul-Aziz attempted to codify the teachings of the four 
Islamic Schools in a way that was similar to the way that the Majalla codified the 
Hanafi fiqh; however, this step had been strongly opposed by some radical scholars 
and did not see the light. In conjunction with that attempt, the King ordered the 
Shari’a judges not to be bound by the rules of one school of fiqh in a way that would 
result in one school’s ruling abrogating another.317 On the other hand, some Ulamas 
had their own agenda; they opposed the King’s reform plans and tried to put pressure 
on the judges in all the courts in the Kingdom to apply the Hanbali fiqh under the 
teachings of the late Scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. The main reason for their opposition 
was the fear that the expansion of civil jurisdiction may come at the expense of the 
Shari’a and lead, at the end, to the application of unrelated laws to the Shari’a. 318       
  
Later on, the Saudi law was inspired by the French system indirectly. The French law 
was of deep influence on the Saudi law because of the foreign experts from other 
Arab countries, especially Egypt which was under French occupation during the 18th 
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and 19th centuries, as well as the young Saudi legal scholars who graduated from the 
law schools in Egypt, Lebanon and France.319 Moreover, many of the consultants of 
the Saudi kings were Egyptians or Syrians either by birth, origin or education which 
are countries highly influenced by the French legal system.320 Those Consultants 
imported the Egyptian laws, which are direct translations of the French laws. 
However, in order to be adopted in Saudi Arabia, all these regulations must be in 
compliance with the Shari’a principles. For instance, in 1966, Saudi Arabia enacted 
the Royal Decree No. (M/6) dated 24/02/1386 H. entitled Regulation Governing Bids 
for Government Procurement, Sales and Leases.321 This was a copy of the Egyptian 
Bid Regulation of 1957, which was a textual translation of the French regulation of 
1953. Another example of the French influence is the Saudi Companies Law enacted 
by Royal Decree No. (M/6) dated 22/03/1385 H. (1965). The law was copied from the 
Egyptian code which was directly patterned after the French company law.322 The 
French influence can even be seen in the case when the Government representatives 
in the Aramco arbitration cited some French administrative laws to support their 
arguments. The list of such borrowed regulations is long and regulates most of the 
aspects of the Saudi law such as the Banking Control Law of 1966, Labour and 
Workers Regulation of 1969 and the Law of Procedure before Shari’a Courts of 2000. 
Although these laws have been borrowed from French law, they are still Islamic in the 
sense that they do not contradict with any of the Shari’a principles.  
 
3.7 The Regulatory Attitude toward Arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia 
 
The regulatory attitude toward arbitration in Saudi Arabia has gone through three 
phases; at first, International arbitration was welcomed by the government and 
governmental entities. The first attempt to use arbitration by the Saudi government 
was in the settlement of the “Wahat Alburaimi” Buraimi Oasis Case in 1955. The 
arbitration took place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and the British government acted on 
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behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Oman. The arbitration agreement 
established a tribunal consisting of five members for the settlement of the dispute as 
to the location of the common border between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, and as to 
the sovereignty of the Buraimi Oasis. According to the arbitration agreement, the 
tribunal had to give due regard to all relevant considerations of law, fact and equity, 
and in particular to the historical rights of the rulers in the area; the traditional 
loyalties, tribal organisation and the way of life of the inhabitants of the area; and the 
exercise of jurisdiction and other activities in the area.323 The Buraimi arbitration did 
not have a significant impact on the arbitration or the legal system of Saudi Arabia, 
like the well-known arbitration between the government of Saudi Arabia and Aramco 
in 1958 which changed the Government’s attitude toward international arbitration for 
a few decades, or what can be called as the second phase.324 During this phase, Saudi 
Arabia looked at international arbitration as a threat to its national sovereignty. The 
Aramco Award of 1958 had a significant impact on accepting arbitration agreements 
and clauses providing for International arbitration by governmental bodies. The award 
will be discussed later in this section. The third phase started with the first oil boom in 
the 1970s and continued up to now.325 Due to the economic expansion and the 
building of the infrastructure, Saudi Arabia had to relax its attitude toward 
International arbitration. The notable steps taken by the Saudi government in this area 
are represented in it joining the ICSID convention, reforming the arbitration 
regulations and offering more protection to foreign investments. This part of the 
chapter will be divided into two main sections; the first will deal with arbitration from 
the creation of the Saudi legal system and the enactment of the Code of Commercial 
Courts in 1931 till the first Oil boom in the mid-1970s. The second part will deal with 
the current approach that started as a result of the oil boom.  
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3.8 Arbitration in the Saudi Legal System Prior to the Oil 
Boom 
3.8.1 Arbitration under the Code of Commercial Courts 1931 
  
The related provisions of the Code of Commercial Courts are concerned with 
commercial arbitration between private parties only. The Code includes nine brief 
articles to regulate arbitration proceedings. Article 493 allows disputants to stipulate 
to arbitrate in a written notarised deed. The parties to the arbitration are free to decide 
on the number of arbitrators, the timescale and the way of rendering the arbitral 
award, whether it is by unanimity or by majority. Arbitration under this Code is 
institutional326 and the proceedings are held under the supervision of the Commercial 
Court.327  
Article 494 deals with the procedural law of the arbitration; the arbitrators are 
required by this article to apply the provisions of the Code of Commercial Courts 
under the light of the Shari’a procedural rules with the support of the arbitration 
agreement.328 Similar to the relevant provisions in the Arbitration Act of 1983, an 
arbitral award is not enforceable unless reviewed by the Commercial Court, which 
will either approve it for enforcement or repudiate it.329 With regard to the 
revocability of the appointment of the arbitrators, the Code prohibits the revocation of 
the appointment of the arbitrators by the parties after the Court’s approval; 
nonetheless, the disputants have been given the right to challenge the award before the 
Court.330 The Code also includes provisions to determine the administrative fees.331  
  
However, the above-quoted provisions did not exist in real life for the following 
reasons; the courts at that time did not recognise the arbitration agreement or 
arbitration clause in the case when the parties insisted on their right to arbitrate in 
accordance with the arbitration agreement. Even if the court approved the arbitration 
agreement or the arbitration clause, the enforcement of the arbitral award would have 
                                                 
326 However, article 613 set the administrative fees for enforcing arbitral awards that have not been 
supervised by the Court.   
327 Supra 290, The Code of Commercial Courts of Saudi Arabia, Article 493.  
328 Ibid., article 494.  
329 Ibid., articles 495 and 497. 
330 Ibid., article 496.  
331 Ibid., articles 610, 611, 612 and 613.  
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been voluntary.332 Accordingly, the reference to arbitration was very limited; the 
conflict between the Commercial Court and the Shari’a courts led arbitration to 
become ineffective, time consuming and in many cases harmful to some parties. The 
Arbitration Act of 1983 superseded the arbitration provisions of this Code; however, 
ad hoc arbitration in cases of a non-commercial nature is still governed by the 
provisions of this Code till now.333          
  
3.8.2 Arbitration Clauses in the Oil Concessions in Saudi Arabia    
 
On 29/05/1933, the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul-Aziz, 
concluded a contract on oil exploitation with the Standard Oil Company of California 
(Socal), the parent company of Chevron. Under that contract, the Company was 
granted an exclusive Concession for 60 years in the eastern province of Saudi 
Arabia.334 In accordance with the Concession Agreement, Socal established a 
corporation, the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc), and assigned to it 
all its rights and obligations under the Agreement. In 1936, due to the failure in 
locating oil and the high cost of the operations, the Texas Oil Company acquired a 
50% stake of the Concession which had been ratified by the government of Saudi 
Arabia. The company name was changed in 1944 from California-Arabian Standard 
Oil Company to Arabian American Oil Company (or Aramco).335 At the time of 
drafting the Concession agreement, Saudi Arabia did not foresee the possibility of a 
dispute with Aramco which resulted in it not including a well-drafted arbitration 
clause; however, article 31 of the Concession Agreement stated that in case of 
dispute, the dispute would be settled through an arbitration panel consisting of three 
arbitrators and the Islamic law as taught by the Hanbali School would be made 
applicable. The issue of the applicability of the Islamic law was even clearly 
expressed in the arbitration agreement between the government of Saudi Arabia and 
                                                 
332 Supra 2, Alebejad, p. 30. 
333 Ibid.  
334 In 1939, by a supplementary agreement, the Concession area was extended to cover about 116,000 
square miles and the period was extended as well to 65 years. 
335See in general, Saudi Aramco, <http://www.saudiaramco.com>, accessed 8 April 2007.  
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Aramco in 1955; nonetheless, the arbitration tribunal failed to apply it in the dispute, 
as will be seen below.336  
 
Due to the outcomes of the Aramco arbitration and following the Council of Ministers 
Resolution No. 58 of 1963, Saudi Arabia avoided the possibility of not applying its 
law in disputes raised in the future, which was demonstrated in the great attention that 
was paid to the Concession agreement between the government of Saudi Arabia and 
Auxirap (French Red Sea). The Auxirap Agreement of 1965 was outstandingly more 
favourable to Saudi Arabia than the Aramco one. Article 63 of the Concession 
agreement between Saudi Arabia and Auxirap of 1965 provides that in the case of any 
dispute raised as a result of the interpretation or the execution of the agreement, the 
dispute should be referred first to a committee of experts. The committee would 
consist of two experts; one of them would be chosen by the government of Saudi 
Arabia and the other would be chosen by the concessionaire. If the Committee fails to 
reach an acceptable settlement, the dispute would be referred to the Committee of 
Settlement of Mining Disputes in accordance with the Mining Act of 1963.337 The 
agreement had altered later on in the same year after the participation of Petromin Oil 
Company338 in the same concession. The distinction had been made between the 
dispute between Auxirap and the Saudi government and the dispute between Auxirap 
and Petromin. There would have been no change in the dispute settlement procedure 
if the dispute had occurred between Auxirap and the Saudi government; however, if a 
dispute happens between the participants i.e. Petromin and Auxirap, the dispute would 
be settled by means of international arbitration like any normal commercial dispute.339 
As an added security, Saudi Arabia obliged Auxirap to incorporate a joint venture 
company in Saudi Arabia to be the operating company for the Concession and set the 
maximum foreign ownership limit at 60%.340 It can be seen from the arbitration 
clauses included in other Oil Concessions (especially after the Aramco award) that 
Saudi Arabia tried not to refer to arbitration outside the country, which was clearly 
                                                 
336 A. Ashoush, The Law of the Oil Concessions in the Arab Countries (1st edn., Alsharikah 
Almuttahidah Lelnashr Wa altawze’, 1975), p. 415. 
337 The Committee is to be established by article 50 of the Mining law of 1963.  
338 The Saudi Arabian Lubricating Oil Company was formed in 1968 by a Royal Decree as one of the 
joint ventures of the General Organisation of Petroleum and Minerals (Petromin). The company was 
renamed as the Saudi Arabian Lubricating Oil Company in 1997 after Petromin's shares in the 
company were transferred to Saudi Aramco. 
339 See supra 332, Ashoush, p. 415. 
340 Ibid. p. 613. 
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demonstrated in the Agreements with Japan Petroleum Trading Co. of 1957 when 
article 55 of that Agreement stated that disputes are to be resolved finally by a five-
arbitrator panel sitting in Saudi Arabia; article 23 of the Agreement between Saudi 
Arabia and Trans-Arabian Pipe Co. also provides for a three-arbitrator panel sitting in 
Jeddah. It can be said that the Saudi government tried to secure its position in any 
possible conflicts to ensure the application of the Saudi law in any future disputes, 
especially after the disappointment of the Aramco award.341  
 
3.9 Aramco v. Saudi Arabia 
3.9.1 Background 
 
In January 1954, an agreement was concluded between the government of Saudi 
Arabia and Aristotle Onassis, the Greek-born shipping tycoon of that time, 
hereinafter, the Onassis Agreement. The original deal was amended in April of the 
same year. It has been argued that the provisions of that agreement were only 
beneficial to Onassis and the middlemen who facilitated the deal. It was also argued 
that Onassis’s main concern was to guarantee the employment of 10 oil tankers that 
he was chartered on in a long-term contract in a time when the global tankers market 
experienced overcapacity in addition to a global depression in the demand for oil.342 
On the other hand, some may argue that the agreement was an attempt to break 
Aramco’s monopoly over the Saudi oil, which was absolutely monopolised by 
Aramco.343 Nevertheless, and away from politics, Saudi Arabia sought its own 
interests which were clearly demonstrated in the provision of the agreement. 
 
The agreement granted Onassis the right to establish a private company in Saudi 
Arabia under the commercial name of the Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers Company, 
hereinafter Satco. The newly formed company was to be bound to maintain a 
minimum of 500,000 tons of tankers under the Saudi Arabian flag and to register this 
tonnage in Saudi Arabia.344 The Agreement obliged Satco to establish a marine school 
                                                 
341 Supra 134, Lerrick and Mian, footnote,15, p. 153.   
342 Supra 316, Holden and Johns, pp. 181-182.  
343 Ibid.  
344 Article 14 of Onassis Agreement as quoted in the Aramco Award 27 I.L.R. (1963), pp. 116-127.   
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in Jeddah and to employ its graduates on board Satco tankers. Satco further undertook 
to give Saudi Arabian employees and workmen preference in working on its 
tankers.345 Moreover, Satco was obliged to carry on her tankers, free of charge, 
50,000 tons of oil and oil products from Saudi Arabian ports in the Persian Gulf to 
any Saudi port in the Red Sea.346 The government of Saudi Arabia was entitled to 
receive a royalty of 1 shilling and 6 pence for every ton shipped abroad in Satco 
tankers, as well as the payment of all port and harbour duties in Saudi Arabian 
ports.347 The agreement foresaw a possible increase in Satco’s fleet which had to 
always represent a minimum of 500,000 deadweight tons of tankships during the life 
of the agreement.348 
 
On the other hand, Satco’s tankers had to bear Saudi Arabian names and Satco had the 
right to enjoy the Government’s protection, which is the right of any Saudi Arabian 
Company.349 The Agreement obligated Saudi Arabia to enact a Maritime Law.350 The 
controversial provisions of the Agreement that raised the dispute were articles 4 and 
15. According to these provisions, the Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers Company 
Ltd. had the right of priority for the transport of oil for a period of 30 years from the 
date of signing the agreement, renewable for a further period by mutual agreement.351  
 
The dispute at issue started when the government of Saudi Arabia ordered Aramco to 
apply Royal Decree No. 5737 of 09/04/1954 that ratified the Onassis Agreement 
concluded in 20/01/1954. The Royal Decree gave the Onassis Agreement a legal 
status similar to that of the Aramco Concession Agreement of 1933. On 23 January 
1954, the Saudi Minister of Finance advised Aramco of the signing of the Agreement 
and informed it of the content of article 4. The letter in this part reads as follows: 
“it is taken for granted that the Saudi tankers have priority over other tankers for 
loading Saudi petroleum (in second place) after the tankers owned by your company 
                                                 
345 Ibid., articles 6 and 9. 
346 Ibid., article 10; however, it did not state the frequency of this shipment, whether it will be for one 
time only or in a frequent manner.  
347 Ibid., articles 11 and 12. 
348 Ibid., article 14. 
349 Ibid., articles 2 and 3.  
350 Ibid., article 5. 
351 Aramco Award, 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963), p. 128. 
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or by companies which founded you and which have been actually transporting Saudi 
petroleum before December 31, 1953”.352   
3.9.2 Aramco’s Response  
 
Aramco rejected the Onassis Agreement and responded to the Minister of Finance’s 
letter, saying that the implementation of the Onassis Agreement would be:  
•   contrary to and in violation of both the letter and the spirit of the existing 
Agreement between the government of Saudi Arabia and Aramco;  
•   contrary to long-established business arrangements and procedures 
developed with reliance on these Agreements; 
•   contrary to established world-wide custom and practice in the international 
oil industry; 
•   of a disastrous effect upon the presently established sales outlets for Saudi 
oil and the possible future development thereof;  
•   wholly impractical.353 
   
Aramco based its rejection on the above-mentioned grounds without any real 
justification which carried on throughout the proceedings, as Aramco failed to prove 
that the Onassis Agreement would cause any injury to its interests.   
 
3.9.3 The Saudi Government’s Position 
 
After months of negotiations to reach an amicable settlement, the parties agreed to 
submit the dispute to an ad hoc Arbitration tribunal in Switzerland. The Arbitration 
proceedings started in 1954 but the Award was issued in 1958. Although it was 
merely an arbitration relating to the interpretation of a Concession Agreement, many 
circumstances lengthened the proceedings to four years. Throughout the proceedings, 
the government of Saudi Arabia tried to reach an amicable settlement outside the 
tribunal. The arbitrator appointed by Saudi Arabia, Dr. Badawi, died during the 
proceedings and was replaced by Mr. Mahmoud Hassan, and both, in addition to the 
arbitrator appointed by Aramco, were Egyptian nationals. Dr. Badawi and Mr. 
                                                 
352 Ibid. p. 130. 
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Habachy, the arbitrator chosen by Aramco, appointed the Swiss Georges Sauser-Hall 
as a referee. The Saudi Government recognised that the Concession Agreement of 
1933 gave Aramco very extensive rights, exclusive in character, in respect of the 
operations pertaining to its enterprise, but it contended that this right did not include 
transportation of petroleum and petroleum products by sea. The Government 
contended that Aramco was granted an exclusive right to transport its oil and oil 
products only to the seashore including the exclusive area in Saudi Arabia and to the 
limit of the territorial waters of the State, but this grant did not include the right to 
cross Saudi Arabia’s maritime frontier and reach the high seas.354 
 
The Government based its argument on the text of the Concession Agreement, which 
did not expressly provide for granting Aramco the exclusive right of transportation by 
sea to foreign countries.355 The Government also relied upon the principle of 
restrictive interpretation of the obligations assumed by a sovereign state in agreements 
with private individuals or companies, inasmuch as a Government must always bear 
in mind and safeguard the interests of the community.356 The Government took the 
position that it could withdraw from arbitration any act done by it to exercise its 
sovereign power. The Saudi Government concluded that with regard to the 
transportation of oil and oil products to foreign countries, Aramco was in the same 
legal position as other inhabitants of Saudi Arabia and it had to therefore, comply 
with any restriction adopted by the Government in connection with external transport 
of oil and oil products. The Company had no ownership in these products or any other 
property interest which would immunise it, or its buyers, from governmental action 
regulating such transport.357  
 
Saudi Arabia insisted that in addition to the principles of Islamic law and the 
principles of International law, the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations do not support the contention that the Concession Agreement of 1933 exempts 
Aramco from the regulatory power of the Saudi government. The Government added 
                                                 
354 Supra 347, Aramco Award, p. 140. 
355 Supra 347, Aramco Award, p. 132. Aramco alleged that it has the exclusive right of transportation 
of Saudi oil; however, it has never exercised it either by engaging in such transport or by exerting 
control over such transport.  
356 Ibid.  
357 Ibid., in support of the Government’s point of view, some Muslim Scholars exclude minerals from 
the scope of private ownership. See supra 134, Lerrick and Mian, n. 88, pp. 170-171.   
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that since the Onassis Agreement had been ratified by Royal Decree No. 5737, it had 
become the law of the land that everyone had to respect.358 The Saudi Government 
contended, therefore, that Aramco could be lawfully bound to ship oil and oil 
products to foreign markets on Satco tankers, in conformity with the Onassis 
Agreement ratified by the Royal Decree. To exercise its sovereignty, the Government 
insisted that Aramco be forced to submit to any regulatory restriction that provides for 
a preferential right in the transportation of its products from Saudi Arabia in favour of 
tankers flying the Saudi Arab flag. Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia ratified the 
Onassis Agreement for the interests of its community, it guaranteed the minimum 
standard of protection to the rights of Aramco.359 Royal Decree No. 5737 gave 
Satco’s tankers a right of priority after Aramco’s tankers and tankers owned by the 
owning companies of Aramco, which is a right that Aramco has never exercised since 
its creation which has resulted in making the application of the Royal Decree of no 
injury to Aramco. Moreover, under the Islamic law, the “generic terms of a contract 
must be interpreted extensively” and if Aramco had been granted the right of 
transport, it should have exercised it; Aramco did not do so for more than 17 years. 
For the sake of the manifestation of the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations, the Government cited the French administrative law, as developed 
by the French “Conseil d’Etat”, to support its contention that a state has the right to 
exercise its regulatory powers in order to control, and if necessary to adapt, the 
methods used by a company operating a public service. In the Government’s opinion, 
the 1933 Concession is included in the concept of public service.360     
 
3.9.4 The Applicable Law 
 
According to article 4 of the Arbitration Agreement between Aramco and the 
Government of Saudi Arabia dated 15/02/1955, the arbitral tribunal would have to 
decide on the dispute in accordance with the Saudi Arabian law in so far as matters 
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within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia; otherwise, the tribunal would be free to decide 
on the applicable law if the matter is outside the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia.361  
 
With regard to the procedural law, despite the fact that the parties agreed for the 
arbitration to take place outside Saudi Arabia, the law of the place of the seat could 
not be applied to the arbitration. The tribunal stated: “considering the jurisdictional 
immunity of foreign states, recognised by international law in a spirit of respect for 
the essential dignity of sovereign power, the tribunal is unable to hold that arbitral 
proceedings to which a sovereign state is a Party could be subject to the law of 
another state”.362  
 
As mentioned above, the parties to the arbitration agreement agreed to apply the 
principles of Islamic law, as taught by the Hanbali School, whereas the tribunal 
supported Aramco’s argument and stood against the application of the Saudi law; 
however, it explained its opinion in a “more polite way” compared to Aramco.363 The 
tribunal stated the following: “the regime of mining concessions, and, consequently, 
also of oil concessions, has remained embryonic in Moslem law and is not the same in 
the different schools. The principles of one school cannot be introduced into another, 
unless this is done by the act of authority. Hanbali law contains no precise rule about 
mining concessions and a fortiori about oil concessions”.364 The above quotation 
cannot show anything but a lack of knowledge of the Islamic law which has rules to 
govern all kinds of contracts, and if, for instance, the Hanbali School has no rules to 
govern a concession agreement, resorting to other schools, by the method of Qiyas, 
can solve the dispute. As it has been mentioned in one of the previous chapters, the 
use of the method of Qiyas does not need any act of authority. The use of Qiyas needs 
adequate knowledge of the nature of both situations and an accurate reasoning without 
any resort to the official authority because it is the law of God, not of the state of 
Saudi Arabia. The original case or, what it is called in the Islamic law, “al asl” can be 
the rules governing hidden wealth, like gold and silver, where oil can be one of its 
applications or “far’a”. The law applicable to this case under all conflict of laws 
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362 Supra 347, Aramco Award, p. 154. 
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theories cannot be any law but the Saudi law. The tribunal denied the application of 
the Saudi law in the dispute and claimed that the Saudi law had no rules to govern oil 
concessions.  
 
The Concession Agreement of 1933 was an agreement between a state and a private 
American party which cannot be subject to public international law. The tribunal 
quoted: “Any contract which is not a contract between states in their capacity as 
subjects of international law, is based on the municipal law of some country”.365 
Consequently, if the international law cannot be applied because of the nature of the 
dispute and other municipal laws cannot be applied because a state cannot fall under a 
jurisdiction of another state, what is the applicable law, then? Even the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations cannot be applied in this case 
because in the end, the tribunal will apply a municipal law of a state on a sovereign 
state. Moreover, when the tribunal denied the application of the Saudi law and applied 
British and Swiss practices, it implied that Saudi Arabia is not a civilised nation, 
which was a discrimination against not just Saudi Arabia alone, but an unfair 
judgment of the Islamic law as a whole.366       
 
The tribunal contradicted itself when denying the application of the Saudi law because 
no other law can be imagined to have a real connection other than the Saudi law for 
the following reasons: 
• The Contract was concluded in Jeddah “Saudi Arabia”.  
• The Contract came into force after its ratification and publication in the Saudi 
official gazette. 
• The place of the characteristic performance of the contract was Saudi Arabia.  
• The Concession of 1933 is a contract concerning immovable property situated 
in Saudi Arabia.  
  
The tribunal’s competence was to specify the rights and the obligations of both parties 
under the Concession Agreement and to determine whether the Onassis contract 
infringed Aramco's rights under the agreement or not.367 The tribunal determined that 
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it could only decide on disputes, such as the five questions submitted by the parties, 
and could find that the two contracts were compatible or in conflict. The tribunal was 
not authorised as an amiable compositeur, however, it was competent to find a 
method to reconcile or harmonise the two agreements. Consequently, the Tribunal 
rejected the suggestion that it had wider powers than those bestowed upon it by the 
parties' agreement. Despite the disagreement of one of the arbitrators, the tribunal 
concluded the case in Aramco’s favour and stated in the award that the Onassis 
Agreement was neither a Law of the State of Saudi Arabia nor a Governmental 
regulation.368 The general principles of law that the tribunal relied on were neither 
clear nor coherent and were not, logically, suitable for the situation. Although the 
arbitral award was not binding on Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government abided by it, 
voluntarily announcing the death of the Onassis Agreement and of Satco.      
 
3.9.5 Comments on the Case 
 
The relationship between the government of Saudi Arabia and Aramco was based on 
mutual understanding of each other’s needs. The Saudi government understood the 
American thirst for oil and facilitated Aramco’s operations in the Saudi deserts; on the 
other hand, Aramco understood the Government’s need for cash and arranged for 
loans, constructions and the employment and training of the Saudi nationals. If 
Aramco gave preferential treatment to Satco, it would have at least reduced the 
amount of loans that it used to give to the Government, bearing in mind the financial 
difficulties that Saudi Arabia faced during the early 1950s.369 However, Onassis had a 
long history of legal troubles with the U.S. government which may seem to be the 
reason behind Aramco’s rejection and gives the impression that if someone else other 
than Onassis made the agreement with the government of Saudi Arabia, Aramco 
would not have opposed applying Royal Decree No. 5737. The FBI had investigated 
Onassis several times since 1943 for charges ranging from fraud to the possession of 
fascist ideas. Moreover, in 1953 Onassis had been charged, along with some other 
individuals and companies, of conspiracy to defraud the United States Government in 
multi-million-dollar deals to buy surplus U.S. ships after the war. The U.S. 
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Government found it in violation of the law which forbids the sale of U.S. ships to 
aliens.370 In the next year, Onassis was charged for another related fraud against the 
U.S. Government. He was charged with violating the citizenship provision of the 
shipping laws which requires that all ships displaying the American flag be owned by 
United States citizens. Onassis pled guilty and agreed to pay seven million dollars to 
the Government of the United States.371   
 
The Arbitrators chose the Swiss Sauser-Hall as a referee. Georges Sauser-Hall was a 
Professor of International Law at Geneva and Neuchatel Universities; also, he was a 
Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and of the Institute of International 
Law. He engaged in many cases of international arbitration such as the dispute 
between Albania and Italy in 1951 and many other cases, but the question here is what 
was his knowledge of the Islamic law and of the Arabic language which was the 
official language of the contracts and one of the languages of the hearings? One of the 
main controversial points in this case was the interpretation of article 1 of the 
Concession Agreement of 1933; whether the Arabic word “Moutlaq” is a synonym of 
the English word “exclusive” and whether the word “Moua’malat” has the same 
meaning as “treat”, which need a good grasp of both languages in order to reach the 
correct interpretation of the texts which the tribunal failed to achieve.       
 
Saudi Arabia claimed that the wording of the Concession Agreement of 1933 does not 
give Aramco an exclusive right for transport. This opinion was supported by one of 
the arbitrators, Mr. Hassan, who quoted:  
“Signing the Award, I state that I am in disagreement particularly with the 
interpretation contained therein of Article 1 of the Aramco Concession Agreement of 
1933. That article is the key to the solution of the present dispute and to the answers 
to be given to the questions submitted to the tribunal. In my opinion, article 1, when 
read in its proper context, covers an Oil Concession with its various technical 
ramifications. The word “transport” which occurs in the nomenclature of Aramco’s 
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exclusive rights can only cover transport which pertains to operations to be performed 
in the exclusive are of the Concession”.372  
 
Mr. Hassan added: “Maritime transport is a vast world-wide operation which is 
independent from the industrial enterprise of the concessionary company and cannot 
therefore be mentioned casually. The right granted to Aramco in article 1 are recited 
in technological order. They correspond to the logical sequences of the successive 
operations of the enterprise which move with clockwork regularity from one stage to 
another. Had the parties intended the “transport” to mean transportation by sea, that 
word should have been the last in the enumeration of the exclusive right granted to 
Aramco. This is because transport by sea is the final act in the process covered by the 
enterprise. Moreover, had the Parties envisaged transport by sea in the 1933 
Concession Agreement, they would have mentioned this expressis verbis, as such a 
right cannot be granted to Aramco by implication”.373   
 
 
The tribunal cited the award of Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi 
as a precedent to support the rejection of the application of the principle of restrictive 
interpretation of the contractual obligation of a Government toward a private 
individual.374 The latter case cannot be treated as such because it has a different 
nature. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi was not a sovereign state at that time as it 
was under the British protection to the extent that the British government acted on its 
behalf in the Buraimi arbitration with Saudi Arabia.375  
 
The lack of experience played an important role in Saudi Arabia losing this case, from 
the submission of the case to arbitration outside Saudi Arabia till the obedience of the 
award. The case was between a sovereign state and a private party; if the dispute had 
occurred nowadays, it would have been governed by ICSID arbitration rules and 
Saudi Arabia would have got a better deal. Saudi Arabia should not have involved 
Onassis in the dispute because Satco was, in theory, a Saudi company and it should 
have granted complete protection as a Saudi company. Saudi Arabia was in the stage 
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of creating or modernising its legal system and such mistakes were normal. Despite 
the fact that the Award was not in favour of Saudi Arabia, it was a good lesson that 
Saudi Arabia benefited from in building its legal regime. The Award encouraged 
Saudi Arabia to be more cautious when dealing with foreign parties in any contract, 
especially when the oil industry is involved, and not to put its national sovereignty at 
dispute again like what happened in the Aramco dispute. This trend was demonstrated 
in the Saudi reservation on the ICSID Convention.     
 
3.10 The Legal Impacts of the Aramco Award 1958 on 
Arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
 
3.10.1 The Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 of 1963 
 
There were many impacts of the Aramco award in different areas of law and legal 
practice, mainly on International arbitration and economic policy. The direct 
regulatory response to the Award was the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 of 
1963, which was supplemented by the Ministry of Commerce Circular of 1979 that 
imposed some restrictions on the acceptance of arbitration clauses and agreements.  
 
The Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 of 1963 concerns arbitration when the 
Government of Saudi Arabia or a governmental entity is a party to the dispute. Prior 
to 1963, the Government frequently provided for arbitration as a means of settlement 
of disputes between itself and private parties; however, due to the disappointing 
outcomes of the Aramco Award of 1958, Resolution No. 58 prohibited resorting to 
arbitration to settle disputes between the Saudi Government or its Ministries, 
departments or agencies on the one hand, and individuals, companies or private 
organisations on the other.376 The regulation did not distinguish between foreign and 
local entities. The Resolution provides: 
 
                                                 
376 The Resolution is incorporated in article 3 of the Arbitration Act of 1983.   
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• No government agency shall conclude a contract with any individual, 
company or private organisation which includes a clause subjecting the 
government agency to any foreign court of law or any judicial body. 
• Except in Concessions granted by the Government,377 no government 
agency shall accept arbitration as a means of settling disputes which may 
arise between it and any individual, company or private organisation. 
• The most important principle of private international law is the principle of 
application of the law of the place of performance; Government agencies 
may not choose any foreign law to govern their relationship with any 
individual, company or private organisation. 
• The above provisions shall not apply to contracts concluded after the 
issuance of this resolution.378 
  
3.10.2 Ministry of Commerce Circular No. 31/1/331/91 of 1979 
 
The Ministry of Commerce Circular No. 31/1/331/91 of 1979 confirmed the Council 
of Ministers’ Resolution No. 58 of 1963 in prohibiting or restricting the recourse to 
International arbitration. The Circular stated that a clause providing for arbitration 
(outside the Kingdom) included in the articles of association of Saudi companies 
would be considered absolutely void. Articles of association that contain such clauses 
would not be approved or registered.379 As a result, reference can be made to domestic 
arbitration in the article of association of a joint company which is formed by foreign 
and local businessmen for the purpose of carrying out investment operations in Saudi 
Arabia. This restriction should include all forms of joint companies, whether they are 
formed by foreign investors and a private party or by a foreign investor and the 
government of Saudi Arabia.380       
                                                 
377 The exceptions here are technical disputes and disputes arising out of Concession agreements which 
have been exempted for its important interest to the country.   
378 See the Ministerial Resolution No. 58 dated 17/01/1383 (1963).  
379 Ministry of Commerce, Companies Department Circular No. 31/1/331/91 dated 22/02/1399 H. 
(1979).  
380 Y. Al-Samman, ‘The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of Domestic Arbitration 
in Saudi Arabia’, Arab Law Quarterly, 9 (1994), pp. 217-220.   
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3.10.3 Other Impacts: the Establishment of OPEC 
  
Following some arbitral awards involving concession agreements concerning natural 
resources such as the Aramco Award, and Petroleum Development Arbitration,381 the 
oil producing states found themselves in need of a protecting cartel against the foreign 
control over their national wealth and against the unfair concession agreement. It 
should be noted that until the mid-1950s, the sums paid as taxes to the American 
government was far more than the share of Saudi Arabia in its oil.382 The Saudi 
Minister of Oil and Mineral Affairs of that time, Abdullah Al Tirigi, sometimes 
spelled “Al-Tariki”, was deeply inspired by the revolutionary ideas of Juan Pablo 
Pérez Alfonso, the Venezuelan Oil Minister at that time, and of Frank Hendryx, who 
was a former Aramco employee and at the time employed by the Minister.383 The 
Venezuelan Minister came up with the ideas of forming the OPEC to enhance 
national sovereignty over natural resources and profit sharing with the foreign 
Concessionaires. Hendryx put forward the proposition that all petroleum agreements 
should be periodically re-negotiated when they no longer suit one of the parties or 
when conditions change to such a degree that the agreement is out of date.384 
According to Hendryx, “An oil producing nation by the law of civilised nations may 
clearly, in a proper case, modify or eliminate provisions of an existing petroleum 
concession which have become substantially contrary to the best interests of its 
citizens. Financial interest must certainly be included in the classification of matters 
of vital interest to a nation’s citizens”.385   
 
                                                 
381 Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi “Petroleum Development 
Arbitration” 1I.C.Q.247 (1952). See also R. El Mallakh, Challenge of Affluence: Abu Dhabi, The 
Middle East Journal, 24/2 (1970) pp. 135-138. 
382 See generally supra 320, Holden and Johns.   
383 Hendryx was the legal advisor to the Saudi Arabian Directorate General of Petroleum and Mineral 
Affairs; the Directorate General had been substituted by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth 
in 1960.  
384 See generally S. Duguid, ‘A Biographical Approach to the Study of Social Change in the Middle 
East: Abdullah Tariki as a New Man’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1/3 (1970), p. 195.  
385 L. Kissam and E. Leach, ‘Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of Concession 
Contracts’, Fordham Law Review, 28 (1959-1960), pp. 177-200.  
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In September 1960, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries was 
established as an instrument for collective bargaining and self-defence.386 OPEC 
changed the role of the game and made the playing field more even by giving the oil 
producers some power in a market dominated by consumers. Nowadays, due to 
speculation, political instability and the huge oil production coming from non-OPEC 
sources, the power of OPEC in controlling global oil prices has been slightly 
decreased; however, the psychological influence of OPEC’s announcements can be 
more effective than some real market factors.  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Middle East experienced a wave of nationalisation of 
foreign properties started in Egypt by nationalising the Suez Canal, which led to what 
is known as the Tripartite Aggression of 1956 when Britain, France and Israel 
attacked Egypt. The Saudi response to this attack was represented in an oil embargo 
against Britain and France.387 The Saudi government used oil as a tool to impose 
some pressure to support Arab countries in political conflicts for a second and last 
time in 1973, which changed the economic facts and the power balance in the region. 
Such incidents urged Saudi Arabia and other oil producers to get rid of foreign 
concessionaires, especially when the concession holder belongs to one of the world’s 
superpowers. Unlike other Arab countries such as Libya and Algeria, Gulf countries 
preferred the gradual participation in the ownership of the companies holding the 
concessions, which proved to be more technically beneficial and politically safe. 
Saudi Arabia did acquire 100 percent participation interest in Aramco by 1980 
through purchasing almost all the assets of the American owners.388 It can be assumed 
that Aramco arbitration encouraged Saudi Arabia to replace the foreign monopoly 
over its natural resources by a national concessionaire that is totally owned and 
controlled by the government and as a matter of public policy, no foreign investments 
are allowed in the oil sector.    
 
                                                 
386 Leonardo Maugeri, The Age of Oil: The Methodology, History, and Future of the World’s Most 
Controversial Resource, (1st edn., Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), p. 85.  
387 See generally, L. Kennett, Suez: The Twice- Fought War, (1st edn., McGraw Hill, 1969). 
388 See generally, Saudi Aramco, www.aramco.com, (accessed in 18/04/2008).  
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3.11 The Change in the Governmental Attitude toward 
Arbitration: 1970s till Now 
 
3.11.1 Reasons for the Change 
 
In the aftermath of the first oil boom, Saudi Arabia accumulated enormous financial 
surpluses which made it the strongest of the OPEC group.389 The financial ability 
characterised Saudi Arabia as a major capital-exporting country exporting to the 
world, especially to the United States and Europe.390 The main objective behind the 
statutory reform was to attract foreign investment. Saudi Arabia at that time did not 
lack financial capital; it was in need of capital, in terms of technology and expertise. 
In the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia started to transform its economy from overwhelming 
dependence on oil to a diversified industrial economy with an ultimate target of 
setting up a hydrocarbon-based petrochemical industry.391 The flow of foreign 
investment would not have met the economic needs without a regulatory flexibility 
and sufficient protection of foreign investment. One of the fundamental needs of any 
foreign investor is to have a fair and impartial dispute settlement mechanism where 
the investor is not the weak party in the dispute.  
 
The shift started when Saudi Arabia agreed to settle certain differences and claims 
relating to the Agreement on Guaranteed Private Investment and guarantees of Saudi 
public sector contracts and investments with the United States in 1975.392 Saudi 
Arabia started a comprehensive  reform, as a legal incentive to foreign investment, by 
joining the ICSID Convention in 1979-80, issuing the Arbitration Act of 1983 and it 
implementing a regulation in 1985, ratifying the New York Convention on the 
enforcement and recognition of foreign arbitral awards of 1958, contributing to the 
                                                 
389 That also led to what is called Petrodollar recycling as a result of having quite a small population 
and/or underdeveloped infrastructure, and the availability of extra financial resources even with 
intensive development plans.   
390 F. El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in the Sudan and Saudi Arabia, A 
Case Study of Developing Countries (1st edn., Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 11.  
391 Ibid.  
392 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) no longer provides coverage in Saudi Arabia. 
In 1995, OPIC removed Saudi Arabia from its list of countries approved for OPIC coverage because of 
Saudi Arabia's failure to take steps to comply with “internationally recognized labour standards”. See 
the US Department of State website <http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2005/43038.htm>, accessed 1 
May 2007.   
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establishment of the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre, giving effect to some 
regional arbitration-related conventions and adopting some bilateral Investment 
Agreements.393               
3.11.2 Saudi Arabia join ICSID Convention 
 
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes is an autonomous 
International organisation with close links with the World Bank. All of the members 
of the ICSID Convention are also members of the World Bank. According to the 
ICSID Convention, which came into force on October 14, 1966, the Centre provides 
facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member countries 
and investors who qualify as nationals of other member countries. Recourse to ICSID 
services is entirely voluntary. However, a party to the dispute cannot withdraw its 
consent unilaterally and member states are required to enforce ICSID arbitral 
awards.394 The acceptance of ICSID jurisdiction was seen as an important instrument 
to give investors confidence to continue with their existing investments as well as a 
tool for attracting further investments.395 Saudi Arabia signed the Convention in 
September 1979 and it entered into force in June 1980.396          
 
Pursuant to Article 25(4) of the Convention, any contracting state may notify ICSID 
of the class or classes of disputes that it may or may not be willing to submit to ICSID 
arbitration. Accordingly, the Kingdom, in its ratification instrument, reserved the right 
of not submitting all questions pertaining to oil and to acts of sovereignty to ICSID, 
whether by way of conciliation or arbitration.397 Investment arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia is to be governed by the ICSID rules in contrast to Commercial Arbitration, 
which is governed by the Arbitration Act of 1983 or other rules provided that the rules 
are recognised by the Saudi authorities. Ed. Züblin AG v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
the first case where the Saudi government was a party to ICSID arbitration. The 
                                                 
393 Saudi Arabia has ratified eight investment promotion and protection agreements other than the 
Agreements under the GCC and the Arab League.   
394 See in general, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid>, accessed 26 April 2007.  
395 J. Lew; L. Mistelis and S. Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2003) pp. 22. 
396 See the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 372 of 15/03/1394 H. (1974). See also Royal Decree 
No. M/8 of 22/02/1394 H. (1974).  
397 G. Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration and the Courts’, The American Journal of International Law, 77/4 
(1983), pp. 784-796.  
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construction of university facilities was the subject matter of the dispute. On January 
28, 2003, the Secretary General registered a request for the constitution of the 
arbitration panel. However, a Settlement was reached by the parties and the 
proceeding discontinued at the request of the Claimant in accordance with article 44 
of the Arbitration Rules.398 This case is an example of the dispute settlement approach 
of the government of Saudi Arabia that performs its obligation under any contract 
adequately and in good faith, and in the case of a dispute, the Government prefers to 
settle it amicably and in private, which was one of the reasons behind the length of the 
proceedings in the Aramco Case.399    
 
3.11.3 The Arbitration Act of 1983 
 
Regardless of the impractical provisions in the Code of Commercial Courts of 1931, 
article 183 of the Labour Law of 1969 and article 3 of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Regulation of 1980, 400   Saudi Arabia lacked a comprehensive arbitration 
regulation. The Arbitration Act of 1983 repealed the related provisions in the Code of 
Commercial Courts of 1931. The Implementing Regulation of 1985 came to answer 
all the related questions that had not been answered in the Act and to describe various 
aspects of the arbitration proceedings. It can be said that the Act is a codification of 
the Hanbali law of arbitration. Regardless of the religious restrictions, the Act and the 
Implementing Rules were described as clarification and simplification of the 
traditional Islamic system.401 The Act provides a framework for commercial 
arbitration in a flexible way that makes arbitration a real alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism, as will be seen in the next chapter.   
 
 
                                                 
398 See the list of the concluded cases of ICSID, Case No. (ARB/03/1) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm>, accessed 25 April 2007. 
399 See supra 347, Aramco Award. It is also the reason for the very small number of disputes against 
the Saudi government, bearing in mind the intensive constructions and governmental contracts during 
the 1970s and 1980s.    
400 See Royal Decree No. (M/21) of 06/09/1389 H. (1969). Article 183 provides for arbitration as an 
alternative for the Committee for the Settlement of Labour Disputes.  See also Royal Decree No. (M/6) 
dated 60/04/1400 H. (1980). According to article 5 of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Regulation, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry are competent to resolve business disputes by 
arbitration if the parties agree to it. 
401 P. Fouchard; E. Gaillard; B. Goldsman and J. Savage, Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldsman on 
International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn., Kluwer Law International, 1999), p.92.                                        
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3.12 Conventions on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards 
 
3.12.1 The New York Convention 1958 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 1958, or what is known as the New York Convention, requires 
signatories to enforce arbitral awards issued by other member nations. Saudi Arabia 
ratified the Convention on July 18, 1994 to become the 94th party to the 
Convention.402 The main purpose of the Convention is to facilitate the enforcement 
and recognition of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State 
where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought.403 The main 
feature of this Convention is article 5.2, which gives the member states two grounds 
to refuse the enforcement of any foreign arbitral award. Article 5.2 (a) stated that a 
member state can refuse the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if the subject 
matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under its municipal 
law. Article 5.2 (b) gives the member state the right not to enforce foreign arbitral 
awards that are contrary to public policy.404 The defence of the public policy can be 
used intensively and there are many aspects of public policy in Saudi Arabia that can 
set aside any foreign arbitral award. Accordingly, it has been argued that Saudi Arabia 
joined the New York Convention without being obliged to enforce foreign arbitral 
awards and the scope of article 5 (b) of the Convention should be restricted.405   
 
3.12.2 The Convention of the Arab League of Nations on the Enforcement 
of Judgments of 1952 
 
Although this Convention was replaced by the Riyadh Convention for Judicial Co-
operation of 1983, it might be useful to give a brief outline about the Convention. The 
Convention of the Arab League of Nations on the Enforcement of Judgments of 
                                                 
402 See the United Nation Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
<http://www.uncitral.org>, accessed 30 April 2007.  
403 Article 1 of the United Nation Convention on the Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York Convention) (10 June 1958). 
404 Ibid., article 5.2.  
405 See in general supra 322, Kristin T. Roy.  
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September 14, 1952 had been ratified by Saudi Arabia on July 18, 1954. Saudi Arabia 
was the first country to ratify the Convention. The Council of Ministers Resolution 
No. 50 dated June 25/12/1379 H. (1960) gives Diwan Almazalim the competence to 
examine the petitions for the enforcement of Arab League judgments. Prior to the 
enactment of the previous resolution, Arab League arbitral awards were not to be tried 
de novo except in the circumstances stated below. The Council of Ministers 
Resolution was complemented by Royal Decree No. (M/51), which expanded the 
jurisdiction of Diwan Almazalim to cover the enforcement of all foreign arbitral 
awards and judgments. The Royal Decree abolished the discrimination between 
arbitral awards issued in a member state to the Arab League and non-Arab arbitral 
awards.406 The Convention provides for the direct enforcement of any court decision 
issued in any court in any member state of the Convention. The Convention left the 
competent authority with a limited scope for judicial review for the reason that most 
Arab countries have their laws based on the same principles.407 With regard to 
arbitration, the competent authority in Saudi Arabia is Diwan Almazalim. According 
to article 3 of the Convention, the competent authority does not have to review the 
arbitral award; however, it has the right to refuse the enforcement in the following 
cases: 
• If the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable under the law of the state 
where the enforcement is sought; 
• If the arbitral tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction; 
• If the award is issued under a non-valid arbitration clause or agreement; 
• If the award is issued in absentia; 
• If the award is not final in the country where it is rendered and 
• If the award is contrary to public policy or the law of the country where the 
enforcement is sought.408 
 
                                                 
406 See generally A. Alfahal, Qada’ Almazalim Fe Almamlakah Al Arabiya Al Saudiya (1st edn., Dar 
Alnawabig, 1994).   
407 See article 1 of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, which states that the “Shari’a” rules are the only 
source of legislation in Saudi Arabia; see also article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, as amended in 
1980, which states that the Islamic Jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation; article 2 of the 
Constitution of Kuwait of 1962, which states that the Shari’a shall be a main source of legislation; 
article 3 of the Constitution of Yemen of 1994, which provides that Islamic Shari'a is the source of all 
legislation. 
408 The Convention of Arab League of Nations on the Enforcement of Judgements of September 14, 
1952.  
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3.12.3 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Commercial Arbitration 
Centre 
 
The GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre was established as an independent, non-
profitable organisation by the Leaders of the GCC States in December 1993 during 
the 14th GCC Summit in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with its headquarters 
situated in the Kingdom of Bahrain.409 The arbitration rules of the Centre were issued 
in November 1994 and the Centre was fully functional by March 1995. The Centre 
can be considered as the most active arbitration Centre in the GCC area due to its 
understanding of the legal systems of the member States. Moreover, arbitration 
through the Centre can be considered as the most advantageous foreign solution for 
the parties with regard to enforcement in Saudi Arabia.410 In relation with the 
enforcement of the Centre’s awards, article 36 of the rules of procedure of the Centre 
provides: “an award passed by the Tribunal pursuant to these Rules shall be binding 
and final. It shall be enforceable in the GCC member States once an order is issued 
for the enforcement thereof by the relevant judicial authority”; the rules set the 
grounds of setting aside an arbitral award in article 36, which are:  
• If it is passed in the absence of an Arbitration Agreement or in pursuance of a 
null Agreement, or if it is prescribed by the passage of time or if the arbitrator 
goes beyond the scope of the Agreement; 
• If the award is passed by arbitrators who have not been appointed in 
accordance with the law, or if it is passed by some of them without being 
authorised to hand down a ruling in the absence of others, or if it is passed 
pursuant to an Arbitration Agreement in which the issue of the dispute is not 
specified, or if it is passed by a person who is not legally qualified to issue 
such an award.411 
 
 
 
                                                 
409 GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council, which is an agreement among the six Arab countries of 
the Persian Gulf region, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in 
1981, with the aim of coordinating and integrating their economic policies. 
410 See in general GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre <http://www.gcac.biz/en>, accessed 30 April 
2007. 
411 Arbitral rules of procedure adopted by the GCC Commercial Co-operation Committee in November 
1994 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  
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3.12.4 Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
Apart from the regional Agreements concluded under the Arab League and the GCC, 
Saudi Arabia concluded the investment promotion and protection agreement with the 
following eight countries: Italy, Germany, Belgium, Taiwan, China, France, Malaysia 
and Austria. These agreements aim to promote and protect the investments of the 
nationals and enterprises of one contracting party in the territory of the other 
contracting party by providing an appropriate legislative environment to stimulate and 
increase investment, trade and industrial activity. With the recession in Western 
economies and the ambitious development plans, Saudi Arabia assumes the role of 
capital exporting country that many Western countries such as the US and the UK are 
trying to share part of its wealth by any means. In relation to the dispute settlement 
method, all the treaties provide for arbitration as a method of settlement of any 
dispute arising out of the interpretation of the Agreements.412 The Agreements also 
provide for arbitration under ICSID for the settlement of disputes between the host 
state and the private parties of the other state as well as ad hoc arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules to settle disputes between private parties.413  
 
3.12.5 The Saudi Arbitration Team 
 
As a sign of unprofessional conduct, a Royal Decree was issued under number 
7/5/23165 dated 24/08/2002 calling for the establishment of the Saudi Arbitration 
Team. After a long series of discussions with one of the members of that team, the 
mission of that team was unclear as it can be summarised as follows: advertising for 
arbitration in Saudi Arabia as an auxiliary mechanism to litigation; attending 
conferences by the members of the team and holding closed discussions to discuss 
issues with regard to arbitration. They claim that the team aims at encouraging the 
                                                 
412 See article 9 of the agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Belo Luxembourg 
economic union (b.l.e.u.) concerning the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments signed in 
Jeddah on April 22, 2001; article 10 of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
Republic of Austria concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment signed in 
Riyadh on June 30, 200?missing number?; article 10 of the Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Malaysia concerning the promotion and reciprocal 
protection of investment signed in Kuala Lumpur on October 10, 2000. 
413 Ibid., moreover, article 11.2.b of the Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Austria provides for an 
ad hoc arbitration tribunal to be established under the rules of UNCITRAL for the purpose of settling 
disputes between host states and private parties.    
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business community to pay more attention to arbitration as a fast, cheap and effective 
dispute settlement mechanism. In reality, problems related to the Saudi law in general 
and arbitration in particular cannot be solved by forming such teams as Saudi Arabia 
is in need of developed arbitration centres instead of the time-consuming proceedings 
before Diwan Almazalim. The problems related to the legal system in Saudi Arabia 
need at least another generation before they can be solved. Personally, I believe that 
this team as well as some other committees benefit its members only for the reason 
that after six years of its creation i.e. in 2008, many of the members of the Saudi 
Arbitration team have been studying in the UK for the last five years.  
 
3.13 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the attitude of the Saudi Government toward international arbitration 
was strongly influenced by the outcome of the Aramco award of 1958. At first, the 
Government welcomed international arbitration as seen in the Buraimi Arbitration in 
1955. After the Aramco award, international arbitration was viewed by the Saudis as a 
breach of their national sovereignty represented in disrespecting their laws and 
regulations and applying foreign laws to their national wealth. International 
arbitration was also seen as a useful tool to be used in favour of western parties in 
order to escape the application of the Saudi law. This argument might be supported by 
the arguably unfair tactical use of arbitration by some western companies.414 The 
disappointing outcomes of the Aramco arbitration were expected due to the lack of 
legal experience and the naïve or the “too honest” conduct with Aramco, which was 
also a normal result for being the weaker party in the dispute. Some of the members 
of the arbitration tribunal in the Aramco case lacked the basic knowledge of Islamic 
Shari’a and its principles. The arbitration tribunal was unfair in judging the Shari’a 
and they refused to apply its principles when the application was due. The Aramco 
award changed the Government’s attitude toward arbitration as the Aramco award 
was followed by the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 85 of 1963, which 
prohibited the government and its agencies from accepting arbitration clauses and 
agreements. Later on, the Ministry of Commerce Circulation complemented the 
                                                 
414 Supra 379, Alsamman, p. 219. 
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Council of Ministers Resolution and prohibited foreign arbitration clauses in the 
articles of association of joint ventures registered within the Kingdom. This approach 
did not last for long because the oil boom started to relax it. The relaxation started 
when Saudi Arabia agreed to settle certain differences and claims relating to the 
Agreement on Guaranteed Private Investment and guarantees of Saudi public sector 
contracts and investments with the United States in 1975. The previous step was with 
an individual country; the comprehensive reform, as a legal incentive to foreign 
investment, began when Saudi Arabia joined the ICSID Convention in 1979-80. The 
impacts of the Aramco award were obvious in the reservation made by the 
Government regarding oil and acts of sovereignty. This step was followed by 
expanding the jurisdiction of Diwan Almazalim to include the enforcement of foreign 
judgments and arbitral awards in 1982. The Arbitration Act of 1983 and its 
implementing regulation in 1985 were the first comprehensive arbitration regulations 
in the Kingdom that are still in force today. The real interaction with the world in the 
field of international commercial arbitration came after the ratification of the New 
York Convention on the enforcement and recognition of foreign arbitral awards of 
1958 regardless of its limited application in Saudi Arabia and the intensive use of the 
public policy defence; the New York Convention is still the main international 
instrument for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Saudi Arabia also 
contributed to the establishment of the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre, which 
works as a fully functioning arbitration centre for the GCC countries with easier and 
more direct enforcement of its awards in Saudi Arabia. The last few years experienced 
the adoption of some bilateral Investment Agreements for the protection of foreign 
investment that include arbitration as the main method of dispute settlement. The 
quality of the regulatory relaxation differs between the 1970s and the current phase, 
which is due to the economic circumstances. In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia needed to 
attract foreign expertise and technology to contribute to the building of the 
infrastructure; however, after the collapse of the global oil prices in the 1990s, the 
objective of attracting foreign capital was added to the Saudi agenda. Despite the fact 
that Saudi Arabia relaxed its regulation toward foreign elements and showed more 
tolerance toward foreign arbitral awards, the impact of the Aramco award was still on 
the scene as it was represented in the limitations on arbitration in Governmental 
contracts, as demonstrated in article 3 of the Arbitration Act of 1983 and in the 
reservation made when ratifying the ICSID Convention; nonetheless, t
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clauses in the Gas Concessions of 2004 show another openness toward the outside 
world in this area.  
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4 Saudi Law as Lex Arbitri: Evaluation of Saudi 
Arbitration Law and Judicial Practice 
 
 
The Arbitration Act of Saudi Arabia was adopted by Royal Decree No. M/46, issued 
on 12/07/1403 H (1983), repealing in the process the relevant provisions of the 
Commercial Court Code of 1931.415 The Implementing Rules of the Act were 
subsequently adopted by the Royal Decree in 1985.416 The purpose of the 
Implementing Rules was to supplement lacunae in the Act and provide guidance on 
particular aspects of Saudi arbitral proceedings. More specifically, the Act is silent 
regarding numerous procedural issues, such as the rules pertaining to the delivery of 
arbitral awards, notifications as to the process and communication between the parties 
and the arbitral tribunal and between the arbitral tribunal and third parties, the seat of 
the arbitral tribunal, and others. It will be demonstrated that the Act constitutes a 
codification of the Hanbali law of arbitration417 as elaborated by Ibn Taymiyyah 
(1263-1328), in his collection of Fatwas418, and Ibn Qudamah (1146-1223), in his 
comprehensive work Almoghni, which has been considered as the most authoritative 
source of Hanbali teachings until the present day.419 The Act provides a framework 
for flexible commercial arbitration with a view to establishing it as a real and effective 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Prior to the adoption of the 1983 Act, 
arbitration existed only as a theoretical possibility on account of several factors. 
Firstly, the courts at the time did not recognise arbitration agreements or clauses, even 
where the parties claimed a contractual entitlement to arbitrate as a result. Even where 
the court approved the arbitration agreement or clause, the subsequent enforcement of 
the arbitral award was wholly voluntary.420 Accordingly, reference to arbitration was 
very limited. Secondly, the jurisdictional conflict between the Saudi Commercial 
                                                 
415 Reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 2969 of 22/08/1403 H. (1983). 
416 Royal Decree No. M/7/2021, of 08/09/1405 H. (1985), reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 
3069 of 10/10/1405 H. (1985). 
417 See generally, S. Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in Shari’a and 
Statute Law (2nd edn., Graham & Trotman, 2006), especially Chapter 20, pp. 290-325.  
418 Supra 175, Ibn Taymiyyah, vol. 29. 
419 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 10.  
420 Supra 2, Albejad, p. 30.  
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Court421 and Shari’a courts culminated in rendering arbitration ineffective and time 
consuming. Although the Arbitration Act of 1983 supersedes the arbitration 
provisions of the Commercial Court Code of 1931, ad hoc arbitrations lacking a 
commercial character are still governed by the provisions of the Commercial Court 
Code.422 While one generally speaks of either ad hoc or institutional arbitration, in 
Saudi Arabia there is yet another classification on the basis of the nature of the 
dispute as either compulsory or voluntary arbitration. As a general rule, resort to 
arbitration is voluntary423 except where the regulator recommends the compulsory 
route in a particular case. The rationale behind this classification is to restrict the 
jurisdiction of the Shari’a courts with respect to some controversial matters under the 
Shari’a and also to avoid the conflict between Shari’a and Saudi law on the one hand 
and Saudi law and some customs and traditions on the other.424   
 
The Arbitration Act of 1983 is relatively brief and ambiguous in parts and, as already 
stated, lacks detail with respect to some key issues of the arbitration proceedings. 
Most of the ambiguous issues were ironed out in the Implementing Rules of 1985. 
The Implementing Rules are elaborate and highly influential for both arbitral tribunals 
and the judicial bodies overseeing the arbitral process in Saudi Arabia. However, even 
the Implementing Rules did not give a clear answer to some essential aspects such as 
the question of arbitrability which will be examined in details in the next chapter.   
 
The following sections provide an analysis of the Rules with reference to Hanbali 
arbitration law and the relevant laws in Saudi Arabia, especially the Law of Procedure 
before Shari’a Courts.425  
                                                 
421 Upon its establishment, there was only one commercial court seated in Jeddah, which was later 
substituted by the Commission for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.  
422 Supra 2, Albejad, p. 30.  
423 Article 1, 1983 Arbitration Act.  
424 Supra 2, Albejad, p. 51. Disputes related to tobacco products, insurance, musical instruments and 
recordings are compulsorily referred to arbitration.    
425 As we have already noted, under Hanbali teachings arbitration is equivalent to litigation and the 
arbitrator is thus analogous to a private judge having specific jurisdiction over the issue at hand only. 
Article 36 of the Implementing Rules provides that the arbitral tribunal should comply with the 
litigation principles of the Shari’a. The Implementing Rules were issued in 1985 prior to the enactment 
of the 2000 Law of Procedure before Shari’a Courts. Prior to the enactment of the 2000 Law, 
arbitrators relied on Shari’a principles in order to find governing rules for arbitral proceedings.       
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4.1 Arbitration, Arbitrators and Parties 
 
Article one of the Implementing Rules concerns with the scope of arbitration. 
According the article, arbitration is not permitted in matters in which conciliation is 
not permitted such as hodoud, 426accusation of adultery between supposes and all 
matters relating to public order.427 The Hanbalies mainly give arbitrator the same 
jurisdiction as court judge. Ibn Taymiyyah does not restrict the scope of arbitration 
and gives it the same scope as litigation; however, according to him, an arbitral award 
is with no value without judicial review.428 The Act followed the restriction made by 
some Hanbali scholars and did not allow arbitration in criminal matters because it 
have a different nature from commercial disputes and got a relation with state 
power.429  
 
Article 2 deals with the capacity of parties to arbitrate. Like any normal contract, 
arbitration agreement should not be valid unless made by a person having full legal 
capacity to conclude a valid contract. In order to conclude a valid agreement under 
Shari’a, the parties to the dispute must satisfy the requirements of legal capacity, i.e. 
to have reached a certain age and have a certain level of mental ability at the time of 
concluding the contract.430 The guardian of a minor, appointed guardian or trustee of 
charitable trust, or what is so-called in Arabic waqf, cannot be conclude arbitration 
agreement arbitration unless authorised by the court.431 Even after being authorised to 
resort to arbitration, an arbitral award against a guardian of an incapacitated person is 
not valid if it provides for any damage against their interest unless approved by a 
judge.432 In accordance with article 5 of the Arbitration Act, the arbitration agreement 
should be sent, in order to be approved, to the competent authority which is the 
authority having jurisdiction on the dispute originally.433 When reviewing arbitration 
agreements, the competent authority decide whether it entails any contradiction with 
the substantive and the procedural law of arbitration as well as the public policy.   
                                                 
426 Hodoud are crimes for which the Quran provides punishments such as theft, adultery and accusation 
of adultery.  
427 Article 1 of the Implementing Rules of the Arbitration Act.  
428 A. bin Mofleh, Al-forou’. (4th edn., A’alam Alkotoub, 1985) vol. 6 p. 440     
429 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah. Vol. 11, p. 484.  
430 See in general, M. Zahraa, The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law. Arab Law Quarterly vol. 
11 1996.   p.245-249 
431 Article 2 of the implementing rules  
432 See in general supra 26, Al-Kenain.  
433 See article 5 of the Arbitration Act and Diwan Almazalim decision No. 59/T/4 of 1412 H. (1992)  
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 After approving the arbitration agreement by the authority which is mainly Diwan 
Alamzalim “the Board of Grievances” or the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the 
authority should inform the arbitral tribunal of the approval and advice it to proceed in 
looking at the dispute at issue or the refusing party may be forced by the Diwan to 
prepare it in accordance with the Arbitration Act.434If one of the parties refused to 
arbitrate after concluding a binding arbitration clause, the other party will prepare the 
arbitration agreement unilaterally but under the supervision of the authority and if the 
agreement meets the legal requirements and the denying party rejected it, the 
authority will approve it, inform the arbitral tribunal and ask it to proceed normally 
following the related provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Implementing 
Regulations.435 
 
Under the Saudi law, the existence of the arbitration clause does not affect the right of 
the parties to resort to litigation. It can be understood from the case law that referring 
the dispute to litigation with the existence of arbitration clause is an implied waiver of 
the parties’ right to arbitrate. In decision number 29/T/4 of 1413 H. (1993), the Diwan 
emphasised on the parties’ right to insist on arbitration as mean of settlement to their 
disputes as a valid agreement436; however, the action of referring the dispute to 
litigation is a waiver of the parties’ right to arbitrate and the arbitration clause will be 
of no affect.437 This view was further supported by decision number 72/T/4 of 1411 
H. (1991) the Diwan denied jurisdiction over the dispute because of the existence of 
the arbitration clause but when the case was referred to the Review Committee of the 
Diwan, it found that one of the defendant insist on his right to arbitrate after referring 
the case to litigation which annul his right to arbitrate; therefore, the committee 
uphold the nullification of the arbitration clause because the defendant raised his 
claim after referring the dispute to litigation.438 The moment when the right to 
arbitrate is waived by the action of referring the dispute to litigation is not clearly 
determined but it might be subject to the time of filing the dispute to litigation before 
the Shari’a court or Diwan Almazalim. 
                                                 
434 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 184/T/4 of 1412 H. (1992) 
435 See Diwan Alamzalim decision No. 150/T/4 of 1413 H. (1993).  
436 Diwan Almazalim decisions No. 113/T/4 of 1416 H. (1996) and 38/T/4 of 1409 H. (1989) 
437 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 29/T/4 of  1413 H. (1993) 
438 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 72/T/4 of 1411 H. (1991) 
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It is not a matter of public policy in Saudi Arabia that the arbitration clause waives the 
parties’ right to refer to litigation. In the Saudi law, if one of the parties want to insist 
on his right to arbitrate, his claim should be done before referring the dispute to 
litigation as seen in decisions number 95/T/4 of 1413 H. (1993) and 142/T/4 of 1409 
H. (1989).439 In the latter decision the Review Committee of the Diwan added: the 
parties to the arbitration have the right to refer the case to litigation even if they have 
a valid arbitration clause. Litigation is the original method for settling disputes and 
arbitration is an exception only which have nothing to do with the public policy.440On 
the other hand, referring the dispute to litigation does not affect the right of the parties 
to resort to arbitration. In case number 27/T/4 of 1411 H. (1991), the defendant 
argued that the plaintiff sued him before a court in the United State which is a waiver 
of his right to arbitrate. The Committee decided that referring the dispute to litigation 
has no affect on the parties’ right to arbitrate.441 As it has been seen above, the case 
law carries some contradiction in the point whether referring the dispute to arbitration 
could annul the arbitration clause or whether the arbitration clause remains valid. 
Such a conflict may be due to the fact that precedent cases have a little affect on the 
legal practice and the dependence was placed heavily on the reasoning and 
understanding of judges and arbitrators.     
 
 
Article three came to determine the nationality of the arbitrators as well as other 
matter of public policy regarding the characters of the arbitrators. The arbitrator 
should be a Muslim Male of a Saudi nationality or a Muslim Male of any other 
nationality of a liberal profession or otherwise he may be a public official upon 
approval of the department to which such official belongs. If there is more than one 
arbitrator, the chairman should be knowledgeable in Shari’a rules and the commercial 
regulations, custom and tradition in effect in the kingdom.442 Article four of the Act 
added that in case of multiple arbitrators the number should be odd.443 The 
appointment of sole arbitrator as well as the validity of arbitral awards rendered by a 
                                                 
439 Diwan Almazalim decisions No. 95/T/4 of 1413 H. (1993) and 142/T/4 of 1409 H. (1989). 
440 Ibid  
441 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 27/T/4 of 1411 H. (1991) 
442 Article 3 of the implementing rules  
443 Article4 of the arbitration act  
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sole arbitrator was upheld by the common practice and the decisions of the Diwan.444 
The requirement of the odd number of arbitrators facilitates the issuing of the arbitral 
award in case of conflict in judgments between the arbitrators.445 The Islamic law 
clearly elaborated the issue of non-Muslims acting as arbitrators and there is no doubt 
between all the scholars that non-Muslims are not allowed to adjudicate in any dispute 
involving a Muslim element within the Muslim territory. This opinion was based on 
the assumption that arbitration is another form of litigation.446  
 
If the arbitration agreement provides for the settlement of the dispute by conciliation, 
then the arbitrators/conciliators can be non-Muslims because the agreement is 
considered to be an agency agreement which can be executed by them.447 In relation 
to the Saudi law, arbitrators working in the settlement of any dispute within the 
Kingdom must be Muslims in accordance with article three of the Implementing 
Rules of Arbitration.448 Residing in Saudi Arabia is not a condition for the validity of 
the appointment of the arbitrators. The Arbitration Act is silent on the issue of the 
place of residence of the arbitrator and it requires them to be Muslim Males only. In 
case number 22/T/4 of 1413 H. (1993), Diwan Almazalim rejected the decision of the 
Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Dispute that annulled the appointment 
of an arbitrator on the ground that he is not residing in Saudi Arabia although, he is a 
Muslim. The Review Committee added: the rejection imposes an unnecessary 
restriction.449 
 
 
Article four provides for some restrictions on the appointment of the arbitrators. 
According to the article, a person having an interest in the dispute, having been 
convicted of a hadd (single of hodoud) or penalty of a crime of dishonour, having 
been dismissed form public office by punitive decision or adjudicated bankrupt, 
unless relived from, may not be an arbitrator.450 These characters concern with the 
                                                 
444 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 7/T/4 of 1419 H. (1999) 
445 Supra 26 Al-Kenain. p. 111  
446 A. Alfarra’, Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyah. Edited by Muhammad Hamid Al-fagy (1st edn, Dar Alkotoub 
Alilmiyah, 1983), p. 61  
447 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah vol.14 p. 170  
448 See article 3 of the Implementing Rules.  
449 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 22/T/4 of 1412 H. (1992) 
450 Article 4 of the implementing rules  
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issues of impartiality and credibility. Moreover, most of the latter issues can be used 
as grounds for the challenging of witnesses. The appointment of an arbitrator 
possessing one of these characters violates the principle that the arbitrator must be an 
adl.451 The appointment of the fasiq452 is void because arbitration under the Hanbali 
teachings is litigation and the arbitrator should possess all the characters of a court 
judge.453      
 
 
Article five obliges the Authorities to issue an official updated list of the licensed 
arbitrators; the list should be prepared by agreement among the Minister of Justice, 
the Minister of Commerce and Industry and the Chairman of the Board of Grievances. 
The courts, judicial commissions, and Chambers of Commerce and Industry shall be 
notified of the list and disputants have liberty to choose arbitrators from such lists.  
The Ministry of Justice states its criterion for prospective arbitrators who have to pass 
an exam before they qualify as arbitrators. The exam covers various topics such as the 
mandatory rules of Shari’a and the arbitration procedure under the Arbitration Act and 
its Implementing Rules in addition to the valid laws and customs that relate to the area 
that the arbitrator want to practice.454 The test that should be taken by the arbitrator is 
no more than a multiple choice based questionnaire of 20 questions. The candidate 
should download it from the website of the Ministry of Justice and send it by fax or 
post after answering it. It might be said that this procedure is not the appropriate way 
of qualifying arbitrators for the following reasons: the questionnaire does not cover 
many important issues with regard to arbitration such as public policy, the issuance of 
the award or even the rules of procedure. For instance, some questions deal with 
issues like the number of articles in the Arbitration Act and the Implementing Rules, 
the date of ratifying the New York Convention of 1958, what does UNICTRAL 
stands for etc.  
Second, the credibility of such a procedure is disputed because anyone can answer it 
on behalf of the candidate. According to the website of the Ministry of Justice, if the 
                                                 
451 Supra 34, Saleh, p.36.  In general, the term adl refers to the person who does not violate Shari’a law 
and have a decent mental abilities.    
452 Fasiq is a term that  describes someone guilty of openly and flagrantly violating Islamic law and/or 
someone whose moral character is corrupt 
453 Supra 26, Al-Kenain p. 77-79  
454 See article 5 of the implementing rules. The list of the arbitrators is available in the website of the 
Ministry of Justice. www.moj.gov.sa 22/05/2007  
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candidate failed in answering one of the questions, he will have to attend an interview 
which might be a mere repetition of the questionnaire that he has already sent to the 
Ministry.455 Although, non-Saudis are allowed to arbitrate if they are chosen by the 
parties to the dispute, the Ministry of Justice required all the applicants to be of Saudi 
nationality.456       
 
4.2 Arbitration Clause 
 
Article six overcomes one of the main impediments to arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
which is the recognition of arbitration clause. The article also sets the minimum   
amount of information that should be included in the arbitration agreement According 
to the article; the arbitrators shall be appointed by agreement of the parties in the 
arbitration agreement which should adequately define the subject of the dispute and 
the names of the arbitrators. An agreement to arbitrate may also be made by a 
contractual clause “arbitration clause” relating to disputes arising out of the execution 
of the contract.457  
 
The failure of the court in recognising arbitration clauses characterised arbitration 
under the Code of Commercial Court of 1931 as an impractical and time consuming 
dispute settlement mechanism.458 Courts did not use to recognise arbitration clauses 
because it doubted its validity under Shari’a and it use to reject arbitration it mainly 
on the ground of uncertainty.  One of the conditions of the validity of arbitration 
agreement is to have an existed dispute; therefore, the legality of the arbitration clause 
is controversial. Under Shari’a, a contract whose object did not exist at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract is not acknowledged and is similar to the prohibited 
contracts of the selling of fish in the sea or bird in the sky. The Hanbali teaching, as 
being the most flexible School in commercial transactions, considers arbitration 
clause a contractual clause which is valid as long as it does not contradict with the 
purpose of the contract, and it is not prohibited under Shari’a.459 The rejection may 
                                                 
455 The Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, www.moj.gov.sa [17/10/2007]  
456 Ibid  
457 Article 6 of the implementing rules  
458 See in general, supra 2 Albejad, p. 30  
459 See in general supra 28 , vol. 14 Ibn Qudamah  
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was a result of the judges misunderstanding of the contractual nature of arbitration 
clauses. 
   
Traditionally, arbitration agreement should include the names of the arbitrators, the 
subject of the dispute, the applicable law and the time of rendering the arbitral award 
as well as the seat of the arbitration.460 It can be seen in the famous incident of 
Tahkeem between Ali the fourth Caliphate and Mu’awiyah the governor of Syria in 
the year (659 AD). This arbitration was an effort to stop the civil war that erupted as 
an impact of the assassination of the third Islamic Caliphate Othman and lasted for 
more than two years. The dispute was submitted to arbitration by a written agreement, 
the two parties agreed to appoint two arbitrators in a written deed which stated the 
names of the arbitrators, the time limit for making the award, the applicable law and 
the place of issuing the award.461 The arbitration agreements between the Government 
of Saudi Arabia and Aramco and the Government of Saudi Arabia and Ruler of Abo 
Dhabi and the Sultan of Oman in the 1950s followed the same model. 462 Under the 
Saudi law of arbitration there is no need to determine the applicable law to the dispute 
in the arbitration agreement or the arbitration clause because it will be, by default, the 
Shari’a or the Saudi law. Moreover, the Hanbali teachings gives a total freedom to the 
parties to the agreement to include any condition in their agreement even if the 
conditions are irrelevant to the dispute at issue as long as it is not contrary to the 
Shari’a principles.463 
 
Article seven of the implementing rules deals with the role of the supervisory 
authority to the arbitral proceedings. The supervisory authority over the arbitration 
proceedings is the authority originally having jurisdiction over the dispute. The 
authority originally having jurisdiction over the dispute should issue a decision 
approving the arbitration agreement within fifteen days and shall notify the arbitral 
tribunal of its decision.464 This article codifies the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah which 
                                                 
460 Supra 46, Sayen. 
461 Supra 7, Alqurashi.  
462 See Aramco Award, 27 I.L.R. 117, (1963) p. 128, see also, The Arbitration agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom acting on behalf of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and His Highness the 
Sultan Said bin Taimur the Sultan of Oman and the Government of Saudi Arabia signed in Jeddah on 
30 July 1954 (H.M.S.O. Cmd. 9272, 1954) cited in J.B. Kelly, The Buraimi Oasis Dispute. 
International affairs, vol.32, No. 3.  (July., 1956) p. 318-324  
463 Supra 46 Sayen, p. 220 
464 Article 7 of the implementing rules  
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considers the arbitral award to be with no value without judicial review.465 Diwan 
Almazalim and the Ministry of Commerce are the competent authorities to deal with 
commercial arbitration in the Kingdom. Having 2 authorities competent for the 
settlement of commercial disputes might seem problematic; however, Diwan 
Almazalim has supremacy over the Committee for the Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Regardless of the very recent 
change in the charter of Diwan Almazalim that moved the competence of settling 
commercial disputes to the Ministry of Justice, the supervision of arbitration still one 
of  the Diwan’s competences till now.466 As a general rule, all the parties to the 
arbitration and the arbitral tribunal are bound by the Arbitration act and the 
Implementing Rules which mean that any clause, agreement or action found to be in 
violation of the law is null and void. The Diwan in its decision number 53/T/4 of 1414 
H. (1994) nullified an arbitral award made without the supervision and approval of the 
competent authority. In this case, the parties to the arbitration agreed to arbitrate 
under the supervision of some entities other than the competent authority originally 
having jurisdiction over the dispute. The review committee of the Diwan set-aside the 
award and stated: terms or conditions in the arbitration agreement contradict the 
Arbitration Act and the related laws and policies are null and void. As a result, it is 
prohibited to have a person, legal or natural, as a supervisor for the arbitration in the 
Kingdom other than the competent authority originally having jurisdiction over the 
dispute.467In another case, the Diwan nullified the arbitral award rendered without an 
approved arbitration agreement. In this case, the Diwan directed the arbitration 
tribunal to proceed in deciding the case even though there was no arbitration 
agreement approved by the Diwan. The arbitral tribunal proceeded relying on the 
communication of the Diwan that included all the information that should be included 
in the arbitration agreement; however,  this action was in violation of the law and a 
mistake form the Diwan that should have informed the tribunal of the importance of 
having a valid arbitration agreement. As a result the award considered void and what 
the Diwan and the tribunal did was in violation to the Arbitration Act and its 
Implementing Rules.468    
 
                                                 
465 Supra 18 Al Kenain p.49 
466 Umm Alqura Gazette, Issue No. 4170 dated 30/09/1428 H. 12/10/2007.  
467 Diwan Almazalim decision No.61/T/4 of 1415 H. (1995)  
468Diwan Almazalim decision No. 99/T/4 of 1414 H. (1994) 
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There is a dispute whether the competent authority has supremacy over the arbitration 
tribunal irrespective of the place of arbitration or not. When looking at the arbitration 
regulation especially article 18 of the Arbitration act469, it can be understood that the 
supervisory authority may act as an appellate body; however, the case law regards the 
supervisory authority as lower court and the arbitral tribunal is the supreme. 
Consequently, the Diwan will either uphold or reject the arbitral award without the 
competence to decide on the case anew. In case number 53/T/4 of 1415 H. (1995), the 
Committee stated: because the word competent authority in the Arbitration Act and its 
Implementing Rules does not specify the degree of the court, the supervisory 
authority should apply its own rules of procedure. With regard to the Diwan, we 
consider it a second degree court after the arbitration tribunal; therefore, the Diwan 
should apply its own rules of procedure and the Diwan’s duty is to uphold or reject 
the decision of the arbitration tribunal only.470   
 
Article eight demonstrates one of the impacts of Aramco Award of 1958; this article 
as well as article 3 of the Arbitration Act has incorporated in the Council of Ministers 
Resolution Number 58 of 1963 and the Deputy Minister of Commerce Circulation 
No.3/9/sh/331/9/2903 of 13/03/1399 H. (1979).471 In disputes to which a government 
authority is a party with third parties and desires to resort to arbitration, such authority 
shall prepare a memorandum concerning arbitration in such dispute stating in it the 
subject of the dispute, the justification for arbitration and the names of the parties for 
submission to the President of the Council of Ministers to consider approval of the 
arbitration. The article allowed some governmental entities to include arbitration 
clauses in their contract and in all cases, the council of ministers should be notified of 
the award rendered in relation to all the disputes involving a governmental element.472 
In practice, if a governmental entity wanted to resort to arbitration for the settlement 
of any dispute with another party, it should obtain approval from the President of the 
                                                 
469 Article 18 of the Arbitration Act reads as follow: All awards passed by the arbitrators, even though 
issued under an investigation procedure, shall be filed within five days with the authority originally 
competent to hear the dispute and the parties notified with copies thereof. Parties may submit their 
objections against what is issued by arbitrators to the authority with which the award is filed, within 
fifteen days from the date they are notified of the arbitrators' awards; otherwise such awards shall be 
final. 
470 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 53/T/4 of 1415 H. (1995) 
471 See the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 dated 03/02/1383 H. (25/06/1963) and the Deputy 
Minister of Commerce Circulation No.3/9/sh/331/9/2903 of 13/03/1399 H. (1979).   
472 Article 8 of the implementing rules  
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Council of Ministers; however, a governmental body may include arbitration clause in 
its contracts.473  
 
4.3 Proceeding 
Article nine specifies some of the responsibilities of the competent authority toward 
the arbitration proceedings. The arbitration proceedings shall be supervised by the 
authority originally having jurisdiction over the dispute; the authority shall appoint a 
clerk to act as a secretary for the arbitral tribunal. The article sets the duties of the 
secretary which include; establishing the records necessary for the registration of 
request for arbitration and submits them to the competent authority for approval of 
arbitration document; the clerk shall be responsible for the notifications and 
communications provided in the Arbitration Act and any other responsibilities 
determined by the competent minister.474Article eight of the Arbitration Act state that 
the clerk of the authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall be in charge of 
all notifications and notices related to the arbitration proceedings.475 Such 
notifications include the notification of the time and the place of the hearings and all 
the communications between the tribunal and the competent authority, witnesses, 
experts and all other individuals and entities.  
Article ten sets the time for the commencement of the arbitral proceedings and 
illustrate some of the responsibilities of the secretary of the arbitral tribunal, the 
article requires the arbitral tribunal to fix the date for hearing the dispute within a 
period not exceeding five days from the date of its notification of the decision 
approving the arbitration agreement and shall notify the parties of that through the 
clerk of the authority originally having jurisdiction over the dispute.476The 
responsibilities of the supervisory authority and the secretary of the arbitral tribunal 
will be illustrated in more details below.  
                                                 
473 For further details see of Appendix (Z) of the gas concession agreement between the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and Lukoil overseas and the gas concession agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and Sinopec International Petroleum and Production Corporation Umm Alqura Gazette, issue 
No. 3990 dated 15/03/1425 H. 4/05/2004. See.  
474 Article 9 of the implementing rules 
475 Article 8 of the arbitration act  
476 Article 10 of the implementing rules  
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4.4 Notification of Parties, Appearance and Default, and 
Representation in the Arbitration 
 
This part of the implementing rules can be divided into three parts; the first part 
illustrates the related issues to the notifications of and the communications with the 
Parties to the arbitration477; the second part specifies the competent persons to appear 
before the tribunal.478The third part deals with the appearance before the tribunal and 
the default in the appearance.479 
 
Article 11 insists on the importance of the role of the secretary appointed by the 
supervisory authority. All the communication and notification relating to the dispute 
should be made by the clerk of the authority originally having jurisdiction over the 
dispute. These communications whether carried out at the request of the parties or 
initiated by the arbitrators should be assisted by the police and the local authority 
within the scope of their area of competence.480  
 
Article 12 determines the official language for the content of all communications done 
by the tribunal. A notification or communication shall be drawn in Arabic in a number 
of copies according to the number of parties and should include all the required 
information such as the timing of making the notification, the names, addresses of the 
parties and the server, the names of the arbitrators, the seat of the arbitral tribunal and 
the timing of the hearing.481  
 
If the arbitration agreement provides for the settlement of the dispute by means of 
arbitration outside Saudi Arabia, the agreement is valid if the conflict of laws rules 
allow and one of the parties of the arbitration is of a non-Saudi nationality. In decision 
number 155/T/4/ of 1415 H. (1995), the defendant, a foreign company, requested that 
arbitration should be held outside Saudi Arabia, the Committee decided that the 
defendant is bound by the Saudi law of arbitration; the arbitration tribunal should be 
                                                 
477 Articles 11-16 of the implementing rules 
478 Article 17 of the implementing rules  
479 Articles 18 and 19 of the implementing rules  
480 Article 11 of the implementing rules and see also article 15 of the law of procedure before the 
Shari’a courts which determined the persons competent to assist in delivering  notifications and 
communications as follow: the Umdah or the chief of the quarter, the police station, to the head of the 
“centre”, or the chief of the tribe.  
481 See article 12 of the implementing rules  
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seated in Saudi Arabia, apply the Saudi substantive law on the merit and it is to be 
supervised by Diwan Almazalim.482 However, if another law got applicability on the 
merit of the dispute, the Diwan does not oppose the reference to arbitration outside 
the Saudi Arabia like in decision number 43/T/4 of 1416 H. (1996). In the latter case, 
the parties to the dispute, a Saudi company against an American company, entered 
into a distribution agreement and agreed in the arbitration clause to refer their disputes 
to arbitration in the State of Iowa in the United State. The Diwan rejected the claim 
that the dispute should be settled restrictedly in Saudi Arabia on the ground of the 
applicability of other foreign laws on the dispute and when the American party 
insisted on its rights under the arbitration clause, the Diwan asked the parties to refer 
dispute to the chosen forum.483   
 
If all the parties to the arbitration are Saudis and the dispute is subject to the Saudi 
law, they have no right to arbitrate outside Saudi Arabia and under any other laws as 
it is against the public policy. In case number 143/T/4 of 1412 H.(1992), the Saudi 
disputants agreed to refer their dispute to arbitration in Zurich under the ICC rules. 
The dispute was a Saudi dispute in all its elements which made the arbitration clause 
for arbitration outside Saudi Arabia null and void for contradicting the public policy. 
The Committee stated: this dispute is subject to the Saudi law and the arbitration 
clause providing for the settlement of the dispute by means of arbitration in Zurich 
under the rules of the ICC is null and void. Regardless of its contradiction with the 
Saudi law of arbitration and its implementing rules, it is an attempt to eliminate the 
jurisdiction of the Saudi judiciary over the dispute which is against the public policy 
of Saudi Arabia. The Committee decided that the arbitration clause is null and void 
and obliged the parties to refer the dispute to Diwan Almazalim to decide on the 
dispute.484 To sum up in the issue of the applicable law, if there is a foreign element in 
the dispute, the Saudi courts will look at the place of characteristic performance but it 
will not apply the foreign law in case a foreign law is applicable, it will give the 
parties the choice of settling the dispute before the court or through arbitration in the 
given jurisdiction. However, if both parties to the dispute are of Saudi nationality, the 
Saudi law most be applied on them.    
                                                 
482 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 155/T/4 of 1415 H. (1995) 
483 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 43/T/4 of 1416 H. (1996) 
484 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 143/T/4 of 1412 H. (1992)  
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4.5 Notification 
 
Articles 13 and 14 deal with the ways of notifying individual parties, the articles also 
determine the place and the means of delivery of the notifications.485 Article 15 deals 
with the same issue but in the case of having legal persons as one of the parties to the 
arbitration, the article determines the related issues to the notification of the state, 
public persons and companies, organisations and private establishments. In relation 
with the latter article, the notification to the state should be delivered to the competent 
minister, regional governor, and the head of the government authorities concern with 
the dispute or to their deputies. In matters relating to public persons, notifications and 
communications should be delivered to the representative authorised by regulations or 
his substitute. Finally, in matters relating to companies, associations and private 
establishments, the notifications and communications shall be delivered to the main 
office as set fourth in the commercial register to the chairman of the board of directors 
or to general manager or to employee substituting for such person; and with respect to 
foreign companies having a branch or agent in the Kingdom, to such branch or 
agent.486 The Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts explains the issue of the 
notification of the parties to the dispute in greater details. Article 18 of the Law reads 
as follow: With respect to government agencies, to their heads or those acting for 
them; With respect to public corporate persons, to their managers or those acting for 
them or representing them; With respect to companies, societies, and private 
establishments, to their managers or those acting for them or representing them; With 
respect to foreign companies and establishments which have a branch or an agent in 
the Kingdom, to the branch manager or the one acting for him or to the agent; or the 
one acting for him; With respect to armed forces personnel and those of similar status, 
to the immediate superior of the person to be served; With respect to sailors and ship 
personnel, to the captain; With respect to interdicted persons, to their trustees or 
guardians as the case may be; With respect to prisoners or detainees, to the warden of 
the prison or detention centre; With respect to persons who have no known place of 
                                                 
485 See articles 13 and 14 of the implementing rules  
486 See article 15 of the implementing rules and  Article 18 of  the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a 
Courts   
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residence or designated place of residence in the Kingdom, to the Ministry of Interior 
in the regular administrative ways for notification by appropriate means. 
 
4.6 Procedure 
 
Under article 16, the secretary of the arbitral tribunal have to bear the duty of 
submitting the arbitration file to the supervisory authority and notifying the parties 
and the arbitrators of the decision issued approving the arbitration agreement within 
one week from the date of the approval.487   
 
Article 17 determines the capable persons for representing the Parties before the 
arbitral tribunal. On the day fixed for hearing the arbitration, the parties should appear 
either in person or through a representative pursuant to a power-of-attorney, or what it 
is so-called in Arabic Wakalah, issued by a notary public488or any official authority or 
certified by a Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The option of appearance through 
a representative should not prejudice the right of the tribunal to require the personal 
appearance of a party if the circumstance so require.489 Wakalah can be translated as 
proxy but under Shari’a Wakalah is more than an agreement between 2 people to act 
on behalf of one another; it involves, in case of unconditional Wakalah, the right to 
act absolutely like the principal party. In Islamic law, Wakalah is a non-binding 
contract on both parties; wakalah is dissolved by the death of the agent or the 
principal regardless of the knowledge of the other party about it. It can be dissolved 
by resignation, recession or any other ground of dissolving any contract.  In the case 
of restricted Wakalah, the contract terminates by the time of executing the contract. In 
the case of a dispute, the power of attorney terminates on the time of rendering the 
final award.490 One of the main conditions that should be available in the agent of the 
                                                 
487 See article 16 of the implementing rules 
488 This body  responsible for issuing the powers of attorney in Saudi Arabia is known as  ketabat 
alad’l 
489 Article 17 of the implementing rules 
490 Supra 99, Alatasi. vol. 5 articles 1521-1530 
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parties to the arbitration is to be qualified to accept a power of attorney according to 
law of Saudi Arabia.491 
 
Article 18 deals with the default in appearance before the arbitral tribunal. If one of 
the parties failed to appear before the arbitral tribunal and the tribunal is satisfied that 
he was notified personally, it may decide the dispute if the parties have deposited in 
the arbitration file a memorial of their claim, defence, answers and documents. The 
award in such cases shall be deemed made as if all parties were presented. If the party 
was not duly summoned, the tribunal will be postponed to a subsequent hearing to be 
notified to the defaulting party. If there is more than one defendant party, some of 
whom were duly summoned and the other was not duly summoned and they all fail to 
appear or the party who was not duly summoned failed to appear, the tribunal shall, 
except in urgent cases, adjourn hearing the matter to a subsequent hearing to be 
notified to the non-appearing parties who were not duly summoned. The award in the 
matter shall be deemed made as if all parties failing to appear at the subsequent 
hearing were present. In addition, an award shall be deemed made as if a party were 
present if the party or his representative makes an appearance at any hearing or submit 
a defence memorial in the case or document related thereof. If a defaulting party 
makes an appearance before the end of the hearing, any award made therein shall be 
deemed null and void. There are strict conditions for issuing a judgment in absentia 
under the Hanbali teachings. The above article codified the exceptional cases where 
the tribunal can render an award without the psychical presence of the parties to the 
dispute. Under the Hanbali teachings, an award issued in absentia requires a judicial 
review before its execution because the defendant might have a defence against the 
claim; nonetheless, as a general rule, the tribunal is not allowed to issue a judgment in 
absentia except in the cases mentioned above.492    
Article 19 provides for the re-notification of the party that have not been notified in 
the proper manner. According to the article, if a party failed to appear and it appears 
to the tribunal that his summons by publication was invalid, it shall suspend hearing 
the claim to a later hearing to be validly re-notified to such party.493   
                                                 
491 There are a few persons who are unable to act as agents or accept the power of attorney before the 
judicial bodies in Saudi Arabia such as minors, women and non-Saudis. See the code of Law Practice 
of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/38 dated 28/06/1422 H. (2001) Umm Alqura Gazette, Issue No. 
3867 dated 17/08/1422 H. (2001) 
492 See in general supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14 p. 96.  
493 Article 19 of the implementing rules 
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4.7 Hearings, Procedure and Recording of the Case 
 
4.7.1 Confidentiality of Proceedings 
 
Under article 20, the case shall be publicly heard before the arbitral tribunal unless the 
tribunal decided on its own initiative or under the request of one of the parties for 
reasons evaluated by the tribunal.494 Accordingly, any member of the public is 
allowed to attend the hearings without restrictions.495 Under the latter article, the 
option of having private hearing cannot be extended to the issuance of the final award 
which must be in public.496 This article seems to contradict with one of the main 
purposes of arbitration as confidentiality is deemed to be one of the advantages of 
arbitration. Some commentators claim that the objective behind the publicity of the 
arbitral proceedings is to enhance the transparency and the impartiality. The latter 
view does not match the reality in Saudi Arabia nowadays. As a general rule, the 
court proceedings are to be held in public; however, in Saudi Arabia, individuals who 
are not involved in the dispute cannot even enter the court room. In addition to the 
negative attitude of some judges, the infrastructure of most of the courts in Saudi 
Arabia do not enable members of public to attend the court proceeding and the law 
should have not imposed the publicity on the arbitral tribunal when the State courts do 
not apply it on its proceedings.  Article 20 was supported also by article 61 of the law 
of procedure before the Shari’a courts which state that the judge on his own or at the 
request of one of the litigants can close the hearing in order to maintain order, observe 
public morality, or for the privacy of the family.497 Although, this article does not 
contradict with the Hanbali law of arbitration, it contradicts with the one of the 
objectives of the resort to arbitration as a private dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
Traditionally, disputes use to be settled in a public place. The judge or the governor of 
the region set either in the mosque or in his Diwan to hear and settle disputes between 
                                                 
494 Article 20 of the implementing rules  
495 A. Aldar’an, Alqawa’ed Al ijrae’iyah fe Al morafa’at Alshar’iyah (1st edn, Altawbah Publications, 
1993) p. 67   
496 Ibid  
497 Article 61 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts of Saudi Arabia.  Royal Decree No. 
M/21 dated 20/05/1421 H. (2000). Umm Alqura Gazette, Issue No. 3811 dated 17/06/1421 H. (2000)  
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the members of the public. With reference to the Islamic law of arbitration, this article 
is in compliance with the traditional rules; however, under the light of modern custom 
and trade practices, the application of this article can be of a harmful affects on the 
parties especially for their business reputation and credibility. 
 
Article 21requires a satisfactory excuse to suspend the hearing of a case.498 Article 22 
upholds some of the rights of the parties to have a fair trail. The arbitral tribunal shall 
enable each party to represent his comments, defences, and answers orally or in 
writing to an appropriate extent on the date of the hearing.499 As a general rule, the 
tribunal is not allowed to decide the dispute without hearing all the parties and giving 
them an equal chance to represent all their evidence.500 Moreover, giving a judgment 
on the basis of the arbitrator’s personal knowledge is prohibited because it may rise a 
suspicion of biasness and can be a ground to challenge the award, even if the 
arbitrator knows the fact, he is not allowed to rely on it in rendering the award without 
clear evidence.501 The article added that the defendant shall be the final speaker which 
is the normal end of any typical dispute before a Shari’a court. 
 
The typical procedure before any court consists of three stages; first the plaintiff 
raises the claim which should be precise in all its details. The claim can be in writing 
or verbal at the time of the trail. At the second stage, the judge invites the defendant to 
answer the plaintiff’s claim. At this stage, the defendant will either admit the claim 
(iqrar) or denies it (nokoul). If the defendant denies the claim, the judge will ask the 
plaintiff to adduce evidence (baiyenah) which will be an oral testimony in such a 
case. The final stage starts if the plaintiff fails to provide the court with the testimonial 
evidence, he may administer the oath (yameen or qasam). If the defendant swears that 
the claim is groundless, the claim will be dismissed; however, if the defendant refused 
to take the oath, the case will be decided in favour of the plaintiff.502     
 
Article 23 specifies some of the chairman’s responsibilities toward managing the 
proceedings. The responsibilities stated in this article are similar to that of a court 
                                                 
498 See article 21 of the implementing rules 
499 Article 22 of the implementing rules  
500 Supra 5 Ibn Qodamah vol.14 p. 96 
501 Ibid  
502 See in general, supra 112, Ibn Farhoun.     
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judge; however, he has no right to imprison anyone for any misbehaviour before the 
tribunal. In the case of misbehaviour before the arbitral tribunal, the chairman can 
only expel the person from the place of the hearing and report him to the competent 
authority. Each arbitrator has the right to direct questions and interrogate parties or 
witnesses through the chairman of the tribunal.503 The responsibilities of the court 
judges toward managing the proceedings were stated in article 69 and 70 of the Law 
of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts. The only difference is that the judge can 
imprison anyone disturbs order for up to 24 hours.504 In accordance with the Law of 
Procedure before the Shari’a Courts, the expelled persons might be referred to the 
authority after the 24 hours sentence in case of committing an offence against the 
judge or anyone at the trail; however, the case of misbehaviour cannot be decided by 
the same judge because, in this case, he will be a party to the case.505    
 
Article 24 provides for what the tribunal might do in case the parties reached an 
extrajudicial settlement. The parties can request the tribunal at any stage of the case to 
record their agreement as to an admission, settlement, and waiver or otherwise in the 
record of the hearing and the tribunal shall make an award based on the parties’ 
agreement.506 Article 67 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts supports 
this article and provides for the same steps to be taken by the court in case of reaching 
a settlement for the dispute outside the court to give it a binding nature instead of 
being a mere statement from the parties without enforceability.507  
 
Article 25 provides for the official language for the arbitration proceedings. Arabic is 
the official language before the arbitral tribunal whether in oral discussions or in 
writing. The tribunal, the parties and other persons should, exclusively, speak Arabic. 
A foreigner who does not speak Arabic should be accompanied by an accredited 
translator who should sign with him the record of the hearing as to the oral statement 
which he translated.  
 
                                                 
503 Article 23 of the implementing rules  
504 See articles 69 and 70 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts. 
505 This information was given by an official in the Ministry of Justice who preferred his name to be 
confidential. 
506 Article 24 of the implementing rules 
507 See article 67 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts.  
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Arabic language is the official language in Saudi Arabia, all the communications, 
contract before any governmental entity must be in Arabic language. Moreover, 
contracts with the Saudi government can be signed in an additional language but in 
case of a dispute relating to the execution of the contract, the disputants should refer 
to the Arabic version of the contract.508 This principle was established by article 1 of 
the Basic Law.509 It was also supported by article 1 of the Law of Procedure before 
the Shari’a Courts which stated that Arabic is the official language for all hearing and 
communications and if the circumstance requires the use of other language, the 
document or the statement must be translated into Arabic.510 In the Hanbali law, if one 
of the parties to the dispute does not speak Arabic and the arbitrator does not know his 
language, an accredited translator must attend the hearing to translate between him 
and the arbitrator and between him and the other parties to the dispute. The translators 
should possess the characters of adalah or full legal capacity.511 
 
Article 26 gives the arbitral tribunal a discretionary power to postpone the hearing of 
a case if the parties requested so in order to represent their documents, papers or 
comments material.512Article 27 provides for the writing of the facts and the 
proceedings of the hearing in a record prepared by the secretary of the tribunal under 
its supervision.513 The principle of the writing of contracts and other similar 
documents such arbitration agreements and arbitration clauses was established by the 
Quran in the following verse:  “When you deal with each other, in transactions 
involving future obligations in a fixed period of time reduce them to writing Let a 
scribe write down faithfully as between the parties”.514  The Sunnah also supported 
the writing of commercial agreements as well as Islamic teachings, current laws and 
practices that emphasised on its importance.515  
 
                                                 
508 See for example article 9-31 of the gas concession agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and Lukoil overseas. Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 3990 dated 15/03/1425 H. 4/05/2004.    
509 The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia. Alnezam Alasasi Lelhokm. Royal Decree No. (90/A) dated 
28/06/1412 H. (1992)  
510 See article 1 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts 
511 Supra 28 Ibn Qodamah, vol. 14 p. 84.  
512 Article 26 of the implementing rules. See also article 65 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a 
Courts 
513 Article 27 of the implementing rules  
514 The Quran: 1/282. please note that quoted verses of the Quran hereinafter are translation to the 
meaning of the Quran as it understood by the translator not a direct translation 
515 See article 69 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts. 
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Article 28 sets the conditions in which the arbitral tribunal can ask one of the parties 
to present any document material to the case.516 The Diwan allow the use to foreign 
arbitral awards as precedent provided that it does not violate the Shari’a rules and the 
public policy in Saudi Arabia. The parties should use the foreign arbitral award as 
precedent to support their argument not to claim enforcement of the foreign award 
because the enforcement is not under the competence of the arbitration tribunal.517  
 
Articles 29 deals with the conditions in which the arbitral tribunal can order for the 
establishment of investigation measures having a material effect on the case if the 
facts sought to be established are relevant, admissible and material to the dispute. 
Article 30 deals with the departing from the evidentiary procedure providing that the 
tribunal state the reasons for the departure in the record of the hearing and in the final 
award.518 The issue of investigations and evidence have been dealt with in greater 
details in other regulations especially the law of procedure before the Shari’a courts of 
2000.519    
 
Article 31 state some rules for the oral statements of witnesses which should be 
proved in writing or orally at the hearing and shall accompany the witnesses, the 
hearing of such statement of witnesses should be in accordance with the Shari’a 
principles. In addition, article gives the other party the right to disprove the facts in a 
similar manner.520 The article sets that the statement of witnesses should be in 
accordance with the Shari’a rules which require certain qualities to be possessed by 
the person who gives the statement.  As a general rule, a witness should be a Muslim 
who reached the age of puberty, not subject to any incapacity and he should be a 
trustworthy person. Non-Muslims’ witness is accepted in all subjects except in 
Hodoud.  Shari’a requires a through investigation of witness trustworthiness because 
if there is any doubt about him, the witness will not be heard. The oral testimony is to 
be made in spot by the arbitrator through the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal and at 
                                                 
516 See article 28 of the implementing rules  
517 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 29/T/4 of 1413 H. (1993) 
518 See articles 29 and 30 of the implementing rules  
519 See articles 154,155,211 and 261 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts.  
520 See article 31 of the implementing rules  
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the request of one of the parties. Some witnesses can be disqualified which are the 
same people that are not allowed to participate as arbitrators in a dispute.521 
 
 Article 32 set the rules of interrogating at the hearings; and article 33 deals with the 
rules of experts’ assistance. Experts are considered witnesses under this article and 
they can be challenged on the same grounds of challenging witnesses and 
arbitrators.522 
 
Articles 34 regulate some of the related aspects to the experts’ witness such as 
requiring a supplementary report; however, the tribunal is not bound to take it into 
consideration when rendering the arbitral award.523 Under the Hanbali teachings, such 
a report cannot be classified as evidence.524  
 
Article 35 gives the arbitral tribunal the option to relocate the seat of the hearing. The 
arbitral tribunal may relocate the seat of the arbitration in order to inspect disputed 
facts or any matter affecting the case; the tribunal should also prepare a record of the 
inspection procedure which complies with article 112 of the law of procedure before 
the Shari’a courts of 2000.525  
 
The implementing rules provide that the arbitral tribunal should comply with 
litigation principles of the Shari’a.526 The implementing rules were issued in 1985 
prior to the enactment of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts. Prior to the 
enactment of the Law, arbitrators use to rely on the Shari’a principles in order to find 
governing rules for the arbitral proceedings but after the enactment of the Law in the 
year 2000, it become applicable for all litigations and arbitration proceedings within 
the Kingdom.527     
 
One of the main differences between arbitration and litigation is that the arbitrators do 
not have the judicial and enforcement power like that of the court judge. Therefore, if 
                                                 
521 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah. vol.14 p. 262 
522 See article 33 of the implementing rules  
523 See article 34 of the implementing rules  
524 Supra 28,  Ibn Qodamah. vol.14 p. 262 
525 See article 35 of the implementing rules and article 112 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a 
Courts of 2000 
526 See article 36 of the implementing rules  
527 See in general the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts 
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the arbitral tribunal faced an issue that are not under its competent such as forgery or 
other criminal matter, the issue should be referred to the competent authority having 
jurisdiction over the dispute. The tribunal should wait till the case investigated and the 
tribunal should suspend issuing the award till a final judgment is rendered by the 
competent authority.528                           
4.8 Making of Awards, Challenging the Awards and 
Enforcement of the Arbitral Awards 
 
When the case is ready for decision, the arbitral tribunal should declare the 
proceedings closed, fix a date for making the award and bring the case under review 
and discussion. Such a review should be held in private and the attendance is 
restricted to the members of the arbitral tribunal only. When the arbitral tribunal fix 
the date of making the award, it should take into consideration the relevant provisions 
of the Arbitration Act and the relevant laws or in other words the law of procedure 
before the Shari’a courts of 2000.529 With regard to the Arbitration Act the relevant 
articles are: article 9 which provides for an extension in the time before the issuance 
of the arbitral award subject to the mutual agreement of the parties or under the 
discretion of the arbitral tribunal; article 13 which state that in case of death of one of 
the arbitrators, the time for the award shall be extended by thirty days unless the other 
arbitrators decide on a longer period; article 14 which state that where an arbitrator is 
appointed in place of a dismissed or a withdrawing arbitrator, the date fixed for the 
award shall be extended by thirty days; and article 15 which gives the arbitral tribunal 
a discretionary power to extend the deadline of rendering the award.530  
 
Article 39 exempts the arbitrators from being bound by regulatory procedures except 
as provided in the Arbitration Act and the Implementing Rules. The article also added 
that the award should be made in accordance with the Shari’a principles and 
regulations in effect.531 Prior to the issuance of the Law of Procedure before the 
Shari’a Courts, arbitrators use to rely on the Shari’a principles to govern the arbitral 
procedure. The application of the Shari’a principles relies to a great degree on the 
                                                 
528 See article 37 of the implementing rules 
529 See article 38 of the implementing rules; see also article 162 of the Law of Procedure before the 
Shari’a Courts  
530 See articles 9,13,14 and15 of the Arbitration Act of 1983 
531 See article 39 of the implementing rules  
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individual understanding of the Shari’a text by the arbitrator which resulted in 
variation in the practice from arbitrator to another. The Law of Procedure before the 
Shari’a Courts of 2000 came to codify the Shari’a principles under the light of the 
common practices; it produced a set of rules to be followed by arbitral tribunal in case 
of silence of the arbitration regulations. As a general principle, in case of silence of 
the “Man-Made” law, the tribunal should go back to the Shari’a principles which 
serve as a safety measure to ensure the compliance with the Islamic law in all cases.  
 
Article 40 regulates some aspects of equality between the parties to the arbitration and 
the procedure of reopening the arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may not, 
during the review of the case and deliberation, hear explanations of one of the parties 
without the presence of the other party nor may receive memorials or documents 
unless the other party examines the same; however, if the arbitral tribunal considers 
them to be material, it may extend the date for pronouncing the award and reopen the 
proceedings by an award in which shall be recorded, the reasons and justifications and 
shall notify the parties of the date fixed for hearing the case.532 The same content was 
provided by article 66,159 and 160 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a 
Courts.533  
 
The arbitral award should be made by majority unless in the case of sole arbitrator, 
and it should contain all the related information to the parties, the disputes and the 
arbitral tribunal.534 Under the classical Shari’a literature, the award should comply 
with the opinion of the majority of the arbitrators. There are four methods to issue the 
arbitral award if unanimity could not be reached: First, when forming the arbitration 
agreement, the number of arbitrators should be odd. Second, seeking the assistance of 
an external arbitrator and decide the case according to his opinion. The external 
arbitrator is not allowed to come up with a new opinion; his job is to choose one of 
the available decisions only.535 Third, if the arbitrators failed to issue the award, the 
dispute can be decided by another tribunal or by a sole arbitrator.536 This option may 
lengthen the dispute which contradicts with the objective of the arbitration as swift 
                                                 
532 See article 40 of the implementing rules 
533 See articles 66, 159 and 160 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts.  
534 See article 41 of the implementing rules  
535 Supra 18 Al Kenain p. 124 
536 Supra 5 Ibn Qodamah, vol. 10 p. 546 
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dispute settlement mechanism. Fourth, if the unanimity could not be reached, and the 
parties to the dispute exhausted the above mentioned methods, they can refer to 
litigation as a last resort.537 In practice, if the arbitral tribunal failed to issue its 
decision within 90 days from the date of approving the arbitration agreement by the 
supervisory authority, the whole case will be referred to the Diwan and it will either 
act like an external arbitrator and chose one of the available opinions, decide the case 
anew or it will give the arbitral tribunal a time extension.538   
 
When making the award, the arbitral tribunal should not exceed its terms of reference 
and look at issues that are not included in the arbitration agreement.  In decision 
number 33/T/4 of 1414 H. (1994), the arbitration agreement gives the arbitration 
tribunal the jurisdiction to decide on the amount of damages for late performance of 
the contract. The tribunal decided in the same award on the claim for the initial cost of 
the contract which was rejected by the Diwan for unconformity with the arbitration 
agreement.539   
   
The arbitral tribunal is responsible to correct technical, typographic and mathematical 
errors.540 Also it is in charge of issuing supplementary award to explain ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the text of the arbitral award which should be issued under request of 
the parties to the arbitration.541    
 
If the parties to the arbitration did not prevail in some claims, a judgment may be 
made apportioning the fees between them according to the determination of the 
supervisory authority or allocating the whole fees on one of the parties.542 Any party 
may object to an order assessing the arbitrators’ fees to the authority; however, the 
authorities’ decision on the objection is final.543   
 
                                                 
537 Ibid  
538 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 35/T/4 of 1418 H. (1998) 
539 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 33/T/4 of 1414 H. (1994) 
540 See article 42 of the implementing rules  
541 See article 43 of the implementing rules  
542 See article 45 of the implementing rules  
543 See article 46 of the implementing rules  
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The arbitral award shall become an enforceable instrument upon the issuance of the 
enforcement order which is the responsibility of the supervisory authority.544 The 
supervisory authority should deliver to the prevailing party the enforcement copy of 
the arbitral award which should set fourth the enforcement order ending with the 
following statement: “All government departments and agencies concerned are hereby 
requested to execute this judgment by all available legal means even if it may require 
the use of coercive force by the police”545 The supervisory authority cannot issue the 
enforcement order unless requested to do so by the wining party or third parties 
having interest in the enforcement of the arbitral award. The request of enforcement 
of arbitral awards should be accepted from third parties provided that they have 
interest in the enforcement of the award like Guarantors and creditors and the 
argument that they are not a party to the arbitration agreement has been rejected by 
the Diwan.546 In addition, the competent authority should ensure that the party 
requesting the enforcement have interest in the enforcement of the award and it 
should also review the award and ensure that it does not violate the public policies of 
the Kingdom.547  
 
4.9 The Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards in Saudi Arabia 
 
The recognition and enforcement is the most important step after the issuance of the 
final award. Although Saudi Arabia started to co-operate with the international legal 
community at a late stage, it has been in co-operation with its neighbouring countries 
since the 1950s. The Saudi law does not have a clear answer for the conflict that 
arises when there is more than one application for the enforcement of different arbitral 
awards issued against the same person on the same specific issue. Some judges give 
priority to the application that is submitted first, whereas some other judges give 
priority to the award that is issued first. Another opinion prefers that judges should 
look at the conflict of laws rules to decide which jurisdiction has the most connections 
                                                 
544 See article 44 of the implementing rules  
545  Ibid article 44 and see also article 196 of the Law of Procedure before the Shari’a Courts  
546 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 136/T/4 of 1409 H. (1989) 
547 Supra 2 Albejad, p. 240 
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with the arbitration and which law is more competent to govern the arbitration.548 
There are two important multilateral conventions of which Saudi Arabia is a member. 
These agreements are: The Riyadh Convention for Judicial Co-operation of 1983 
“Riyadh Convention” and the New York Convention for the Enforcement and 
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 “New York Convention”.   
 
4.9.1 Riyadh Convention for Judicial Co-operation of 1983 
 
The Riyadh Convention came into effect in order to replace the old Arab League 
Convention of 1952 in a way that mixed the spirit of the New York Convention of 
1958 with the Shari’a principles. In its preamble, the Convention states that reaching a 
degree of legal harmony between the parties to the Convention is the main objective 
of the Convention for the reason that these countries share many legal principles and 
fundamentals.549 The Convention borrowed some certain basic rules from the New 
York Convention and from some Western bilateral agreements. The main benefit of 
the principles borrowed from the Western conventions is the rule restricting the courts 
in the place of enforcement from examining the merits of the dispute.550 This principle 
was demonstrated in article 37 of the Riyadh Convention, which prohibited the 
judicial authority in the place of enforcement from looking at the merits of the 
dispute; however, it seems that the judicial bodies in Saudi Arabia do not comply with 
this article of the agreement as it claims that the interpretation of the principle of 
public policy in Saudi Arabia differs even from most of the neighbouring countries. 
Actually, this claim is partly true especially in cases involving prohibited or disputed 
issues under Shari’a such as banking interest and the sale of musical instruments. The 
same article provides that an arbitral award issued and recognised in one of the 
member states of the Convention cannot be set aside except in the following 
circumstances: if the dispute at issue is not arbitrable under the law of the place of 
arbitration; the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings; the award deals 
                                                 
548 This piece of information was provided by one of the judges of the Shari’a Supreme Court of Jeddah 
who preferred his name to remain confidential.   
549 The member states of the Conventions are: Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Mauritania and Yemen.    
550 Supra 407 Saleh, p. 151. 
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with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration; if the recognition of the award would be contrary to the principles of the 
Islamic Shari’a, the relevant laws and regulations or the public order. When reading 
article 37 in conjunction with article 30 of the same agreement, a foreign arbitral 
award cannot be recognised or enforced if the award is issued in absentia unless the 
losing party was duly informed of the arbitration; if the dispute was referred to 
litigation in the place of the issuance of the award; if one of the parties lacks the legal 
capacity under the law of the place of the issuance of the award or if the law of the 
place where the enforcement is sought has no connection with the dispute at issue. 
According to the Convention, a party seeking the enforcement of an arbitral award in 
a place other than the place of the issuance of the award should provide, with the 
arbitration agreement, a certificate from the court of the place of the issuance of the 
award stating that the award is enforceable. In contrast with the New York 
Convention of 1958, which requires the arbitral award to be binding on the parties, the 
Riyadh Convention called back the condition of double exequatur, which requires the 
award to be final and operative in the place of the issuance.551 It can be said that for 
the load of official procedure required by the Riyadh Convention, the Convention 
seems to be ineffective, and enforcing a foreign arbitral award under the New York 
Convention might be more practical for the party seeking the enforcement of the 
award.   
4.9.2 New York Convention for the Enforcement and 
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 “New York 
Convention” 
 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
hereinafter New York Convention came into effect to overcome some of the 
impracticalities of the Geneva Convention of 1927 and to make the enforcement and 
the recognition of foreign arbitral awards easier and set arbitration as an effective 
dispute settlement mechanism. According to the first article of the Convention, the 
scope of the application of the Convention should include “the recognition and 
                                                 
551 See article 4.1 of the Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Geneva Convention) 
(26 Sept. 1927) and Article 5.1.e. New York Convention of 1958. 
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enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State 
where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of 
differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral 
awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and 
enforcement are sought”. In relation to Saudi Arabia, an arbitral award issued in a 
territory other than Saudi Arabia relating to a non-domestic dispute will be considered 
foreign. Moreover, if the arbitral award relating to a domestic dispute is issued outside 
Saudi Arabia it will also be considered foreign and the provisions of the New York 
Convention will apply. Parties seeking the enforcement should apply to Diwan 
Almazalim, which will consider the enforcement after reviewing the award.   
 
The New York Convention provides general guidance on the procedure of enforcing 
foreign arbitral awards and sets the documents that are required from the place of 
enforcement of the award. The parties seeking the enforcement of an arbitral award 
should accompany their application with the following documents: the duly 
authenticated original award or a duly certified copy; the original arbitration 
agreement or arbitration clause or a duly certified copy. The same article of the 
agreement added that in cases where the award is made in a language other then the 
official language of the place where the parties are seeking the enforcement, the 
documents should be translated to the official language of the place of enforcement. 
The translation should be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a 
diplomatic or consular agent.552 Furthermore, parties seeking the enforcement should 
be bound by the internal procedure of the place of enforcement of the award. Most of 
the jurisdictions in the world make their rules of procedure clear to everyone seeking 
the enforcement of an award, whereas in Saudi Arabia, the rules of procedure rely 
heavily on Royal Decrees and Ministerial Circulars; but this is not the problem. The 
problem might arise when such Royal Decrees, Ministerial Circulars and Internal 
Regulations contradict each other and one has to search through hundreds of Royal 
Decrees, Orders and Circulars issued in a period of 40 years which are mostly not 
available to the public. The Royal Decree No. 51/M dated 17/02/1402 H. (1981) held 
Diwan Almazalim responsible for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in Saudi Arabia as well as judgments issued in the Courts of the Arab League 
                                                 
552 Article 4 of the New York Convention of 1958. 
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countries. The new Law of Diwan Almazalim upholds the latter decree and provides 
that the Administrative Department of Diwan Almazalim is the competent authority 
for the enforcement and recognition of foreign arbitral awards in the Kingdom.553  
Diwan Almazalim’s Circular No. 7 dated 15/05/1405 H. (1985) determined the 
procedure for filing an application for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in 
Saudi Arabia. According to the Circular, the party seeking the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award in Saudi Arabia should submit a request for the enforcement of 
the arbitral award in the same way as bringing a new claim before the Diwan. In order 
to commence the procedure, the party seeking the enforcement should submit certified 
copies of the relevant documents; however, in cases when the parties do not have 
certified copies, the Diwan may arrange for the submission of the original documents. 
After receiving the request for enforcement, the Diwan will notify all the parties to the 
arbitration award. The person against whom the award has been made would have the 
right to see the application that was submitted against him and he would be allowed to 
defend himself before the Diwan.554 This Circular is one of the main elements that 
determine the credibility of arbitration as an alternative for litigation. The main 
problem here is that the Diwan would re-examine all arbitration awards brought 
before it anew. Such practices are no more than a waste of time, effort and resources, 
and at the same time, it indicates that arbitration is not a reliable dispute settlement 
mechanism.  
 
The Saudi law provides many remedies for cases when the award is challenged before 
the Diwan and the Diwan accepts the challenge; however, foreign arbitral awards do 
not enjoy such treatment. The law is silent with regard to this issue; nonetheless, it 
can be understood from the silence of the law that foreign arbitral awards are of no 
effect unless approved by the Diwan.555 It is not clear whether foreign arbitral awards 
or judgments can be used to establish facts before Saudi courts, as many judges have 
not yet reached the level of understanding how legal systems really work. In addition, 
the Saudi Courts might enforce foreign arbitral awards or judgments on the basis of 
reciprocity; however, the application of this concept is still a matter of theoretical 
argument and no one knows how the Diwan applies it. The concept of reciprocity 
                                                 
553 See article 13 of the Law of Diwan Almazalim.  
554 Diwan Almazalim’s Circular No. 7 dated 15/05/1405 H. (1985). 
555 O. Bakhashab, ‘The Concept of Extraterritoriality in the Saudi Arbitration Act’, King Abdul-Aziz 
University Journal, 14/1 (2000), p. 152.     
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does not have a fundamental impact on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
Saudi Arabia nowadays as most of the country members of the United Nations have 
adopted the New York Conventions, and for the countries that have not become 
members to the Conventions, Saudi Arabia has other instruments of enforcement of 
arbitral awards with some of them.556         
4.10 Public Policy in Saudi Arabia 
 
Public policy is of great importance to arbitration, especially when it comes to the 
enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of whether it is a domestic or a foreign 
award. As a general rule, an arbitral award is unenforceable if it violates the public 
policy of the country where the enforcement is sought.557 This is also true in Saudi 
Arabia and is applicable to both foreign and domestic arbitral awards, despite the fact 
that the latter proceedings would have, by the time of the enforcement, already been 
very closely monitored by the supervisory authority. As a result, refusals to enforce 
are more common when setting aside foreign arbitral awards because public policy in 
Saudi Arabia covers a vast area of practice that might be unknown to foreign 
arbitrators sitting abroad and applying non-Saudi lex arbitri. The following section 
aims to provide an overview of Saudi public policy, its sources and how it is applied 
in practice.  
      
Public policy in the Saudi Kingdom is derived from three principal sources: a) the 
Shari’a; b) Royal power which itself is drawn from the Shari’a with an emphasis on 
public customs and public interest within the framework of the Shari’a’s 
prescriptions; and c) public morals. At the outset, it should be noted that historically a 
distinction has been drawn by Muslim scholars between Shari’a and Islamic 
jurisprudence, or what is known in Arabic as fiqh. The concept of Islamic law was not 
in use at the time of the Muslim classical scholars and began to develop as a reaction 
to Western influence. The concept of Shari’a is broader than jurisprudence and the 
jurisprudence itself comes within, as well as other concepts of Islam such as Islamic 
creed and Quranic sciences, the umbrella of Shari’a. Shari’a or Ash-Shari’a literally 
                                                 
556 There are five countries who are members of the Riyadh Convention but not yet of the New York 
Convention, which are: Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Sudan. 
557 See Article 5 of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 330 UNTS 538. 
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means the pathway or a way to be followed and the way that a Muslim has to walk in 
life. In its original usage, the term Shari’a meant the road to the watering place or the 
path leading to the water, i.e., the way to the source of life.558 From the latter point of 
view, Arab Lexicographers treated the term and developed it to mean “the law of 
water” and in time it was extended to cover all aspects of Muslim life, both spiritual 
and that pertaining to the exigencies of everyday life.559 Shari’a is best translated as 
the “way of life” and Ash-Shari’a as the “way of the Muslim life” which is wider than 
the mere formal rites and legal provisions.. Islamic law may be defined as the entire 
system of law and jurisprudence associated with the religion of Islam.    
 
The primary sources of Shari’a are the Quran and the Sunnah and there exist a 
number of other secondary sources or methods for adducing appropriate normative 
behaviour in response to new incidents and unregulated circumstances. These 
secondary sources are Ijma’, Ijtihad, Qiyas, public interest and custom, or what is 
known in Arabic as Urf. The methods of Ijma’, Ijtihad and Qiyas are employed in the 
light of current circumstances in order to shed light on and analyse the Quran and the 
Sunnah. The sustained use of these secondary sources led to the creation of a body of 
law known as fiqh. Western scholars tend to use the terms Shari’a and Islamic 
jurisprudence as “fiqh” interchangeably. The aforementioned distinction between the 
two should become clear and receive scholarly attention, given that Shari’a is the 
foundation of all doctrines formulated and developed under fiqh, whereas the fiqh 
represents a human understanding and analysis of Shari’a sources. The term Saudi 
law is more comprehensive than Shari’a and encompasses Islamic law and the Codes 
and Regulations adapted from other laws within the general framework of Shari’a 
principles.560 There are a few exceptions to this rule, particularly as regards Saudi 
legislation that is unrelated to Islamic teachings and principles, such as the Banking 
Control Law, because it regulates some activities that are clearly prohibited under 
Islamic Law.  
  
In Saudi Arabia, the Shari’a’s primary sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, have 
supremacy over all laws and man-made regulations or normative instruments. In the 
                                                 
558 Ibid.  
559 See generally Supra 60, Mallat. See also The Quran 45: 18 and 5: 48. 
560 See generally p. 45, Usul Alfiqh.  
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1920s, King Abdul-Aziz attempted to codify the teachings of the four Islamic schools 
in a manner similar to that by which the Majalla codified Hanafi fiqh. Despite his best 
efforts, this project was vociferously opposed by certain radical scholars and did not 
materialise. In combination with his codification project, the King ordered Shari’a 
judges not to be bound by the rules of one school of fiqh, with the aim that the 
prevalence of one school should not have the result of abrogating another.561 At the 
same time, however, some Ulamas had their own agendas; they not only opposed the 
King’s reform plans, but moreover sought to exert pressure on judges in all Saudi 
courts with a view to applying exclusively Hanbali fiqh under the teachings of the late 
Scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. The main reason for their opposition rested in their fear that 
the expansion of civil codes could eventually culminate at the expense of the Shari’a 
and ultimately lead to the promulgation of secular laws that have little or no 
connection with Shari’a. In practice, although the Saudi legal system is premised on 
Shari’a on the basis of Hanbali teachings, judges have the freedom to apply any of the 
four schools of fiqh. This judicial latitude granted to Saudi judges is the direct result 
of the aforementioned order of King Abdul-Aziz to Shari’a judges.562 Saudi judges 
currently rely on a number of legal commentaries – authored by recognised Islamic 
legal scholars – in the delivery of their judgments, but it should be noted that a 
codification of these dispersed commentaries is expected in the foreseeable future. 
Apart from Ibn Qudamah, the majority of scholars who authored these commentaries 
follow the teachings of the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah.563  
 
According to Article 7 of the Saudi Basic Law, the ruling regime derives its power 
from the Holy Quran and the Prophet's Sunnah, which have supremacy over all State 
laws.564 Accordingly, the imposition of public policy restrictions within the Kingdom 
cannot be relied upon to violate Shari’a principles under any circumstances. The 
Basic Law even emphasised that even a temporary state of emergency during turmoil 
cannot violate Article 7, which renders the Shari’a the only source of regulation in the 
Kingdom.565   
                                                 
561 Supra 289, Sfeir, pp. 729-744. 
562 Ibid. p. 732. 
563 These books are: Almoghni by Ibn Qodamah; Asharh Alkabeer by Ibn Qodamah; Sharh Zad 
Almustaqna’ by Albahouti and Alhajjawi; Sharh Montaha Al Eradat by Alfoutohi and Albahouti and; 
Manar Assabeel by Meri’e Alhabnali and Ibn Douawan.  
564 See Article 7 of the Saudi Basic Law, Royal Decree No. (90/A) dated 28/06/1412 H. (1992). 
565 Ibid., Articles 1 and 7. 
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Just like Saudi law, the Kingdom itself as a political entity is inseparable from 
religion.566 Regardless of his considerable regulatory authority, the King lacks the 
power to legislate in the very extensive field that has already been regulated by the 
Shari’a, in respect of which he is bound by the same duty of obedience as are all of 
his subjects.567 Consequently, it can be said that the separation of law from religion is 
impossible in most aspects affecting public life in Saudi Arabia. Given the Kingdom’s 
political structure as an absolute monarchy, the King is endowed with authority to 
promulgate regulations by issuing such royal decrees that supplement existing Shari’a 
rules with a view to adapting to new circumstances, especially in relation to trade and 
commerce. “In doing so, the Government tries to balance traditional prospects against 
modern needs”.568 Royal Decrees can also be considered a codification of some 
aspects of Shari’a law. This codification is achieved with the assistance of foreign 
laws and common practices that do not necessarily violate Shari’a principles. The 
decisions of judicial bodies have little impact on public policy because in Islamic 
legal practice, they merely offer an interpretation of the Shari’a and relevant royal 
decrees and are, moreover, subordinate to these.  
  
What exactly constitutes public morals, interests and customs is not clearly delineated 
in Saudi law. What is abundantly precise, however, is that anything that is deemed as 
violating the Shari’a would certainly fall outside acceptable public policy constraints. 
When discussing about Saudi society in search of public morals and interests, it 
should be noted that the terms Deen, which means religion, and Adat, meaning 
custom, have been used interchangeably. The reason for this lies in the fact that most 
customs and traditions have been either derived from religion or upheld by it. This 
observation, however, may produce the result of restricting the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in cases where the outcome of an arbitral award is contrary to Saudi 
public customs. The determination of the concept of public interest under Shari’a is 
derived through the use of the method of istihsan. The term istihsan may be translated 
as “juristic preference”.569 Another scholar preferred to translate it as “public 
                                                 
566 D. Karl, ‘Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know’, Geo Wash J Intl 
Law & Economics, 25 (1991), p. 131. 
567 Supra 68, Schacht, pp. 133-136. 
568 Supra 557, Karl, p. 142.  
569 Supra 86, Fadel.  
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interest”. Conceptually, istihsan may be defined as the process of selecting one 
acceptable alternative over another, on the grounds that the first appears more suitable 
for the situation at hand, even though the selected solution may be technically weaker 
than the rejected one. Equally, istihsan has been viewed as a process for selecting the 
best solution for the general public interest as a form of ijtihad.570 Istihsan allows 
judges and scholars some flexibility when interpreting the law to allow for the 
infusion of elements deemed useful. In other words, istihsan constitutes a permit for 
the spirit of the law to prevail over its letter.571 Slight divergences exist between the 
various schools. Hanbali scholars call it istislah, which may be translated as equity or 
public interest, whereas Maliki scholars refer to it as Almasaleh Almursalah, which 
denotes a departure from strict textual adherence in favour of public welfare.572 The 
principal pre-condition for the validity of istihsan is its compliance with the principles 
of Shari’a. Nonetheless, there are situations where the non-application of a Shari’a 
rule is more beneficial for public interest than strict textual application. For instance, 
in the field of finance and commerce, the application of Shari’a may obfuscate socio-
economic development, as is the case with the so-called istisna’ contracts.573 As a 
general rule, the object of the contract must exist at the time when the contract 
becomes binding upon the parties. The requirement of the existence of the object at 
the moment of the conclusion of the contract was made to protect the parties from 
assuming any risk through a hazard or uncertainty likely to harm party interests.574 
Public interest, therefore, required a relaxation of strict contract rules. This was done 
by Prophet Muhammad himself when he allowed Muslims to conclude contracts with 
future objectives under certain circumstances, even though the general rule required 
otherwise. At present, public interest is determined by reference to specific suitable 
options within the framework of the main principles of Shari’a.  
 
                                                 
570 Supra 82, Makdisi, p. 66. 
571 Supra 86, Fadel, p. 150. 
572 Supra 82, Makdisi, p. 73. 
573 Istisna’ contracts are derived originally from slam contracts, wherein one party paid a year in 
advance for crops of a particular weight at the time of harvest. Istisna’, or sale by manufacture, is a 
contract to manufacture a particular good not yet in existence, for an agreed price. The buyer need not 
pay for the goods until its acceptance and both parties may revoke their agreement at any time before 
delivery. Some scholars distinguished between the slam and istisna’ contracts, but both seem to be 
based on the same theory; however, the slam is used mainly in respect of crops and carries a greater 
risk of a future discounted price. Istisna’ contracts, on the other hand, are more common in 
construction and manufacturing and are more flexible in that they serve as financing and hedging tools.  
574 N. Comair-Obeid, ‘Particularity of the Contract’s Subject-Matter in the Laws of the Arab Middle 
East’, Arab Law Quarterly, 11 (1996), pp. 331-336.   
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The Kingdom maintains a negative list of activities excluded from foreign investment. 
This is a fine example of activities prohibited for the benefit of public interest.575 
When it comes to the protection of public interest, Saudi authorities consider the 
Shari’a at first instance, as well as the will of its population. King Abdullah bin 
Abdul-Aziz, in one of his speeches to the Shura Council, underlined the fundamental 
tenets of Saudi policy, stating that “we will work in the interest of the religion, 
homeland, our citizens and our traditions”.576  
4.11 Conclusion 
 
In assessing a legal system that is fundamentally different to the types of legal 
systems that western lawyers are used to, one must necessarily examine the 
underlying reasons for such diversity. In the case of Saudi arbitration law, it is evident 
that two reasons are particularly prevalent. The first concerns the Kingdom’s troubled 
past during which some of the arbitral tribunals that determined cases to which it was 
a party rejected Islamic law as the law governing its contractual relations with third 
parties, even though this law was clearly stipulated in the relevant contracts. The 
frustration and embarrassment caused as a result had an impact far greater than 
merely downgrading the law of a particular country under the pretext that it was 
undeveloped and backward. Given that Islamic law pervades not only all aspects of 
normative conduct, but also all other social and public conduct within Muslim 
societies, those arbitral awards were perceived as having broader implications about 
Islam and Muslim States. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is a very conservative country in 
every respect, whose official policy strives to strike a balance between tradition and 
modernisation.577  
 
The result in the Kingdom’s contemporary arbitral law and judicial practice is hardly 
surprising. Disputes conducted in Saudi Arabia, or containing Saudi elements, are 
                                                 
575 The Saudi Arabia General Investment Agency (SAGIA), ‘Negative List: Activities Excluded from 
Foreign Investment’ <http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/business-environment/investment-laws/negative-
list.html>, accessed 14 Nov. 2007. 
576 King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, speech to the Shura Council in Riyadh, 14 April 2007.  
577 “Some countries have sacrificed the soul of their culture in order to acquire the tools of Western 
technology. We want the tools but not at the price of annihilating our religion and cultural values”. 
Statement made by Bakr Abdullah Bakr, the Head of King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals 
Cited by W. Ochsenwald, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival’, International Journal for Middle 
East Studies, 13 (1981), pp. 271-272.   
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governed by the Kingdom’s lex arbitri, which requires that not only the arbitration 
clause and compromis be submitted to a designated competent authority for approval, 
but that the proceedings be supervised by the said competent authority throughout 
their duration, save where conflict of laws rules permit the parties to refer to a foreign 
jurisdiction. Western lawyers may at first glance find these restrictions as unduly 
compromising the benefits of arbitration, but closer examination reveals that 
equivalent procedures exist in developed arbitral fora. For one thing, both in Europe 
and North America the arbitration clause may be subject to scrutiny, either by the 
tribunal itself or by reference to the courts of the lex arbitri. Equally, the parties are 
not generally free to turn to the civil courts during the course of the arbitral 
proceedings; institutional arbitration is to some degree monitored by the relevant 
institutions, and where significant improprieties occur, whether in terms of corruption 
or other, the parties may approach the courts of the lex arbitri. Finally, some western 
arbitral legislation provides that the award requires ratification by the courts before 
enforcement proceedings can be undertaken.578 Moreover, as with western public 
policy that is dictated by reference to local laws and perhaps social customs, so it is 
with Saudi Arabia that the Shari’a is the benchmark in respect of public policy. In the 
light of this, Saudi arbitration law does not seem to differ much from its western 
contemporaries. Why, then, is it deemed problematic? The primary reason is obvious; 
where a Saudi element is involved, the parties cannot escape being subjected to Saudi 
lex arbitri. They could, of course, arbitrate outside the Kingdom and avoid all the 
relevant hustles, but their award would subsequently be unenforceable in Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, although in most countries there exists a consistent judicial 
practice that embraces the supervisory authority of civil courts over arbitral 
proceedings, in Saudi Arabia the situation is problematic. Despite the fact that the 
Saudi competent authorities (particularly the Diwan) do offer some jurisprudence as 
to their reasoning for either accepting or rejecting arbitration clauses – and the 
validity of the proceedings and compliance with public policy – there is no sense of 
precedent.579 The judges decide on the basis of their personal opinions and are not 
obliged to adhere to any precedent, even if a decision of the Review Committee of the 
Diwan exists on a particular matter. Moreover, these cases are not generally 
                                                 
578 See generally A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (4th edn., Sweet and Maxwell, 2004), especially chapters 9 and 10. 
579 Nonetheless, as we have demonstrated, the Diwan is not opposed to the parties themselves 
introducing foreign judgments, or arbitral awards, as evidence backing up their particular claims. 
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accessible and it is only telling that this is the first instance in which a compilation has 
been made with a view to their examination. As a result, arbitration remains a very 
speculative business since the parties and their lawyers navigate through legal 
uncertainty. From an international law point of view, it may be argued that the 
decisions of all competent authorities are an expression of State practice on the basis 
that they are organs of the State. Thus, even if their decisions carry no binding 
precedent within the Saudi legal system, at least the said decisions reflect the will of 
the Kingdom and bind it in its international relations. In any event, there is no doubt 
that a Hanbali arbitration law does exist, which itself informs Saudi arbitral law. My 
analysis has demonstrated that this Hanbali corpus of law is in fact more flexible than 
Saudi law, particularly on the grounds of interpretative techniques. This finding 
should dismiss the notion that Hanbalism is an archaic and backward-looking 
institution. 
 
Parties intending to draft arbitration clauses and undertake arbitral proceedings in 
Saudi Arabia, or elsewhere in cases where a Saudi element is involved, should ensure 
that they are fully compliant with Shari’a law and Saudi public policy. Given the 
requirements regarding the status of arbitrators, foreign lawyers dealing with such 
disputes must constantly be alert as to reliable arbitrators that fulfil these exact 
criteria.  
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5 Arbitration for the Settlement of Banking Disputes 
in Saudi Arabia 
 
In all legal systems around the world, the contradiction of public policy is a great 
threat to the arbitral process. The banking and general legal systems of Saudi Arabia 
are structured in quite a strange manner due to the obvious conflict between the 
Shari’a principles and the way in which conventional banks function. This conflict 
has created a gap between the Shari’a and Statutes within the Saudi legal system in 
various fields, especially where the dispute involves an unacceptable element under 
the Shari’a, such as the imposition of interest, hereinafter riba, which is the primary 
motive of the conventional banking system. As discussed in the previous chapter, this 
conflict has proved to be a fatal legal tactic against banks by those defaulting debtors 
trying to avoid serving their debts, at least in part, and to lengthen the time of the 
disputes, which render the loan practically “interest free”.  After examining arbitration 
as a general mechanism of settling commercial disputes in general, this chapter 
examines the issues related to arbitration as a mechanism for the settlement of 
banking disputes in Saudi Arabia and will discuss the following points: 
• Arbitrability of banking disputes 
• Arbitration clause in financial transactions  
• The concept of duality in the Saudi legal system 
• Alternative remedies when arbitration fails to serve its objectives which will 
include, in addition to arbitration, the resort to the Committee for the 
Settlement of Banking Disputes and to the Committee for the Settlement of 
Negotiable Instruments Disputes.   
 
The study will be conducted in a comparative way between the Shari’a, the Statutes 
and current practices, and in some parts will compare the Saudi law with the laws of 
some of the countries neighbouring Saudi Arabia, such as Egypt and the UAE. The 
reason behind comparing the Saudi law with the Egyptian law is due to the fact that 
the Egyptian law is practically one of the sources of the Saudi legislations. On the 
other hand, the UAE is a growing economic power in the region that has a close 
business ties with Saudi Arabia.    
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5.1 Banking Disputes under the Law of Saudi Arabia 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the nature of banking disputes in Saudi Arabia, the 
scope of the word “banking” under Saudi law should be determined in order to give a 
clearer vision of banking activities. The Banking Control Law of 1966 defined the 
term banking business as “the business of receiving money on current or fixed deposit 
account, opening of current accounts, opening of letters of credit, issuance of letters of 
guarantee, payment and collection of cheques, payment orders, promissory notes and 
similar other papers of value, discounting of bills, bills of exchange and other 
commercial papers, foreign exchange transactions and other banking business”.580 
The latter definition may bring up a few questions regarding the scope of banking 
business and consequently banking disputes; however, the most important question is 
about the reason behind the absence of money-lending operations in the definition of 
banking business under the Act when it should be considered as the core of banking 
business. It can be noticed that the Saudi legislators broadened the scope of the 
definition by inserting the following sentence “and other banking business”. It can be 
assumed that the Saudi legislators added that sentence in order to allow the practice to 
encompass controversial matters under the Shari’a. For instance, the drafters of the 
Act were unable to include explicitly the activity of money lending with interest, or 
fawaid, in the Act because riba is clearly prohibited under the Constitution of the 
country, bearing in mind that the Act was drafted in 1966, at a time when the concept 
of banking and the imposition of interest was totally unacceptable by the majority of 
Saudis due to its obvious violation of the Shari’a. Similar to other GCC countries, the 
Saudi society has been experiencing rapid changes following the first oil boom of the 
1970s, when the business sector began to accept what it formerly used to reject, as 
well as transforming its attitude toward banking interest. One may expect that if Saudi 
Arabia were to redraft its Banking Act, the law would not differ from any banking 
statute anywhere in the world and interest might not be the dilemma that it used to be.  
  
                                                 
580 See article 1.b of the Banking Control Act of Saudi Arabia. Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 22/02/1386 
H. (1966). Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 2126 dated 05/03/1386 H. (1966). 
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The quoted activities in the definition, in addition to money lending which has 
constituted an accepted practice of the commercial banks under the supervision of the 
Government, are the main subject matters of banking disputes in Saudi Arabia. The 
question of which competent authority should settle banking disputes in Saudi Arabia 
carries an even greater deal of ambiguity. Despite the recent law reform, which 
requires a minimum period of two years before it can take practical effect, Saudi 
Arabia does not possess proper commercial courts, and the competence of settling 
commercial disputes in general is devolved among several semi-judicial committees 
and it is understandable that in many cases a great conflict of authority is 
manifested.581 In any event, even the creation of specialised courts entrusted with the 
settlement of  commercial disputes would not solve the problem, especially if the case 
relates to “banking business”, as these prospective courts would work under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Justice, which itself would never tolerate any violation 
of the Shari’a.582    
 
In addition to arbitration, disputes relating to banking business can be settled through 
one of the following two committees in accordance with the subject matter of the 
dispute, irrespective of whether it relates to negotiable instruments or concerns other 
banking activities: 
a) The Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes under the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), which is competent to settle disputes arising as a result of 
pure banking activities only, such as the opening of current and deposit accounts, 
letters of credit, money exchange, foreign transfer, money lending, etc;583 
b) The other Committee is that for the Settlement of Disputes Involving Negotiable 
Instruments, which functions under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry and possesses the jurisdiction to settle disputes related to cheques and other 
negotiable papers only. The Committee for Negotiable Instruments is also known as 
the Negotiable Instruments Office. 
 
                                                 
581 Examples for such cases can be found in the cases of cheques and negotiable instruments disputes 
involving the payment of interest.    
582 See in general the Law of Judiciary and the Law of the Board of Grievances of Saudi Arabia. Issued 
by Royal Decree No. M/78 dated 19/09/1428 H. Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 4170 dated 
30/09/1428 H. (12/10/2007). 
583 See Royal Order No. 4/110 of 1409 H. (1989) and Ministry of Finance Circular No. 17/5583 dated 
19/09/1409 H. (1989).  
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5.2 Arbitrability of Banking Disputes 
 
The doctrine of arbitrability generally relates to the question of whether the applicable 
law allows a matter to be resolved by arbitration. All legal systems exclude some 
matters from the scope of arbitration and the non-arbitrable matter is referred to 
litigation even if the parties to the dispute agree to arbitrate.584 Similar to other areas 
of the Saudi commercial law, arbitration in general has not received sufficient 
attention from legislators, who prefer to rely on the classical Shari’a teachings and, in 
some cases, oppose modernising the legal system even if the said modernisation 
proffers to exist within the scope of the Shari’a. This attitude has resulted in a great 
deal of ambiguity in Saudi day-to-day affairs, especially when a prohibited or 
disputed element is the subject matter of a dispute. Saudi law is relatively vague when 
providing an answer to the question of arbitrability. Under Saudi law, whether a 
dispute is arbitrable is answered by reference to the Arbitration Act and its 
Implementing Rules. According to Article 2 of the Arbitration Act, arbitration is 
permitted in disputes where conciliation is permitted.585 Therefore, the Act excludes 
some criminal disputes, as will be seen below, and disputes concerning public policy, 
which themselves are encompassed under the jurisdiction of the Shari’a courts and the 
Diwan Almazalim, in addition to disputes relating to national sovereignty. 
 
With regard to banking disputes, a few opinions exist under the Shari’a as to whether 
to allow the use of conciliation. The reason for the difference between these opinions 
is due to the legal status of banking business under Shari’a law, given that the Shari’a 
prohibits particular banking transactions, and the question here is whether conciliation 
should be permitted where prohibited contracts are concerned. As a general rule, none 
of the Shari’a courts in Saudi Arabia or the Board of Grievances would decide on a 
dispute concerning a prohibited subject matter or, likewise, issue a decision entitling 
one of the parties to perform an unlawful act under the Shari’a.586 In order to 
determine the issue of arbitrability of a dispute in general, one needs to examine the 
                                                 
584 M. Paul, ‘Arbitrability of Copyright Disputes: Desputeaux v. Les Editions Choutte (comments)’, 
Canadian Business Law Journal, 38 (2003), pp. 125-149. 
585 Article 2 of the Arbitration Act of 1983.  
586 This information was given by a senior judge in the Shari’a Supreme Court of Makkah, Saudi 
Arabia, who preferred his name to be confidential; and he added, as a general rule, Shari’a courts 
assume jurisdiction over all claims brought before them. They do not decide on cases that entitle a 
violation of the Shari’a law.    
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Shari’a law on conciliation as the fundamental basis for deciding the arbitrability of a 
dispute, especially when the process of conciliation concerns riba.   
 
 
5.2.1 The Law on Conciliation in Saudi Arabia 
 
Having said that disputes should be amenable to conciliation in order to be arbitrable, 
there are no specific rules on conciliation in the law of Saudi Arabia and the 
procedure depends wholly on Shari’a teachings. In the Arabic language, there is no 
semantic difference between conciliation and mediation and both terms can be 
translated as sulh. The doctrine of conciliation or sulh was established by the Quran, 
the Sunnah, the teachings of the various schools of fiqh, as well as by common 
practice and customs. The Quranic verses recommend conciliation as a means of 
settlement of disputes in general and as the main mechanism for the settlement of 
family disputes in particular, stating that: “If a woman senses oppression or desertion 
from her husband, the couple shall try to reconcile their differences and conciliation 
is best for them.”587 The Quran also recommends conciliation in inheritance matters, 
as in the case of an unfair will, stating that: “If anyone fears partiality or prejudice on 
the part of the testator, and conciliates between the parties concerned, there is no 
wrong in him.”588 Moreover, the Quran regarded conciliation as the best practice in 
the settlement of disputes generally, as the following verse recommends: “If a person 
forgives and makes conciliation, his reward is due from Allah as Allah loves 
conciliators.”589    
 
With regard to the Sunnah, it was reported that the Prophet Muhammad conciliated 
between disputants or deferred deciding on a dispute in order to give the parties some 
time to reach an amiable settlement outside the court. In support of his practice, 
Prophet Muhammad also said: conciliation is permitted except if it legalises a 
prohibited matter or prohibits a lawful matter.590 After that, conciliation became a 
                                                 
587 The Quran 4: 128.  
588 The Quran 2: 182.  
589 The Quran 42: 40.  
590 Supra 156, bin Gasim, vol. 5, p. 128. 
 193
customary practice under Islamic law and an essential part of procedure before any 
Shari’a judge. 
 
Under Hanbali law, the conciliation agreement is a valid contract, similar to the 
arbitration agreement, and all the rules applicable to the arbitration agreement should 
apply to the conciliation agreement mutatis mutandis in accordance with the general 
principles of contract under Shari’a.591 Despite the latter similarities, there are some 
fundamental differences between conciliation and arbitration under the Saudi law and 
Shari’a law in general. In arbitration, the arbitrators are chosen on the basis of the 
mutual agreement of the parties to the dispute, whereas in conciliation the entire 
process depends on the parties to the dispute or their representatives and the 
conciliators have no authority to impose their view on the parties. Unlike arbitration, 
there are no rules to regulate the conciliation procedure, as conciliation may be 
initiated by the parties to the dispute or by the judge as part of the common 
procedure.592 The issue of the predictability of the arbitral award makes conciliation 
less harmful to the parties, especially if one of them intends to waive some of his 
claims in order to end the dispute, because in conciliation both parties know the 
acceptable limits for their waiver, which are not known in arbitration. In addition, the 
conciliation results can be enforced in a way similar to enforcing arbitration awards 
provided that they take the form of an award after concluding a valid conciliation 
agreement or if done before the court. Similar to arbitration awards, a conciliation 
award is not enforceable without an enforcement order from the authority having 
original jurisdiction over the dispute, which will review the award to ensure its 
conformity with public policy. Judicial review is not required for the enforcement of 
conciliation awards concluded before the court and they carry the same strength as 
court decisions.593     
 
Classical Scholars emphasised the legality and the importance of sulh as the primary 
basis for settling most kinds of disputes, but some scholars did not consider the sulh 
or the conciliation agreement as an independent contract, as is the case with the 
                                                 
591 I. Alhamoud, Conciliation in Commercial Disputes and Its Applications. A paper presented at the 
Conference on Arbitration and Conciliation, Taif, Saudi Arabia, 15-16/05/1424 H. (2004). 
592 Supra 2, Albejad, p. 77.  
593 Ibid.  
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arbitration agreement.594 It has been argued that under Hanbali law, a conciliation 
agreement is not an independent agreement and it cannot stand on its own. Scholars 
who supported that view assume that there is nothing to be called conciliation 
agreement and such agreements are to be attached to the type of contract such that the 
conciliation award possesses most of its features. For instance, the conciliation 
agreement in commercial disputes may be considered as a sales contract, lease 
contract, gift agreement, termination of a contract agreement, settlement agreement, 
loan agreement, etc.595 In other words, they claimed that there is no conciliation in 
commercial disputes and what is thought to be conciliation is merely negotiations of a 
new contract or amendments of an existing contract. However, the latter opinion 
seems to add more ambiguity to the legal status of conciliation and also contradicts 
the contractual nature of the conciliation agreement, which is actually independent 
and should not be influenced by other contracts.       
 
5.2.2 The Conciliation Practice in Saudi Arabia  
 
5.2.2.1 Conciliation in Criminal Disputes 
 
Besides family disputes, conciliation is one of the primary methods for settling many 
kinds of criminal disputes in Saudi Arabia, especially those concerned with private 
injury, such as murder and personal criminal injuries. Under Shari’a, any offence 
committed against a person is amenable to conciliation, i.e. arbitration. This issue 
requires a distinction between so-called hodoud offences, which are those committed 
against society as a whole, such as terrorism, assassination and adultery; and crimes 
committed against individuals, such as murder and personal injury, which can be 
subject to conciliation proceedings. Moreover, there are some crimes that are of a 
mixed nature, but which are nonetheless classified under the category of hodoud, 
particularly theft and rape, which cannot be subject to any kind of settlement, even 
though they involve a private entitlement, because of their relation to state power and 
society and whose punishment has already been determined by the Quran. 
                                                 
594 Supra 28, Ibn Qodamah, vol. 4, p. 322. 
595 Muhammad bin Moflih, Kitab Alforou’ (1st edn., Dar Alkotoub Alilmiyah, 2003), vol. 4, p. 268.  
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Consequently, hodoud crimes cannot be subject to any kind of extrajudicial 
settlement.596 
 
It is obvious from the case law that criminal disputes can be subject to conciliation as 
long as they do not concern a hodoud crime. In a case before the Shari’a Supreme 
Court of Riyadh, the Court ordered the execution of a murderer by beheading him in a 
public place; however, following a process of conciliation, a settlement was reached 
between the defendant and the plaintiffs, i.e. the family of the victim, which entitled 
the defendant to pay the amount of 1.7 million Riyal in exchange for a direct waiver 
of the claim of execution of the defendant.597 In order to encourage conciliation and 
other types of ADR in general, Saudi courts prefer to delay the execution of particular 
sentences in order to give third parties the chance to intervene between the disputants 
and thus save the guilty party from the death penalty. This tendency has its roots in 
the practice of the companions of the Prophet, as Omar bin Alkhattab, the second 
Caliph after the Prophet, said: “defer the issuance of your judgments; let the 
disputants conciliate.”598 In another case where conciliation was involved, the parties 
reached a settlement requiring the defendant to pay double the amount of the actual 
compensation in exchange for a prompt waiver of the plaintiff’s right. In this case, the 
plaintiff was shot by the defendant and as a result, the plaintiff was rendered 
paralysed, which, according to the law, entitled him to receive damages of 500,000 
Riyal. The defendant preferred to pay the amount of one million Riyal and get 
released from prison promptly.599  No statistics exist concerning the exact number of 
criminal cases in which conciliation has been involved, but it may be said that 
conciliation has been a great influence on the finality of decisions in criminal matters 
in Saudi Arabia.    
 
 
 
                                                 
596 Supra 175 Ibn Taymiyyah, vol. 3, p. 139. If an offence is not reported to an authority, i.e. the court 
or the police, the persons who are concerned with the offence have the right not to report it; 
nonetheless, the settlement is of no value if the claim reaches the authority.     
597 See A. Aloraini, ‘Conciliation in Criminal Matters’, Al-Adl Journal, 8 (2001), pp. 1-23.    
598 T. Alonaizan, ‘Conciliation Before and After the Death of the Victim’, Al-Adl Journal, 7 (2000), pp. 
1-29.   
599 Ibid.  
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5.2.2.2 Conciliation in Commercial Disputes  
 
Conciliation in commercial disputes has been divided into two main types according 
to the characteristics of the conciliation award; the first is sulh moua’wadah and the 
other is sulh isqat.600 The second type of sulh, i.e. sulh isqat, is the one that is most 
related to banking disputes nowadays because such disputes mainly involve financial 
claims and the settlement may be reached through reducing the amount of the claim or 
rescheduling the remainder of the claim.601 In a claim brought before the Shari’a 
Supreme Court in Taif “Saudi Arabia”, a conciliation award was approved by the 
Court in order to reduce the amount claimed by the plaintiff from S.R 840,000 to S.R 
700,000 that was subject to immediate payment.602 The conciliation award can also 
assist in rescheduling the claim, as was achieved in another case brought before the 
Board of Grievances, where the plaintiff agreed to reschedule his claim against the 
defendant if the defendant paid the instalments on time; otherwise, the payment of the 
full amount was due on demand at any time.603 The same kind of Sulh may also result 
in rescheduling the payment of outstanding claims, which is accepted by the Shari’a 
as long as the deferral of the payment itself does not bring any benefit to the claimant; 
otherwise, such deferral would be considered as riba or usury.604 
 
Moreover, sulh can also result in a total waiver of a part of the claim, while also 
simultaneously discounting another part of the same claim, as what occurred in the 
following case: a company claimed a payment of S.R 192,084 as damages for some 
defective goods, in addition to an amount of S.R 300,000 as compensation for certain 
direct and indirect losses as a result of faulty goods. The Board of Grievances 
approved a conciliation award entitling the defendant to pay only the amount of S.R 
120,000 out of the S.R 492,084 initially claimed by the plaintiff. In this case, the 
parties agreed to reduce the amount of the claim from S.R 192,048 to S.R 120,000 
and omit the payment of the compensation.605 The above-quoted cases constitute 
examples for claims arising out of normal commerce and not from banking activities. 
                                                 
600 Sulh moua’wadah results in a barter deal between the parties to the dispute, whereas in sulh isqat, 
one of the parties waivers or discounts part of the claim.  
601 Supra 156, bin Gasim, vol. 5, p. 141.  
602 See sulh document No. 51 dated 26/06/1421 H. (2001) from the Supreme Shari’a Court of Taif 
(Saudi Arabia). 
603 The Board of Grievances “Makkah branch” decision No. 369/2/Q of 1421 H. (2001). 
604 The Board of Grievances decisions “Makkah branch” No. 992/2/Q of 1421 H. (2001). 
605 The Board of Grievances decision No. 651/1/Q of 1423 H. (2003). 
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If the claim relates to banking business, the Shari’a courts and the Board of 
Grievances will not approve the conciliation award unless the conciliation award 
discards the interest and requires payment of the capital initially received from the 
bank without any additional cost. Nonetheless, the voluntary payment of interest can 
still be an effective extrajudicial method for the settlement of banking interest 
disputes, but the enforcement of the conciliation award is totally dependent on the 
good faith of the parties to the dispute, as well as the business relationship established 
between them.606         
 
Despite the argument that conciliation is inapplicable in prohibited subject matters, 
common practice nowadays clearly suggests that banking disputes can be subject to 
conciliation in accordance with the main principles of Shari’a and the general Quranic 
verses, as well as the tradition of the Prophet, which did not specify the scope of 
conciliation. Moreover, the following Quranic verse encourages people to give more 
flexibility in terms of rescheduling the repayment of a debt if the borrower is facing 
hardship and is unable to pay the sum owed on time: “If the debtor is in hardship, let 
him have respite until it is easier, but if you forego out of charity, it is better for you if 
you realize.”607 Although, the latter Quranic verse does not include the word 
conciliation, the conciliatory spirit can be felt within its teachings.   
 
Theoretically, banking disputes are arbitrable in Saudi Arabia because they can be 
subject to conciliation, whereas, in reality, banks are faced with a great deal of 
discrimination when it comes to the ratification of arbitration agreements and 
execution of arbitral awards. This discriminatory treatment may have negative effects 
on many aspects of Saudi Arabia’s commercial and social life. Firstly, banks may 
restrict the provision of conventional banking facilities, on the basis that the 
settlement of disputes arising out of related transactions may not be fair for the bank. 
For the same reason, the restriction in the provision of banking facilities might slow 
economic growth, especially when the alternative is more costly for the customers.608 
                                                 
606 This piece of information was given by the Deputy Chairman of the GCC Commercial Arbitration 
Centre, Mr. Ahmad Mazhar, in a visit to his law firm in Jeddah Saudi Arabia on 20/12/2007.   
607 The Quran 1: 280.  
608 When considering Islamic Banking as an alternative to the Conventional banking system, the 
Islamic banking system has not been developed to attract large-scale businesses and the cost of Islamic 
facilities is almost the same as the conventional ones, if it not higher. For more details see M. El-
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Another direct effect of the unfair treatment of banking disputes can be seen in 
attempts to avoid choosing Saudi Arabia as the applicable forum, where it would 
otherwise be the most convenient forum for the particular conventional banking 
dispute. For the sake of public interest, banking disputes should receive more 
attention both in arbitration and in litigation for the reason that discrimination against 
banks has the potential to undermine the credibility of Saudi Arabia as a potential 
financial centre and may slow the flow of foreign investment to the Kingdom.   
 
5.3 Arbitration Clause and Arbitration Agreement in Financial 
Transactions in Saudi Arabia 
  
As a general principle of Shari’a contract law, parties to the contract are free to 
stipulate whatever they want. According to some Schools of fiqh, there are some 
restrictions on this principle and conformity with the general principles of Shari’a is 
required.609 Following the principle of freedom of contract as established in Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s treatises, arbitration clauses or agreements of this nature (compromis) 
are permissible even if the subject matter of the dispute at issue is prohibited.610 This 
opinion enhances the autonomy of the arbitration agreement as an agreement separate 
from the underlying transaction and drives us to regard arbitration agreements related 
to banking transactions as lawful independent agreements of their own accord 
regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. The following few paragraphs will not 
discuss the legality of arbitration agreements concerned with banking transactions, 
this being the subject of a long-contested debate in the field of contract law, but will 
instead discuss the use of arbitration clauses in banking transactions in Saudi Arabia. 
      
In the light of common practices, financial transactions in Saudi Arabia can be 
classified as either Islamic or conventional. The classification is undertaken in 
accordance with the nature of the transaction as a whole and whether it is Shari’a 
compliant. Nonetheless, the law treats each class of disputes differently, as disputes 
                                                                                                                                            
Gamal, Islamic Finance, Law, Economics and Practice (1st edn., Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
pp. 77-78. 
609 N. Hammad, ‘Adhesion Contracts in the Islamic Jurisprudence’, Al-Adl Journal, 24 (2005), pp. 51-
78.  
610 See generally F. Vogel and S. Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return (1st edn., 
Kluwer Law International, 1998), Chapter 5, pp. 97-128. 
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relating to Islamic banking are settled like any other normal commercial dispute, 
given that Islamic banks function in a manner similar to normal commerce. In such 
transactions, the arbitration clause usually provides for the settlement of disputes by 
means of domestic arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act of 1983 of Saudi 
Arabia and under the supervision of the Diwan Almazalim.611 In these cases, the 
arbitration is performed normally without any impediment and the award is enforced 
in a way similar to that of the enforcement of any ordinary arbitral award. This is due 
to the nature of Islamic banking transactions, which shifts the nature of the underlying 
transaction from a loan agreement with interest to a sales transaction in order to avoid 
riba.612   
            
Domestic conventional banking transactions are arbitrable in principle; however, 
when it comes to the ratification of an arbitration agreement or the enforcement of an 
arbitral award, arbitration might encounter some obstacles from Diwan Almazalim, it 
being the supervisory body for arbitration proceedings in Saudi Arabia.613 The 
Diwan’s attitude does not seem to serve the main objectives behind resorting to 
arbitration as a fast, cheap and reliable dispute settlement mechanism; moreover, 
some of the decisions of the Diwan can be considered as a great waste of time and 
resources and undermine the credibility of arbitration in general. Nowadays, 
arbitration for the settlement of domestic conventional banking disputes has proved to 
be ineffective, as will be seen below.         
 
As a general rule, if both parties to the contract are of Saudi nationality, their choices 
for adopting a method of dispute settlement are very limited. Saudi parties have to 
resort either to the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes or to arbitration 
in Saudi Arabia, which excludes all those elements that are deemed to violate the 
Shari’a, i.e. interest accruing from the enforcement order.614 On the other hand, the 
existence of a foreign element to the arbitration agreement can offer more choices to 
the disputants and the resort to international arbitration anywhere in the world can 
                                                 
611 This piece of information has been provided by the Shari’a Compliance Officer at the Islamic Retail 
Banking Division of one of the commercial banks in Saudi Arabia (12 Jan. 2008). 
612 For more details on this kind of transaction, please see A. Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest (2nd  
edn., Brill Publishers, 1999). See also, T. El Diwany, The Problem with Interest (2nd edn., Kreatoc Ltd, 
2003), pp. 135-192. 
613 See Diwan Almazalim decision No. 50/1418 dated 24/01/1409 H. (1988). 
614 See Diwan Almazalim decision No. 59/1419 dated 28/10/1419 H. (1999).  
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become a possible option provided that, for the purpose of enforcement in Saudi 
Arabia, the arbitral award is in conformity with the Shari’a rules.615 It has been noted 
that the Diwan upholds the parties’ right to arbitrate wherever they stipulate, as long 
as a foreign element exists in the dispute. In a dispute between a Saudi bank and a 
foreign company, the arbitration agreement provided for the settlement of disputes 
arising out of the contract by means of arbitration in Zurich, subject to the rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce. The foreign party insisted that Saudi Arabia be 
the seat of the arbitration proceeding and for the Shari’a to be the substantive law 
applicable to the dispute. It was obvious that the foreign party tried to escape the 
payment of interest as provided in the loan agreement between the parties to the 
dispute. However, the Diwan issued a decision denying the jurisdiction over the 
dispute on the grounds of the existence of an arbitration agreement that the parties had 
an obligation to comply with, and resort to arbitration in Zurich and under the rules of 
the ICC. The Review Committee added: “the Diwan has no jurisdiction over this 
dispute for two reasons; first, the existence of the arbitration agreement. The parties 
should resort to arbitration in Zurich as they stipulated. Secondly, the Diwan is not the 
authority with original jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties. We conclude that 
the parties to the dispute should either resort to arbitration in accordance with the 
arbitration agreement or refer the case to the Committee for the Settlement of Banking 
Disputes of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.”616 It can be said that having a 
foreign party involved in a dispute is the only way to enforce the full payment of 
interest. This method has been upheld by the Diwan, but on what grounds? There are 
two main arguments on this issue and one of them suggests that the Diwan allowed 
resorting to international arbitration on the grounds of the principle of Alaqd Shari’ at 
Almouta’qedeen, which is the Islamic equivalent for Pacta Sunt Servanda. It may be 
understood from the latter view that the parties to the arbitration agreement are 
obliged to respect the terms of the said agreement as long as they are allowed to. 
Another argument suggests that the Diwan did not rely on principles of contract law, 
not because it wanted to enhance the freedom of contracts generally, but because it 
was instead forced to uphold the original arbitration clause for the reason that the 
Diwan lacked competence over the dispute and there was no possible defence against 
                                                 
615 This information was provided by an official in the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, who prefers 
his name to be confidential (7 Jan. 2008). 
616 The author was given access to the archive of a Saudi commercial bank on the condition that all the 
relevant information about the parties and the dispute remain confidential.    
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the insistence on the right to arbitrate outside Saudi Arabia. This issue will be 
elaborated in more detail below.    
5.4 Duality in the Saudi Legal System: Banking Interest as an 
Example 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the existence of two governing bodies of law with regard to banking 
business created a great deal of uncertainty. The uncertainty was not caused by the 
existence of the two bodies themselves; rather, it was created because both bodies of 
law contradict each other in some very sensitive matters. Interest payment is one of 
the main points of conflict between the Shari’a and existing banking regulations and 
practices because, despite the fact that it represents the main motive for the 
conventional banking system, it is prohibited under Shari’a. In Saudi Arabia, judicial 
review will lead to an indirect application of the Shari’a law if the arbitration is 
governed by a law other than the Shari’a or Saudi law, or is granted in a non-Muslim 
country. When Diwan Almazalim reviews an arbitral award, it searches for any 
contradiction of the main Shari’a principles as well as contradictions of other areas of 
public order. If contradictions are found, the party seeking the enforcement of the 
award will have two options;  
• Enforce the award after excluding the part contradicting public policy or; 
• Refer the entire dispute to the competent authority to decide the case anew. 
In the second scenario, the competent authority is the Diwan itself, one of the 
Committees of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry or the Committee for the 
Settlement of Banking Disputes of SAMA. Disputes relating to conventional banking 
are a clear example of the duality in the Saudi legal system for the reason that the 
Diwan, as the competent authority for the enforcement of arbitral awards, will not 
enforce the parts that contradict with the Shari’a, whereas someone else would. 
Despite the Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes’ willingness to enforce 
interest payment, it is unable to impose its decision and force the losing party to 
comply fully with its judgments. The weakness in the enforceability of the 
Committee’s decisions is due to its nature, which does not give it the power to act as a 
judicial committee, because if it were considered so, it would have to comply with the 
Shari’a rules, which is not the reason for its existence. Another face of this duality can 
be found even in the existence of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking 
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Dispute itself. The function of the Committee contradicts with article 1 of the Basic 
Law, which states that “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic 
state with Islam as its religion; the Quran and the Sunnah are its constitution”; and 
article 7, which states that “the Government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the 
Holy Koran and the Prophet's tradition”.617 Although the Committee for the 
Settlement of Banking Disputes works under the supervision of SAMA, the function 
of the Committee violates article 6 of the Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency, which does not allow SAMA to act in any manner which contradicts with the 
teachings of the Islamic law, and what the Committee does can be considered as 
support of a prohibited activity under Shari’a.618 The reason for arguing for the 
prohibition of the function of the Committee is due to a well-known principle under 
Shari’a that provides for the prohibition of all activities associated with riba, as will 
be seen below. The legal status of interest under Shari’a and under the Statute law of 
Saudi Arabia as a sign of contradicting duality within the legal system as well as the 
methods of settling banking disputes will be examined in the next part of this chapter.   
 
5.4.1 Interest under Shari’a  
 
The issue of interest has been a religious and ethical dilemma for many Muslim 
businessmen since the early years of Islam for many reasons. First, usury or riba is 
very similar to some kinds of sales contracts, especially futures contracts for the sale 
of not-yet-existing subject matters or what is known as Bay’ al salam. The latter view 
was the argument for the riba in the Quran as can be seen in the following verse: 
“They said “Trade is like interest” while Allah has permitted trade and forbidden 
interest”.619 Second, interest is the main motive for modern banking business and can 
be considered as the cornerstone of any modern economy. 
    
Islam came to abolish some of the pre-Islamic practices in order to protect the whole 
society from its negative effects. In the pre-Islamic era, charging interest was a 
                                                 
617 The Basic Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, issued by Royal Decree No. A/90 dated 
27/08/1412 H. (1992). Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 3397 dated 02/09/1412 H. (1992). 
618 See generally Article 6 of the Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Issued by Royal 
Decree No. 23 dated 23/05/1377 H. (1957). Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 1698 dated 06/06/1377 H. 
(1957).   
619 The Quran 1: 275. 
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standard condition for any loan agreement; however, the total prohibition went 
through different stages and took a long time during the life of Prophet Muhammad in 
order for it to become final. When looking at the legal basis of the prohibition of riba, 
the complete ban has gone through four stages, starting with showing that riba is not 
recommended for Muslims and they should avoid it as much as they can, and ending 
up with a definite prohibition.   
 
The first stage discouraged people from charging interest over loans given to other 
people; this discouragement can be understood through the following verse: “That 
which you give as interest to increase within other the people’s wealth increases not 
with Allah; but that which you give in charity, seeking the goodwill of Allah, 
multiplies manifold”.620 
 
In the second stage, the prohibition took the form of reminding what previous nations 
had done before the Quran showed that their practices were not the right thing to do. 
The following verse might indicate that Muslims should stop charging interest over 
loans: “And for their taking interest even though it was forbidden for them, and their 
wrongful appropriation of other peoples' property, we have prepared for those among 
them who reject faith a grievous punishment”.621  
 
The third stage clearly demonstrated that riba was prohibited and it was a sin. It can 
be seen in the following verse that the riba had not reached the level of being one of 
the major sins that Muslims must not even get close to: “O believers, take not doubled 
and redoubled interest, and fear Allah so that you may prosper. Fear the fire which 
has been prepared for those who reject faith, and obey Allah and the Prophet so that 
you may receive mercy”.622  
 
In the fourth and final stages, the prohibition of riba became final and since then, riba 
has been considered as one of the major sins, i.e. very close to murder, worse than 
adultery and similar in guilt to terrorism, which can be understood through the 
following verses of the Quran: “O believers, fear Allah, and give up the interest that 
                                                 
620 The Quran 30: 39. 
621 The Quran 4: 161.  
622 The Quran 2: 130.  
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remains outstanding if you are believers”;623 “Those who charge interest shall be 
raised like those who have been driven to madness by the touch of the Devil; this is 
because they say: "Trade is like interest" while Allah has permitted trade and 
forbidden interest. Hence those who have received the admonition from their Lord 
and gave up may have what has already passed, their case being entrusted to Allah; 
but those who revert shall be the inhabitants of the fire and abide therein for ever”.624  
 
This latter Quranic verse determines the legal basis for settling disputes involving 
interest or riba, and judges in Shari’a courts and Diwan Almazalim apply the principle 
established by this verse when deciding on any disputes or when reviewing arbitral 
awards: “If you do not do so, then be sure of being at war with Allah and His 
Messenger. But, if you repent, you can have your principal. Neither should you 
commit injustice nor should you be subjected to it”.625 In accordance with the 
teachings of this verse, interest must be avoided; however, if a person involved in a 
usurious transaction, he must not take more than the principal amount that he lent and 
interest must be excluded from any Shari’a-compliant judgment. The prohibition of 
riba in the Sunnah was not just a restricted prohibition like the prohibition of many 
unlawful actions. The prohibition of interest followed the doctrine of extended 
prohibition, i.e. the prohibition covers all activities related to the prohibited subject 
matter and all the people involved in it are sinners on equal basis. 
 
The doctrine of extended prohibition of interest was established by the following 
Hadeeth: “Prophet Muhammad cursed the receiver and the payer of riba, the one who 
records it and the witnesses to the transaction and said: they are all alike” (in the 
sin).626 The latter Hadeeth can also be the legal basis for arguing for the prohibition of 
the functions of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes, as when the 
Committee upholds a riba transaction, it is considered to be involved in it if not as the 
one who records it, as witness to the transaction. Moreover, another Hadeeth 
establishing a general rule for detecting unlawful transactions reads as follows: “any 
                                                 
623 The Quran 1: 278.  
624 The Quran 1: 275. 
625 The Quran 1: 279. 
626 Al-Imam Alzaylai’e, Tabeen Alhaqaiq Sharh Kanz Aldaqaiq (1st edn., Dar Alkotoub Alilmiyah, 
2000), vol. 4, p. 84.  
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loan attracts a benefit is riba”. 627 The latter Hadeeth is a safety measure against some 
practices employed by some “Islamic banks” which take advantage of some 
differences in legal opinion among Scholars with regard to the scope of the 
prohibition of riba. Riba is generally classified as unlawful advantage by way of 
excess, or what is known as riba alfadl, and rescheduling riba alnasi’ah.628  
 
The issue of riba alfadl arises in contracts of sale when there is an increase in the 
terms of exchange when the subject matter of the contract and the consideration are 
identical. For instance, the exchange of a certain amount of US dollars for a higher 
amount of US dollars can be considered as riba, but if the consideration is different 
from the subject matter, like in the case of exchanging US dollars for Saudi Riyals, 
there is no riba as long as the exchange is made on the spot.629 There are some 
similarities between this class of riba and the practices of some Islamic banks 
nowadays, as some of them avoid Riba alnasi’ah to get involved in riba alfadl. The 
law on riba alfadl was established by the following Hadeeth: “the selling of gold for 
gold is riba (usury) except if the exchange is from hand to hand and equal in amount 
and similarly, the selling of silver for silver is riba (usury) unless it is from hand to 
hand and equal in amount”.630                 
 
Riba alnasi’ah, what is mostly referred to as riba aljahiliyah or what is sometimes 
called the obvious riba, literally means the riba of the pre-Islamic era because it was a 
very common practice among Arabs before Islam. This type of riba is similar to 
charging interest over loans and to delaying damages. It has been reported that 
Prophet Muhammad said: “all contracts of riba of the pre-Islamic period are null and 
void. The first contract of riba I am cancelling is that of Abbas bin Abdulmottalib” 
(the Prophet’s uncle). Moreover, in the treaty of the Prophet with the Christians of 
Najran,631 the Prophet cancelled the interest accrued on their debts, which had 
originated in the pre-Islamic period.632 
                                                 
627 Supra 558, Vogel, p. 77.     
628 H. Ramadan, Understanding Islamic Law from Classical to Contemporary (1st edn., Alta Mira 
Press, 2006), p. 117. 
629 Ibid.  
630 Supra 599, El-Gamal, p. 68. 
631 Najran is a city in the south of Saudi Arabia. 
632 A. Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and its Contemporary 
Interpretation (2nd edn., Brill Publisher, 1999), p. 30. 
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For the sake of representing some of their practices as Shari’a compliant, some of the 
pioneers of modern Islamic banking adopted the narrowest scope available for 
determining riba and recognised the latter type i.e., riba alnasi’ah, only, arguing that 
it is the only prohibited practice mentioned in the Quran. They also relied on the 
reasoning of some of the companions of Prophet Muhammad, who said: “there is no 
riba except riba alnasi’ah”.633  
 
Having said that interest is prohibited under Shari’a, we should know the reason 
behind this prohibition. There are many social, ethical and economic factors that 
support the prohibition of riba, which have been summarised by Kula (2008) as 
follows:  
 
“The reason why usury is prohibited in Islam is manifold. First, the taking of interest, 
in the main, implies appropriating another person’s property without giving him/her 
anything in exchange, because one who lends one pound for two pounds gets an extra 
pound for ‘no real effort’. Second, dependence on interest prevents some people from 
working for a living, since the person with money can earn much more through 
interest without working for it. In this way individuals with money who will not bother 
to take the trouble of running a business will inevitably undermine the worth of work 
in the community. This will not only deprive the individuals with wealth of justly 
earned benefits, but it will also depreciate the wellbeing of the Islamic community for 
it is not possible to sustain the flow of goods and services by simply borrowing and 
lending money alone. The third and perhaps the most important aspect of riba is that 
it is, essentially, a transfer of money from the ‘poor’ to the ‘rich’, which is contrary to 
Islamic teaching”.634  
 
The prohibition of riba can be considered as one of the main rules in Islamic 
economics nowadays. Modern economists have defined the riba in the new contexts 
as any unjustifiable increase in capital, whether through loans or sales. More 
precisely, any positive, fixed, predetermined rate tied to the maturity and the amount 
                                                 
633 Ibid.  
634 E. Kula, ‘Is Contemporary Interest Rate in Conflict with Islamic Ethics’, Kyklos International 
Review for Social Sciences, 61/1 (2008), pp. 45-49.  
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of the principal (i.e., guaranteed regardless of the performance of the investment).635 
The distinction should be made between the riba and the rate of return or profit on 
capital, as Islam encourages the earning and sharing of profits, because profits 
represent a successful entrepreneurship and the creation of additional wealth; whereas 
interest can be considered as a cost that is accrued regardless of the outcome of the 
business operations and may not create wealth if there are business losses.636 
 
To sum up, all forms of interest charged over loans are totally prohibited under 
Shari’a and contradict with the public policy of Saudi Arabia, and a contract involving 
such terms is null and void in the part including the prohibited action. This view has 
been upheld by the teachings of all fiqh schools, fatawa of the Ulama, the judgments 
of the Shari’a courts and the Board of Grievances. For instance, the Minister of 
Justice ordered all Shari’a courts and kitabat aladl “the notaries” not to authenticate 
the mortgages of commercial bank loans on which such banks take interest from the 
debtor by a certain percentage. The order covers any agreement or contract involving 
the payment of interest because it is prohibited by Shari’a.637 The Minister of Justice’s 
order was upheld by the Supreme Judicial Council, which prohibited borrowing from 
commercial banks because they charge interest. The same decision exempts judges 
from deciding on disputes that involve the payment of any form of interest or loans 
associated with benefits.638 It can be said that when kitabat aladl refuse to 
authenticate loan agreements, they might go against the injunction provided in one of 
the verses of the Quran that obliges them to authenticate any agreement, as they are 
not held responsible for their content. That verse reads as follows: “O you who 
believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed term, record it in writing. Let a scribe 
record it in writing between you in (terms of) equity. No scribe should refuse to write 
as Allah hath taught him, so let him write, and let him who incurred the debt dictate, 
and let him observe his duty to Allah his Lord, and diminish naught thereof”.639  
 
Interest is prohibited under Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia, but the overall status is 
not really clear and a great deal of ambiguity surrounds the issue as a whole which 
                                                 
635 Z. Iqbal and H. Tsubota, Emerging Islamic Capital Markets: A quickening pace and new potential 
(The World Bank Publications, 2006), p. 6.   
636 Ibid.  
637 See the Minister of Justice Circular No. 107/2/T dated 25/08/1389 H. (1969).   
638 See the decision of the Supreme Judicial Council No. 291 dated 25/10/1401 H. (1980).   
639 The Quran 1: 282.  
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might be due to the fact that the two bodies of law, i.e. the Shari’a and the Statute, are 
applied in parallel with the theoretical supremacy of the Shari’a ruling. The current 
practice in Saudi Arabia has not identified whether riba is prohibited; however, it can 
be observed that riba is prohibited but the prohibition is unenforceable in the sense 
that a person or a bank can charge interest as long as no dispute reaches the authority. 
 
Arbitral awards entitling one of the parties to perform any unacceptable act under 
Shari’a, such as paying interest, will be set aside and the Board of Grievances will not 
enforce the parts contradicting with the Shari’a. A typical case in which a party seeks 
the enforcement of an arbitral award including interest can be seen in the following: 
an application for the enforcement of an arbitral award made in Bahrain was refused 
because it entitled one of the parties to pay interest. The Board allowed the 
enforcement of the part that complied with Shari’a only and the losing party was 
forced to repay the principal only without interest.640 
 
It can be said that, although banks claiming interest is against the Shari’a, a client 
refusing the performance of a binding contract is against the Shari’a as well because it 
contradicts with one of the main principles of  the Shari’a contracts law, which is 
Alaqd Shari’ at Almouta’qedeen, which is the Arabic for Pacta Sunt Servanda. The 
non-performance of a contract may contradict with some of the Quranic texts such as: 
“O ye who believe! Fulfil (all) obligations”.641 Nonetheless, these principles can be 
easily challenged by the assumption that the Shari’a prevails over the terms of any 
contract if the contract provides for a breach of one of the established principles of the 
Shari’a.642   
5.4.2 Interest under the Banking Regulations 
 
The banking system is the heart of any modern economy and a strong economy 
cannot exist without a sound banking system.643 From this fact, Saudi Arabia had to 
allow the establishment of commercial banks and the first Saudi bank was established 
                                                 
640 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 19/28 of 1399 H. (1979). 
641 The Quran 5: 1.  
642 Supra 617, Al Imam Alzaylai’e, vol. 4, p. 98. 
643 R. Sylla, ‘Financial Systems and Economic Modernization’, The Journal of Economic History, 62 
(2002), pp. 277-292.  
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in the 1930s. Banks started, from that time, providing its services and charging 
interest and it expanded its network largely, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Oil boom of the 1970s resulted in the establishment of some public funds that started 
lending to individuals and some kinds of businesses with zero interest and on very 
flexible terms.644 The Oil Boom also resulted in an accumulation of a huge amount of 
cash and liquid assets in a very short period of time, which led commercial banks to 
be more generous in providing their facilities without thorough consideration of the 
creditworthiness of its clients. Following that, banks started to suffer from a major 
legal problem represented in the refusal of Shari’a courts and the Committee for the 
Settlement of Commercial Disputes to recognise the validity of interest in banking 
transactions.645 The official position was not clear as the government allowed banks to 
charge interest as long as it was necessary for the financial system and charging 
interest served the public interest, but it refused to recognise it in the case of disputes.  
 
 
 
Despite article 149 of the Code of Commercial Courts of 1931, there is no mention of 
interest in the Saudi regulations.646 Financial regulations in Saudi Arabia do not give a 
clear answer to the question of whether charging interest on loans or awarding interest 
in arbitral awards is a permitted action. Even the Banking Control Act and its 
implementing rules did not mention the word interest or fawaied in its text. The 
situation is truly vague and confusing to the extent that nobody is able to determine 
whether interest is legal or illegal for different reasons such as, riba has been 
practised for many decades even though such practices contradict with the main 
principles of the Shari’a and because the government itself deals with it in some of its 
contracts. Having said that riba violates Shari’a, there is no punishment for riba 
dealing and all that the judicial bodies do is annul the contradicting part of the 
contract. 
                                                 
644 These funds were established by the Government, and they work under its direct supervision: The 
Saudi Arabian Agricultural Fund established in 1963; The Saudi Credit Bank founded in 1971; The 
Public Investment Fund created in 1973; The Saudi Industrial Development Fund established in 1974; 
The Real Estate Development Fund established in 1974.  
645 Supra 597, Mazhar.   
646 Article 149 of the Code of Commercial Court does not really deal with interest charged over loans; 
it deals with one of the tricks applied by the Islamic bank to circumvent the prohibited riba. The 
example given in that article describes exactly the Tawarrouq transactions applied by Islamic banks 
nowadays.    
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It is appropriate to quote a conversation between King Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz (1903-
1975) and a businessman, which shows that some regulatory bodies were more or less 
impartial with regard to banking interest. A bank customer complained to King Faisal 
that his bank was claiming interest, which he refused to pay because it is against the 
Shari’a. The businessman expected the King to abolish the payment of interest but the 
King said: since the bank granted the complainant a certain facility for a specified 
period, and he refused to pay interest, the complainant must return this favour to the 
bank and give the bank an equal amount for an identical period, after which time the 
bank is to repay it to him without interest. The complainant is said to have settled the 
interest to his bank without further objection.647 By the early 1980s, banks complained 
to the authorities, arguing that they were losing too much and that the risk was too 
high. This complaint led to the establishment of the Committee for the Settlement of 
Banking Disputes in 1987.648 The establishment of the Committee as a last resort for 
banks did not serve the banks’ objectives in full and interest remained to be an 
avoidable obligation.649     
           
As a general rule, the Saudi law is the law applicable to all governmental contracts. 
This choice of law may indicate that whatever the Government stipulates is not 
against the law or the public policy. The practice of the Saudi government adds more 
ambiguity as charging interest became a valid practice in most of the Governmental 
contracts, both domestically and internationally. For instance, the recent gas 
concession agreements concluded in 2004 have a specific clause for interest charged 
on the amount of the financial guarantee in case of late payment. Article 18 in all 
three gas concession agreements provides for interest to be charged for late payment 
at the rate of LIBOR plus 1%, which is exactly the prohibited riba under Shari’a. 650 
Moreover, and in contrary to its Charter, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
“SAMA” receives interest on assets deposited or invested with international financial 
institutions.651 For one reason or another, the Saudi Government has been investing in 
                                                 
647 M. Alameldin, ‘Banking Disputes in Saudi Arabia’, International Financial Law Review, 10 (1991) 
pp. 36-38.  
648 Ibid.  
649 Supra 597, Mazhar.  
650 See article 18 of the Concession Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Lukoil Saudi Arabia Ltd. 
Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 3990 dated 15/03/1425 H. (04/05/2005).  
651 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency v. Dresnder Bank AG (2003), WL 23145143.  
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the US treasury securities, which are simply debt certificates with interest charged 
over it.652 In addition, the government of Saudi Arabia has been financing its budget 
deficit through internal borrowing where the major lenders are the General 
Organisation for Social Insurance and the Pension and Retirement Fund. Both 
organisations work under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Government has been serving the debt owed to those funds since mid-1980 with a 
total interest accounting for S.R 30 billion in the year 2000.653 It can be said that 
charging interest is a governmental practice, but it does not usually apply to domestic 
transactions, i.e., contracts with the private sector other than banks, for the reason that 
Diwan Almazalim is the applicable forum for settling disputes arising out of the 
execution of such contracts and the Diwan does not recognise interest. It can be said 
again that interest payment is prohibited under the Saudi law, but the prohibition is 
unenforceable as long as the parties voluntarily comply with their agreement. 
 
The clash on this very specific legal issue represents a bigger point of controversy 
between two schools of thought within the Saudi authorities or even within the society 
as a whole; a conservative party who rejects any attempt of reform or development 
and insists on leaving this vague situation against a larger group who seeks the 
modernisation of the system without prejudice to the established principles and moral 
values of the society and arbitration in such an economically, religiously sensitive 
issue is one example of this clash.654      
 
5.5 The Settlement of Banking Disputes in Saudi Arabia 
 
Having said that interest is partly contrary to the public policy of Saudi Arabia and 
arbitral awards should not include interest in order for them to be enforced; now we 
will examine the ways of settling such disputes in Saudi Arabia. First of all, Shari’a 
courts and Diwan Almazalim are not competent for the settlement of disputes relating 
                                                 
652 See generally, D. Spiro, The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and 
International Markets (1st edn., Cornell University Publication, 1999).   
653 A. Shoult, Doing Business with Saudi Arabia (3rd edn., GMB Publishing Ltd, 2006), p. 42.   
654 The Chairman of Diwan Almazalim, Sheik Muhammad Alissa. Okaz Newspaper, issue No. 2459 
dated 11/03/2008. The Sheik added that some judges even oppose computerising the archive system in 
addition to the reform of some existing regulations and procedures. 
 212
to banking activities.655 In addition, if a claim for interest is brought before the Shari’a 
Courts or Diwan Almazalim, the contract will be considered null and void in the part 
that violates the Shari’a law. Therefore, the available remedies refer the dispute to:  
• Arbitration;  
• The Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes; or  
• The Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes. 
 
5.5.1 Arbitration 
 
The previous chapter examined the arbitration law and practice in case of normal 
commercial dealings which does not violate the principles of Shari’a and public 
policy, the following part of this chapter will examine arbitration in disputes relate to 
domestic conventional banking in Saudi Arabia. As concluded above, arbitral awards 
violating the Shari’a law are of no effect and they cannot be enforced in Saudi Arabia 
either wholly or at least in the contradicting part of the award. Even though arbitration 
is an independent dispute resolution method, arbitration is found to be attached to the 
domestic legal system and the public order of the place of the issuance and the place 
of enforcement for the reason that arbitral awards cannot be enforced unless they are 
judicially approved in the place of enforcement and they should be, at the same time, 
valid at the place of issuance. It can be said that unlike some other neighbouring 
states, there is no way whatsoever to enforce an arbitral award concerning domestic 
conventional banking in Saudi Arabia if it provides for the performance of a 
prohibited act under Shari’a. Prior to the establishment of the Committee for the 
Settlement of Banking Disputes, arbitration was the only available remedy for banks; 
nonetheless, the enforcement of the award was totally dependent on the good faith of 
the parties to the dispute. For instance, in a loan agreement concluded in 1985, a 
Saudi bank agreed to settle a dispute that arose between him and a Saudi 
businessman, who refused to serve his debt, by means of arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
subject to the ICC arbitration rules and under the supervision of the Jeddah Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry. The final award upheld the bank’s right to receive interest 
on the principal amount in addition to the immediate repayment of the principal 
amount in cash. The arbitration panel applied the principle of Alaqd Shari’ at 
                                                 
655 Royal Order No. 729/8 dated 10/07/1407 H. (1987).  
 213
Almouta’qedeen, where the terms of the contract prevail over the law and arbitrators 
should rely on it when issuing their decisions without prejudice to the public order. 
When the bank filed a request for the enforcement of the award, the Diwan rejected 
the enforcement of the part contradicting with Shari’a and gave the bank a choice 
between executing the award in the part compliant with the Shari’a or referring the 
whole dispute to the competent authority, i.e., the Committee for the Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes, to decide it anew. In another case, the Diwan blocked all 
possible solutions, rejected the whole award on the grounds of the prohibition of the 
subject matter of the dispute and denied jurisdiction on the case. The bank had to 
settle the dispute through conciliation with the debtor, who had the upper hand at that 
time, and asked for rescheduling of the principal only, which the bank had to agree 
upon as the very last resort.656 I have gone through a number of arbitration cases 
concluded before the establishment of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking 
Disputes and in many of them the Diwan gave the party seeking the enforcement of 
the arbitral award a choice between executing the Shari’a-compliant part of the award 
or referring the case to the Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes 
under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; however, on most occasions, the 
Diwan rejects the enforcement of an arbitral award, leaving no room for alternative 
remedies. In such cases, the parties to the dispute have to initiate a new claim before 
the competent authority, which is very costly and time consuming.  
 
After the establishment of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes, 
arbitration became less attractive, in settling domestic disputes, for banks, as resorting 
to the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes under SAMA gives banks a 
better chance of recovering the outstanding claims for interest.657 Moreover, in some 
circumstances, arbitration is a useless dispute settlement mechanism for banks due to 
the Diwan’s inflexibility or even hostility against banks, as the Diwan considers all 
banking activities as violations of the Shari’a. The legal doctrine of “ma boniya ala 
batil fahowa batil”, applied by the Diwan, provides for the illegality of all actions and 
practices if they are based on illegal principles, which might be the legal basis for 
                                                 
656 Ibid.  
657 This piece of information has been provided by one of the Shari’a Controllers at the Islamic 
Banking division of one of the Commercial Banks in Saudi Arabia (9 Jan. 2008).   
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denying the enforcement of arbitral awards providing for interest.658 It can be 
assumed that the Diwan regards arbitration agreements and awards as illegal because 
of the nature of the underlying contract, which is a void contract under Shari’a.  
 
 As a result, the number of arbitration cases in which banks are involved has become 
very limited and, practically, banks in Saudi Arabia do not resort to arbitration 
anymore in disputes relating to domestic conventional banking. The banks refrain 
from resorting to arbitration in domestic conventional contracts because the 
Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes of SAMA gives better solutions, 
as it looks at the dispute from a contractual point of view without the strict adherence 
to the Shari’a rules applied by the Diwan. Therefore, arbitration remains a very 
speculative business since the parties and their lawyers navigate through legal 
uncertainty. 
 
It has been noticed that the Diwan denies jurisdiction over any claim involving banks, 
even if the case falls within the Diwan’s general jurisdiction as the competent 
authority for the enforcement of arbitral awards in the Kingdom. In the following 
case, the Diwan rejected the whole application for the enforcement of a domestic 
award on the grounds of having banks as parties to the dispute. The application for the 
enforcement of an arbitral award in relation to a dispute involving a Saudi company 
and two national banks was filed but rejected by the Diwan on the grounds of lacking 
jurisdiction to hear disputes in which a bank is involved.659 In its decision, the Diwan 
quoted the Royal Order No. 8/729 of 1407 H. (1987) as being the basis for its refusal; 
however, the previous Royal Order determines the competent authority for the 
settlement of a banking dispute and the Diwan, when reviewing the arbitral award, is 
not settling the dispute; it is merely enforcing the decision of the arbitration 
committee with regard to the dispute after a general review of the award. It was a 
disappointment when the Diwan exceeded its terms of reference and tried to decide on 
the case anew. Accordingly, the presence of a bank as a party to the dispute can be 
grounds for setting aside an arbitral award without looking at the merit of the award 
itself, which can be considered as discrimination against banks. On the other hand, it 
                                                 
658 See Diwan Almazalim decision No. 11/D/F/2 of 1417 H. (1997). The legal doctrine of “ma boniya 
ala batil fahowa batil” can be translated as: anything based on something illegal, is illegal.   
659 Diwan Almazalim decision No. 50/1418 dated 24/01/1409 H. (1988). 
 215
can be said that there was a misunderstanding by the Diwan because the Diwan 
treated the enforcement application in a manner similar to treating an initial claim 
where, if it were the case, the reasoning of the Diwan would be accurate, but as the 
application was for the enforcement of a final arbitral award, the Diwan should not 
have intervened in such a discriminatory way. If the latter possibility is real, the 
Diwan should really consider the qualifications and the quality of its judges. In a case 
where the party seeking the enforcement of the arbitral award insisted on the full 
enforcement of the award, the Diwan gave the choice of referring the whole case to 
the competent authority, i.e., the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes, 
which was supposed to be the second option after looking at the award, but the Diwan 
did not look at the award in the first stage on the grounds of having banks as parties to 
the arbitration. In another case, after the parties to the dispute spent a great deal of 
time and money, the award was set aside by the Diwan even though none of the 
parties challenged it. The latter case shows the main difference between arbitration 
under the Diwan and the judgments of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking 
Disputes, which are binding on the parties if they are not opposed by the parties 
before issuing the award, as will be seen below. 
It can be assumed that the Diwan follows one of the opinions under the Hanbali 
School that considers contracts related to prohibited subject matters as null and void 
and there is no real dispute because the whole transaction is of no value at all.660 
Nonetheless, the Diwan’s practices led to a movement among banks to avoid the 
jurisdiction of the Saudi authorities over their transactions, as will be seen below. On 
the other hand, the high level of legal risk encouraged banks to move toward Islamic 
banking, which seems to be ethically acceptable for customers and judges and has 
proved to be more profitable and less risky for banks in Saudi Arabia.   
 
In international banking transactions where at least one of the parties to the dispute is 
considered to be a foreign party even though it is not, parties to the contract can 
stipulate to arbitrate anywhere outside Saudi Arabia, which is usually their first 
preference. In any scenario, the Shari’a secures its position by not allowing the 
enforcement of arbitral awards contradicting it, as the enforcement order must be 
filtered by the Diwan in the light of the Shari’a ruling. However, arbitration is not the 
                                                 
660 Supra 617, Alzaylai’e, vol. 4, p. 101. 
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favourite dispute settlement mechanism, as in most cases the parties to the contract 
stipulate that the English law or the law of New York is the proper law of the contract 
and London or New York is the appropriate forum. This tactic is mainly preferred by 
banks because there are no impediments to the enforcement of interest and other 
prohibited or disputed sale contracts like in Saudi Arabia. By doing so, the Saudi 
court will not be involved in the dispute by any means; however, if the arbitration 
award is brought to Saudi Arabia for the sake of enforcement, it will be regarded 
invalid and the Diwan will consider it a circumvention to avoid the jurisdiction of the 
Saudi Judiciary. In most cases, the parties to the dispute are wholly Saudis but the 
legal entity is incorporated somewhere outside Saudi Arabia, so they would be 
considered as foreign parties, like in the following case. The case of Islamic 
Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. V. Symphony Gems NV and others is 
a clear example of such tactics of circumvention to avoid the application of the 
Shari’a law on transactions where the application of the Shari’a could affect the 
parties’ right to receive interest. In this case, the English Court quoted: “The fact that 
the claimant was based in Saudi Arabia, and the offer made in that country was 
insufficient to bring into play the illegality principle, on the assumption that the 
agreement was contrary to Saudi law”.661    
It has been noted that a great deal of care was put into the drafting agreements 
concerning international conventional banking and they tried to find a way in which 
the law of Saudi Arabia becomes inapplicable to the transaction even though the 
actual parties to the contract were of Saudi nationality and Saudi Arabia was the place 
of characteristic performance and the place of the conclusion of the contract. Some 
Saudi businessmen adopted this attitude because of the pressure put on them by 
foreign parties, as adjudication under any law other than the Saudi law is more 
convenient for both of them.  
In Midland International Trade Services Ltd. and others v. Al-Sudairy and others, the 
English court decided on a case related to their actions in Saudi Arabia. The 
agreement provided for the Saudi Company to pay interest on the sums advanced and 
to repay the third plaintiff by honouring bills of exchange payable in Riyadh. The 
agreement was expressly to be governed by, and construed in accordance with, 
English law and the parties to it agreed to submit their disputes to the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
661 See Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems NV and others. 
[2002] All ER (D) 171 (Feb.).  
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the English courts without prejudice to the right of the third plaintiff to sue the Saudi 
Company in Saudi Arabia. The case was first brought to the Committee for the 
Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes in Riyadh where interest was not 
awarded. Then a claim was initiated in London where the English court concluded by 
awarding interest to the second and third plaintiffs.662     
 
From the current practices, it can be noted that, in the absence of good faith, there are 
a few ways to avoid the intervention of the courts of Saudi Arabia in arbitration, 
which can be summarised as follows:  
• The party benefiting from the banking facilities should incorporate a business 
entity outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with total independence from 
other Saudi corporations like in the above case of Islamic Investment 
Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. V. Symphony Gems NV and others. By 
doing so, the Saudi authorities would have no way to intervene in the arbitral 
process and there would be a need to resort to the Diwan for enforcing the 
award, as everything would be done outside Saudi Arabia provided that the 
parties have enough assets outside the jurisdiction of the Saudi court.    
• Another way in which foreign banks can deal with Saudi parties safely is if 
they have a well-drafted agreement and the bank is assured that Saudi Arabia 
is not the applicable forum to settle the dispute, and that by taking the 
following steps: 
o The Saudi party establishes a branch in the home country of the bank 
to carry out business activities and have a permanent address. 
o The place of the characteristic performance should be that of the home 
country of the bank which means that if there is a dispute, it will be out 
of the reach of the Saudi judiciary as it concerns an action done outside 
Saudi Arabia and the Saudi judiciary is not competent to decide on it 
unless both parties are of Saudi nationality. In this case, arbitral awards 
should be enforced in the place where the contract was executed. 
o Finally, the bank providing the facilities should retain sufficient 
collateral against the debt within its own legal system to avoid forum 
shopping in case the debtor defaults, as if that happens, the bank has to 
                                                 
662 Midland International Trade Services Ltd v. Al-Sudairy (Q.B.D., 11 April 1990), The Financial 
Times, 2 May 1990. 
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resort to the Saudi judiciary to recover its claims where interest is 
contrary to the public policy.      
5.5.2 Banking Disputes in Neighbouring Countries 
 
In comparison to Saudi Arabia, other neighbouring states that have their laws based 
on principles similar to Saudi Arabia, such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, 
have a different approach to the issue of banking interest in general.663 It should be 
noted that the Constitution of the UAE followed the Kuwaiti model and both 
Constitutions were drafted by Egyptian scholars and inspired by the Egyptian 
Constitutions, especially the Constitution of 1971.664 The approaches adopted by the 
neighbouring countries reflected their tolerance of interest in arbitral awards, as in 
some cases interest has been treated as being totally compliant with the public policy, 
like in the UAE, and in some cases interest is allowed with some restrictions, such as 
the case of Egypt. In Egypt, the law has recently been hesitant with regard to banking 
interest. Apart from the UAE and Oman, other GCC states do not have a clear answer 
to the question of whether interest is contrary to public policy. The hesitation is due to 
the fact that interest contradicts with the Constitutions of all these countries including 
the UAE itself; however, they do allow interest to be charged either on loans or as 
delay damages in commercial transactions.  
 
In Egypt, as the pioneer of modern statute law in the Arab Countries, the issue of 
interest in general and in arbitral awards in particular has become theoretically vague 
in the last two decades as a result of the 1980 amendment of the Constitution and 
because the decisions of the Commercial Court contradict each other.665 For instance, 
article 227 of the Civil Code of 1949 stipulated that the contracting parties could 
agree on interest rates of up to 7%. On the other hand, basing on the fact that the 
amended constitution of 1980 identifies the Shari’a as the principal source of 
legislation, the Sheik of Alazhar brought a claim before the Supreme Constitutional 
                                                 
663 W. Ballantyne, ‘The States of the GCC: Sources of Law, the Shari’a and the Extent to which it 
Applies’, Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1986), pp. 1-18. 
664 See generally B. Al-Muhairi, ‘The Position of Shari’a Within the UAE Constitution and the Federal 
Supreme Court’s Application of the Constitutional Clause Concerning Shari’a’, Arab Law Quarterly, 
11 (1996), pp. 219-244. The Kuwaiti Constitution was drafted by Abdulrazzaq Al-Sanhuri and the 
UAE Constitution was drafted by Professor Wahid Ra’fat, and both are well-known Egyptian jurists.    
665 S. Habachy, ‘Commentary on the Decision of the Supreme Court of Egypt Given on 4 May 1985 
Concerning the Legitimacy of Interest and the Constitutionality of Article 226 of the New Egyptian 
Civil Code of 1948’, Arab Law Quarterly, 1 (1985), pp. 239-241.   
 219
Court pleading against a lower court judgment obliging Alazhar to pay the debt and 
the 4% interest on it according to the relevant article of the Civil Code of 1949. The 
court dismissed the case, arguing that “the Shari’a rulings cannot be applicable to the 
already existing legislation retroactively without creating confusion and instability for 
the commercial and judicial process”.666 However, the Sheik of Alazhar himself, in 
his well-known fatwa, allowed interest on banking deposits, as he said: “riba is haram 
but banking interest is halal”. Sheik Alazhar Muhammad Sayed Tantawi was the first 
respectful figure in the Islamic world to give such an opinion. The fatwa itself can 
also be regarded as a shift in the attitude of many Muslims toward banking interest, 
even though the Sheik himself put some restrictions on the application of interest in 
various contracts where the main condition is not to take advantage of the hardship of 
debtors and also not to enhance the difference between the classes of the society.667 
The Sheik of Alazhar’s fatwa encouraged some Islamic banks to adopt various 
methods to calculate interest charged on loans and cover it with different names 
which result in a similar interest rate to conventional loans or even a higher rate on 
some occasions.668 There is another opinion given by some Egyptian scholars with 
regard to banking interest, but it proved to be based on a misunderstanding of the 
mechanism of interest. This opinion suggests that a fixed interest rate is prohibited 
and a variable interest rate is permissible. It can be said that variable interest rate does 
not differ from the fixed one as interest will be charged in both cases but with a 
different manner of calculation, and instead of determining the rate at the beginning of 
the agreement, the rate would be reviewed at the beginning of each sub-period into 
which the loan is divided.669 On the other hand, the decisions of the Egyptian Courts, 
even after the claim of the Sheik of Alazhar, did not pay any consideration to the 
argument that interest violates the Constitution. The Court of First Instance at the 
South of Cairo decided that the Egyptian Government represented the Ministry of 
Finance and the Taxation Department should pay an operator of a hotel the amount of 
                                                 
666 F. Nomani, ‘The Problem of Interest and Islamic Banking in a Comparative Perspective: The Case 
of Egypt, Iran and Pakistan’, Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, 1/1 (2003), pp. 37-70. 
667 See the fatwa of Majma’ Albohouth Al Islamiya Bil Azhar, “the Islamic Research Committee of 
Alazhar”, concerning banking interest dated 23/09/1423 H. 28/11/2002, Cairo, Egypt.  
668 One of the methods is what is called cost plus profit, where the bank estimates the real value of the 
principal on the maturity date and adds what they consider as administrative fees, which sometimes 
result in a rate that is higher than the conventional rate; however, according to this method, banks are 
not allowed to charge any additional fees after the maturity date.  
669 Supra 560, Tarek, p. 137.  
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33,320.13 Egyptian Pound as compensatory interest for late payment of three years.670 
The confusion created by the amendment of the Constitution did not apply to the legal 
system as courts continued to regard charging interest as part of the public policy of 
Egypt.    
Conversely, the legality of the practice of charging interest in the UAE is not disputed 
as the law has integrated it as a fundamental practice to the extent that charging 
interest is not a matter of conflict, and if there is a dispute, it will be about when to 
charge it and how much the rate is. For instance, article 76 of Federal Law No. 18 of 
1993, or what is known as Commercial Transactions Law, emphasised on the right of 
a commercial debtor to charge interest, as article 76 states: “A creditor is entitled to 
receive interest on a commercial loan as per the rate of interest stipulated in the 
contract. If such rate is not stated in the contract, it shall be calculated according to 
the rate of interest current in the market at the time of dealing, provided that it shall 
not exceed 12% until full settlement”.671 The structure of the economy and the ruling 
system has contributed to the relaxed regulatory attitude toward many traditionally 
controversial issues and represented riba as a normal and even necessary practice in 
the economic life in the UAE.672 As a result, interest became an established principle 
within the UAE law; it is not considered as a religious dilemma and it is not even 
faced with opposition like in Saudi Arabia or Egypt.673 Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the Dubai International Financial Centre enjoys actual independence in 
the fields of civil and commercial law, with the express authorisation of the amended 
UAE Constitution, which introduced common law-based regulations. The regulators 
did that hoping to attract foreign investment even at the expense of the established 
principles of the society. Some commentators added that Law No. 18 of 1993 
concerning commercial transactions is an attempt to circumvent the application of the 
Shari’a in commercial matters.674 
 
                                                 
670 The Court of First Instance at the South of Cairo, decision No. 4615 of 1992. see also, The Supreme 
Court of Egypt decisions No. 93/6/7 of1996 and decision No. 26/16/8 of 1996.  
671 The UAE Federal No. 18 of 1993, Commercial Transactions Law, article 76.  
672 H. Tamimi, ‘Interest under the UAE Law and as applied by the Courts of Abu Dhabi’, Arab Law 
Quarterly, 17 (2002), pp. 50-52.  
673 This is due to the various degrees of influence of the religious institutions on the regulatory bodies 
and on the public. It can be said that Shari’a has very little influence on the commercial law of the 
UAE. 
674 A. Carballo, ‘The Law of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Common Law Oasis or Mirage 
within the UAE?’, Arab Law Quarterly, 21 (2007), pp. 91-104.  
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One of the similarities between the mechanisms that banks employ in paying interest 
on deposits in the UAE and Saudi Arabia is the way of stipulating. As a general rule, 
banks in Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not pay interest unless the client requests it; 
however, the main difference is that in Saudi Arabia there are no certain rules to 
regulate interest and everything is based on the market practice and the terms of the 
contract. In the UAE, the law provides for the interest rate to be determined by 
agreement between the parties and in the case of not specifying the interest rate, the 
rate would be determined by the common interest rate in the market provided that it 
does not exceed 12%.675 
 
Bearing in mind that the UAE is a Muslim state having the Shari’a as a principal 
source of legislation, it has been noted that the economic necessity led it to change its 
view of interest, which led to allowing interest in commercial matters first, and then 
interest became an ordinary practice in all areas of commercial activities. As an 
obvious violation of the Shari’a, the UAE law allowed for, what some Scholars call, 
the obvious riba or riba aljahiliyah, which is the riba alnasi’ah discussed above. This 
kind of riba cannot be circumvented and the law allowing it reads as follows: “Where 
the contract stipulates the rate of interest and the debtor delays payment, the delay 
interest shall be calculated on the basis of the agreed rate until full settlement”.676 
Another article in the same law stated clearly that the debtor is obliged to pay interest 
over the debt to the creditor subject to their agreement.677 Consequently, charging 
interest is not disputed at all and the latter ceiling for the interest rate is also upheld by 
the case law. It can be said that in the absence of an agreement between the parties on 
the interest rate, the UAE law allows simple interest to be charged on all financial 
transactions within the limit of 12% per annum. The same rule also applies to the 
delay interest as a means of compensation or what is known in Shari’a as riba 
aljahiliyah. 
 
In a case decided in 1980, the Federal Supreme Court had considered certain 
provisions of the Abu Dhabi Code of Civil Procedure that expressly allowed interest. 
The statutory language under review in 1980 provided that the rate of interest 
                                                 
675 Commercial Transactions Law of the UAE article 399.1. A  
676 Ibid., article 77. See also, article 7 of the Federal Constitution of the United Arab Emirates of 1971.   
677 Ibid., article 409.3. 
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determined by the court may not exceed the rate of interest agreed upon by the parties, 
or upon the basis of which they transacted, and that in the absence of an agreement 
the court may determine the rate provided that it does not exceed 12% with respect to 
commercial transactions and 9% with respect to non-commercial transactions. In its 
1980 judgment, the Federal Supreme Court held that these statutory provisions were 
constitutional, but that banks would not be permitted to charge rates of interest in 
excess of 12% and that only simple interest would be allowed. In the current case, the 
Federal Supreme Court first considered an objection by the borrower that all interest-
bearing transactions were void pursuant to Article 714 of the Civil Code (promulgated 
pursuant to Federal Law No. 5 of 1985). Article 714 provides that if a contract of loan 
provides for a benefit in excess of the essence of the contract, then such a provision 
will be void. However, the Federal Supreme Court held that the Civil Code did not 
apply to banking transactions, which were commercial by nature and were therefore 
governed by the Commercial Code. The Federal Supreme Court therefore held that 
the borrower’s challenge to the entirety of the interest owed to the bank could not be 
sustained. However, the Federal Supreme Court agreed with the borrower’s challenge 
to the bank’s attempt to collect interest in excess of 12% and held that the interest rate 
ceiling established by the 1980 judgment continues to apply.678 In the decision of the 
Federal Supreme Court of Abu Dhabi No. 245/20 dated 7 May 2000, the Court 
established that charging interest in excess of the statutory ceiling of 12% per annum 
is permitted as long as the parties agreed to it. In accordance with article 76 of the 
Commercial Transactions Law of 1993, the Court did not distinguish between 
interests charged before or after the maturity date and the Court argued that the 
statutory limit should apply in the absence of such an agreement.679 The scope of 
judicial review under the UAE law is very limited compared to that of Saudi Arabia. 
Apart from the general grounds provided in article 5 of the New York Convention of 
1958, no obvious obstacles for the enforcement of arbitral awards can be found in 
Saudi Arabia, which might be due to the fact that the economic situation in that 
country forces the legal regime to be more tolerant in this respect.680   
 
                                                 
678 Ibid.  
679 Supra 621, Tamimi. See also, the UAE Supreme Federal Court decision dated 06/09/1983. 
680 N. Angell and G. Feulner, ‘Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates’, Arab Law 
Quarterly, 3 (1988), pp. 19-32.  
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To sum up, interest is not considered as an impediment to arbitration at all in the UAE 
as it has become an essential element of the economy and the legal system. Some may 
argue that arbitral awards providing for interest can be challenged in Egypt on the 
grounds of its contradiction of the Constitution, i.e., the Islamic Shari’a. This 
argument is still theoretical only, and setting aside an arbitral award in Egypt on the 
grounds of interest is not likely to happen as the Egyptian Courts have their own rules 
of determining and enforcing interest obligations.681    
 
5.5.3 The Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes 
 
The Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes is the only authority in Saudi 
Arabia that recognises charging interest as a valid practice. The Committee is 
competent to settle disputes arising out of the conduct of banking business between 
banks and customers, and disputes between commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. 
Settlement of cheques and negotiable instruments disputes were excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the Committee as they fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee for 
the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes and the Shari’a courts in some 
cases. If Diwan Almazalim finds an arbitral award to be contrary to the public policy 
and the dispute relates to banking business, the Diwan will refer the whole case to the 
Committee to be decided anew, as one of the remedies available to the parties to the 
dispute. In the following paragraphs, the procedure of the Committee will be 
described with reference to the available cases and materials.  
 
First of all, it should be noted that the Committee was established as a compromise 
between Shari’a and economic interest in order to remove the burden from Judges 
who face a religious dilemma when deciding on disputes related to banking business. 
The dilemma occurs because of the gap between the legal right of the bank to collect 
the amount of interest in full, as stipulated in the agreement between the parties 
following the principle of pacta sunt servanda, on the one hand and the fact that the 
whole transaction is unacceptable under Shari’a on the other. It should also be noted 
                                                 
681 See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited [SPP(ME)] v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Case 
No. ARB/84/3. ICSID report (1st edn., Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 242. 
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that there are no statutory rules of procedure for the Committee and proceedings rely 
fully on the practice.682  
 
In Saudi Arabia, legal prosecution concerning banking disputes or financial claims in 
general may be brought initially to the Civil Rights Department under the Ministry of 
the Interior, or what is known as Alhoqooq Almadaniyah, which in its turn will refer 
the case to the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes. The claim can be 
initiated directly to the Committee or through the Regional Governorate, or what is 
know as Al Amarah, and all these bodies will refer the case to the Committee. In the 
case of bringing the claim before the Civil Rights Department, the Department has the 
right to take action against the debtor to force him to pay off the debt if it finds the 
claim to be genuine. If the debtor challenges the claim either in full or in part, the 
whole case is sent to the competent authority, which would be the Committee for the 
Settlement of Banking Disputes in the case of banking disputes.683  
 
After obtaining approval to look at the dispute, the secretary of the Committee will 
then notify the respondent of the claim, attaching a copy of the claim and asking him 
to respond to it within one month. All claim notifications must be in writing and in 
full detail. Such details include the names of the parties, the nature of the relief or 
order applied for or the directions sought from the Committee, the names and 
addresses of the persons on whom it is intended to serve the application and the 
applicant’s address for service in addition to the signature of the applicant or his 
representative. The applicant may state the amount of his claim in foreign currency. 
Notifications of claims, hearings and decisions are sent through the claimant bank to 
the respondent if he is a customer; in the case of having another bank as a respondent, 
the secretary will notify him directly.684 The secretariat prepares a report about the 
suit, and in some cases, an accountant is called by the Committee to check the amount 
of the claim. The Committee may also order a deposit by way of security for the 
administrative fees. It has been noted that accountants mainly admit banking service 
charges, as a substitute term for interest, until the end of the facility agreement 
between the parties. In this way, no tacit renewal of the facility can be claimed unless 
                                                 
682 Supra 596, Alameldin. 
683 Ibid.  
684 Ibid.  
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it is proved that an amount was withdrawn by the customer after the end of the facility 
agreement, and in such cases, interest can be granted up to the date of the later 
withdrawal. The Committee used to consider such an accountancy report as final and 
binding on the parties without giving the parties the chance to challenge it or even to 
know its content, and the Committee gave the parties a notice of it during the hearing 
only. The Committee appoints a venue for the hearing, which is usually the 
Headquarters of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency in Riyadh. The hearings are 
held in private and the attendance is restricted to the parties to the disputes or their 
authorised lawyers; however, the power of attorney must contain the right to settle 
and transact on behalf of the principal. The Committee looks at the case as it was on 
the day of its presentation to the Civil Rights Department or to the Committee, but the 
amount of the claim can be amended. A written record of the examination is made and 
signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, which is considered as evidence against any 
statement that the debtor makes during the examination.685  
 
According to the Royal Decree providing for the establishment of the Committee, the 
Committee was formed in order to find solutions for banking disputes, and in the case 
of not reaching a fair settlement between the parties, the Committee should refer the 
case to the competent authority because the Committee is not a judicial body.686 In 
practice, the Committee does not follow the instructions of the Royal Decree and it 
tries to impose its own view on the parties even if the parties or one of them rejects 
the proposed solution. If the parties accept the proposed, or sometimes imposed, 
settlement and the parties conclude a transaction agreement, the Committee will add 
the following statement to the award: “This decision is considered an injunction 
enforceable by the authorities legally competent”. Nonetheless, if the parties or one of 
them refuses the proposed solution, the award will not include the latter statement, 
which shows the conciliatory nature of the Committee’s decisions, or in other words, 
the Committee’s decisions are treated in the same way as conciliation awards, which 
are non-binding on the party who reject to accept it. As a general rule, the decisions of 
the Committee are binding and enforceable; however, it has been noticed that the 
Civil Rights Department found difficulties executing the decisions of the Committee 
either because of a lack of clear instructions concerning the execution of the 
                                                 
685 Ibid.  
686 See the Circular of the Minster of Interior No. 10207 of 07/02/1407 H. (1987). 
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Committee’s decisions or because of the unwillingness of the debtors to pay off their 
debts, and all that might be due to the fact that the Committee is not a judicial body.687 
Another reason for the weakness in the decisions of the Committee is the possibility 
that the decisions of the Committee can be challenged before Diwan Almazalim on the 
grounds of contradicting the public policy. In one of the Diwan’s cases, the losing 
party, i.e., the debtor to the bank, argued that SAMA, when instructing the losing 
party to pay interest, did not violate the Shari’a only, it violated even its own charter 
that prohibits SAMA from acting in any manner contradicting with the Shari’a. The 
Diwan did not issue a decision for this dispute as the plaintiff requested a stay of 
proceedings, as the plaintiff reached a settlement with the bank outside the Diwan.    
 
As an attempt to add some strength to the decisions of the Committee, the Minister of 
Finance advised the Ministry of the Interior that the decisions of the Committee are 
final, enforceable and unchallengeable and asked the Minister of the Interior to put on 
more pressure to oblige debtors to pay off their debts, because the delay in the 
payment would have a negative effect on local banks and on the economy as a whole. 
Nonetheless, the enforcement of the Committee’s decisions through the Ministry of 
the Interior faced many obstacles which led the Ministry of Finance to impose its own 
measures to ensure the enforcement of the decisions of the Committee. As a remedy, 
plaintiffs can ask the Committee to place the defendant’s name on a blacklist in order 
to prevent him from travelling abroad and prevent banks from giving him new 
facilities. Moreover, the Committee can freeze or seize the defendant’s banking 
assets; however, there has been a dispute about whether the Committee can freeze or 
seize all the moveable and immovable property of the defendant. It can be observed 
that in most cases the Committee cannot order a seizure of the defendant’s non-
banking assets unless it is pledged as a security against the debt for the reason that 
such orders must be made through one of the bodies of the Ministry of Justice or 
Diwan Almazalim, and these bodies will not usually approve such actions if the 
seizure is to be made to recover a claim of banking interest; but if the claim is brought 
to recover the principal only, the Diwan or the Shari’a court will usually approve it. 
Appeals can be made through the Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
the Minster of Finance or to the Committee directly.  
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Since it was founded in 1987, the Committee has been facing some problems, making 
it unable to serve the objectives of its establishment. First is the absence of clear 
procedural rules, as there are no procedural rules for the working of the Committee 
and all the proceedings are done in a vague manner. Second is the lack of 
enforceability of the Committee’s decisions, which can be considered as the biggest 
problem faced by the Committee. This issue makes the Committee totally dependent 
on other governmental bodies such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Justice and Diwan Almazalim. The dependence on other governmental bodies for 
enforcing the judgments of the Committee is not a problem on its own as all other 
judicial bodies rely on some other authorities to enforce their decisions; the problem 
occurred as a result of the contradiction between the principles applied by the other 
bodies, i.e., the Ministry of Justice and the Diwan, and the principles applied by the 
Committee. For instance, in cases where a real property is pledged to the debt, the 
enforcement of the agreement will face great difficulties when authenticating the 
agreement at kitabat aladl and when reaching Diwan Almazalim to obtain the order to 
sell the pledged property, since the Diwan might not approve the selling of such 
property for the recovery of interest.688 Moreover, banks have some problems with 
securities other than real property, especially in the case of guarantees. Guarantees 
under the Saudi law can be classified into two types; presence guarantee, or what is 
called “Kafalah Hodouriya”, is where the guarantor guarantees the presence of the 
debtor before the official authorities only. The other type of guarantee can be 
translated as a full guarantee or “Kafalat Ghorm wa Ada’”; in the existence of this 
kind of guarantee, the bank has the option of claiming the debt from the guarantor 
directly, but in practice the bank should exhaust all of the available remedies before 
claiming the payment from the guarantor. The main problem associated with such 
guarantees arises when the amount of the claim is not stated in the letter of guarantee 
provided by the guarantor. The guarantee will be considered void and of no effect or 
the amount claimed by the guarantor will be considered as the correct amount.689  
 
                                                 
688 See for details: The Commercial Mortgage Act, Royal Decree No. M/75 dated 21/11/1424 H. 
(2004). Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 3981 dated 07/01/1425 H. (2004). 
689 Supra 596, Alameldin. 
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Third, similar to conciliation, the acceptance of the award by the parties is an essential 
condition for the enforcement of the award and that shows the conciliatory nature of 
the Committee’s decisions. Fourth, in addition to the absence of clear procedural and 
substantive rules and due to the fact that none of the members of the Committee have 
a legal background, the Committee cannot function as a judicial body and some of its 
decisions even seem to be impractical and harmful on the parties, like in the case of 
rescheduling a debt in annual instalments for 20 years with a fixed interest. In this 
case, a debtor refused to pay his instalments due to some financial difficulties. The 
defendant presented an official document issued from the Shari’a court stating that he 
was unable to pay off his debt and he should enjoy very flexible terms of 
repayment.690 The Committee calculated the amounts claimed by the bank and 
divided it by 20 years instead of five years. The decision was accepted by both parties 
as being the last resort for the bank.691 In another case, the Committee totally 
cancelled the interest in exchange of the repayment of the principal in cash. The 
decision is seen to be reasonable in normal circumstances, but in this case the bank 
had to accept the decision after more than two years of not receiving any payment for 
the facilities granted to the defendant, which means that the defendant enjoyed an 
interest-free loan.  
 
It has been noted that in many of its decisions the Committee rescheduled debt claims 
for various periods ranging from five years to up to 30 years. Nonetheless, the 
Committee could issue relaxed decisions if it finds the defendant willing to pay the 
full amount in cash. Such relaxations include discounting part of the interest as in the 
following example: a businessman borrowed an amount of S.R 19,000,000 from one 
of the commercial banks in Jeddah. The parties stipulated on charging interest at the 
rate of 5.5% per annum for five years. Following the market depression in the late 
1990s, the businessman was unable to pay the instalments for 14 months and that was 
due to some financial difficulties. The bank brought a claim before the Committee 
asking for the payment of the principal plus the stipulated interest in full or a direct 
liquidation of the collateral in accordance with the terms of the contract. The 
                                                 
690 This kind of document is known as Saq E’isar; one of the main advantages of obtaining such a deed 
can be the very relaxed repayment terms as such documents are issued for insolvent persons.   
691 This case and the following cases have been provided by one of the commercial banks in Saudi 
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Committee, during the hearing, proposed that the businessman could end the dispute 
if he paid the principal in cash and the bank should exclude 50% of the outstanding 
claim of interest; the parties agreed on that.692      
 
Following the Stock Market crash in early 2006, the Committee has been 
experiencing some difficulties dealing with the large number of disputes between 
banks and their clients, vice versa with regard to banking facilities granted to buy 
shares with the guarantee of existing shares owned by debtors. This kind of dispute 
started to appear as a result of the common banking practice of selling the securities 
when the market value of it falls below a certain limit without notifying the clients 
even though it is a violation of SAMA’s regulations.693 For many years, securities 
related disputes provide one of the most frequent occasions for arbitration in the 
financial service industry.694 However, until recently, commercial banks used to 
conduct stock brokerage directly, not through a specialised subsidiary, which raised 
the suspicion that banks contributed to the crisis because of the conflict of interest 
between conducting stock brokerage, holding shares as debt security and managing 
speculative funds. This problem was also worsened by the ill supervision of the 
Capital Market Authority, who denied supervision of the practices of the commercial 
banks because it fell under the competence of SAMA, and SAMA in its turn denied 
the responsibility because such activities related to the stock market and the Capital 
Market Authority should have been in the position of supervising such activities.695 
The settlement of such disputes would take a long time because the competence of 
this kind of dispute is still a matter of conflict between the Committee for the 
Settlement of Securities Disputes of the Capital Market Authority and the Committee 
for the Settlement of Banking Disputes, and also because of the large number of 
disputes. Such disputes related to banking business for the reason that they arose out 
of the execution of banking transactions, and they could also fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Committee for the Settlement of Securities Disputes of the Capital 
Market Authority because they were related to price manipulation and they were 
related to the selling of securities without the owner’s permission.   
                                                 
692 Ibid.  
693 See Circular No. 333/BC/200 dated 22/08/1413 H. (1993).  
694 See generally W. Park, ‘Arbitration in Banking and Finance’ Yearbook of International Financial 
and Economic Law, ed., J. Norton, The Hague: Kluwer Law International (1997)  
695 See generally, A. Baamir, ‘Issues of Disclosure and Transparency in the Saudi Stock Market’, Arab 
Law Quarterly, 22 (2008), pp. 88-108.   
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5.5.4 The Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable 
Instruments Disputes 
 
Another competent body for the settlement of banking disputes is the Committee for 
the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes, which is competent to settle 
disputes arising out of negotiable instruments such as cheques, promissory notes and 
bills of exchange. Established by the Law of Negotiable Instruments, the Commercial 
Paper Committee is also known as the Office for the Settlement of Commercial 
Papers Disputes and has the jurisdiction to hear claims concerning bills of exchange, 
promissory notes and cheques only.696 The Negotiable Instruments Law provides the 
substantive legal provisions applied by the Commercial Paper Committee. The law 
largely reproduces the provisions of the Geneva Convention Providing a Uniform 
Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes of June 7, 1930 and for Cheques of 
March 9, 1931, even though Saudi Arabia has not become a party to the conventions 
themselves. The Law of Commercial Papers can be considered as a mixture of the 
Code of Commercial Courts of 1931 and the above-mentioned Conventions, with 
some modifications to meet the Shari’a requirements. For instance, as Shari’a forbids 
the payment and charging of interest, any provisions in the Conventions relating to 
prohibited practices under Shari’a were omitted from the Negotiable Instruments 
Law. In practice, this position has been applied by offsetting interest payments 
voluntarily made by the debtor, against the principal of the debt. The procedure before 
the Committee is subject to the provisions of the Code of Commercial Courts of 1931 
and decisions may be appealed to the Minister of Commerce or to the Committee 
itself.697   
 
Unlike the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes where most of the 
submitted disputes occur between banks or between banks and customers, the 
majority of the disputes submitted to this Committee do not involve banks as parties. 
Banks try to avoid adjudicating to this Committee because it applies the Shari’a law 
and does not recognise the obligation to pay interest as a valid contract. At the same 
time, the Committee does not have the competence to award damages and all claims 
                                                 
696 See in general, The Law of Commercial Papers, Nizam Alawraq Altejariyah. Issued by Royal 
Decree No. 37 dated 11/10/1383 H. (1963). Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 2010 dated 15/10/1383 H. 
(1963). 
697 Ibid.  
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for damages should be directed to the appropriate authority.698 With regard to riba, 
negotiable instruments related to usurious transactions are considered by the 
Committee to be void and of no value because the underlying contract is considered 
void.699 Appeals against the Committee’s decisions are made either to the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry or to the Committee itself. When the decisions of the 
Committee become final, they are enforced by the Civil Rights Department who 
detain the losing party till full payment is made. The Committee is not really a 
committee and contrary to its name, it consists of one of the legal advisors of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry only, who is usually not a Shari’a-trained 
advisor. The legal advisor usually works as the secretary and arbitrator at the same 
time. The hearings of the Committees are held in the legal department of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry where the attendance is restricted to the parties to the 
disputes only. It has been noticed that the decisions of this Committee are easier to 
enforce than the decisions of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes 
for the reason that the decisions of this Committee do not contradict with the Shari’a. 
The decisions of this Committee are directly enforced by the Civil Rights Department, 
which will detain the respondent until full settlement of the claim is reached.           
 
   
Unlike Saudi Arabia, the majority of the legal systems in the Muslim world have no 
problem with regard to arbitration in banking disputes, as it is treated in the same 
manner as other commercial disputes. In Saudi Arabia, the problem occurred because 
the principles of conventional banking contradict with the principles of the Shari’a, 
especially when it comes to some very sensitive issues such as interest. Nowadays, 
interest is the main motive for the banking system, which can be considered as the 
core of modern economies; nonetheless, the Saudi law did not give even a clear 
answer to the question of arbitrability of disputes in general and of banking disputes 
in particular, and referred the whole issue to the law on conciliation. The law on 
conciliation itself carries a great deal of ambiguity and conflict among the Fiqh 
Schools and that was added to the fact that there were no rules on conciliation in 
Saudi Arabia till now, and what is practiced over there is no more than a personal 
                                                 
698 See the decision of the Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes No. 
82/1405 dated 08/05/1405 H. (1985).  
699 The Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes, decision No. 67/1404 dated 
11/04/1404 H. (1984).  
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effort to find pacific solutions to disputes or to avoid litigation. Another issue that 
worsens the situation is the duality within the Saudi law. This duality is not a problem 
in itself, as if there are two straight lines, they can go in parallel without clashing and 
two different schools of thought can complement each other in many cases unless a 
fundamental point of conflict occurs between them, which is the case of interest in 
arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. The contradiction between the two bodies of law with 
regard to interest is the main problem and it has caused a great deal of uncertainty in 
relation to arbitration, as the Shari’a prohibits all forms of banking interest and the 
Saudi law does not enforce this prohibition. After being the best solution for banking 
disputes, it can be concluded that arbitration becomes a less attractive method for the 
settlement of domestic conventional banking disputes for the reason that the 
Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes offers a better chance for 
recovering interest claims. Moreover, arbitration for banking disputes tend to be more 
risky as the Diwan will consider arbitral awards providing for the payment of interest 
as contrary to the public policy and it will refuse the enforcement either in part or in 
full. In the latter case, the Diwan will either exclude the interest from the award or 
refer the whole dispute to the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes to be 
decided anew, and that is a waste of time and money and weakens the credibility of 
arbitration as a fast, cheap and effective dispute settlement mechanism. It was also 
noted that banks attempted to avoid the jurisdiction of the Saudi judiciary in 
international banking contracts and tried to apply a mechanism in which the Saudi law 
would have no influence on the transaction in general and on the settlement of 
disputes in particular.     
  
The future of the semi-judicial Committees is not yet clear as the new law of Judiciary 
stated that such Committees should be incorporated in the proposed commercial 
courts that should be formed in the next couple of years.700 The Law first calls for a 
reform in the procedural law before joining the specialised committees within the 
competence of the Ministry of Justice.701 The new Law excluded some of the 
committees from this merger because it deals with some sensitive issues on the one 
                                                 
700 These Committees are: the Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes; the 
Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes, the Committee for the Settlement of Labour 
Disputes, the Committee for the Settlement of Media Disputes, The Committee for the Settlement of 
Securities Disputes, The Committee for the Settlement of Customs Disputes and the Commercial 
Departments of Diwan Almazalim. 
701 See article 9.1 of the Law of Judiciary of Saudi Arabia. 
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hand and on the other hand, because Shari’a judges are not qualified enough to decide 
on them. The law excluded the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes, 
the Committee for the Settlement of Securities Disputes and the Committee for the 
Settlement of Customs Disputes.702 There are a few reasons behind excluding the 
Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes from the expected merger: first, 
the Ministry of Justice, when upholding the practice of riba, violates the Constitution 
of the Kingdom, especially articles 1 and 7 which regard the Quran and the Sunnah as 
the main sources of legislation, and these sources state clearly that riba, speculation 
on banking assets like shares and bonds, is forbidden. Second, recognising riba 
contradicts with the main objectives behind the establishment of the Ministry as a tool 
to apply Shari’a in daily life and it also violates the law of Judiciary which states that 
the Shari’a prevails over all man-made regulations.703 Finally, it can be said that the 
reason for excluding the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes from the 
competent of the general judiciary is exactly the same reason for establishing it in the 
first place. 
 
As an issue related to arbitration, the Saudi judiciary suffers from the lack of judges in 
general and specialised judges in commercial matters in particular. This is due to the 
nature of the training received by judges, who do not receive enough training in 
modern commerce, and even if they have received some, the training programmes are 
neither efficient nor sufficient. The curriculums of the Shari’a faculties and the High 
Institute of the Judiciary totally depend on the classical Shari’a treatises that had been 
written a few centuries ago before the creation of the current business practices. 
Moreover, it has been difficult to find people who are qualified well in Shari’a and 
commercial laws equally. Even if that person is found, like in the case of some 
experienced lawyers, such a person must hold a Shari’a degree in order to be 
appointed as a judge, in addition to some hidden requirements. The old guard within 
the Ministry of Justice considers any attempt of reform as a threat to the application of 
Shari’a in Saudi Arabia, and Shari’a in their view should be kept in the same way that 
it is applied by classical scholars. Such attitudes resulted in a conflict between the 
application of Shari’a and the economic interest that is not a result of the application 
                                                 
702 See generally, Section three, articles 1 and 2 of the Law of Judiciary of Saudi Arabia. 
703 See the Law of Judiciary of Saudi Arabia, issued by Royal Decree No. M/78 dated 19/09/1428 H. 
(2007). Umm Alqura Gazette, issue No. 4170 dated 30/09/1428 H. 12/10/2007.  
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of the Shari’a itself; it is a result of not developing the application of the Shari’a 
principles on the modern commercial life. The failure in updating the Shari’a 
teachings in Saudi Arabia had many negative impacts, where the difficulties faced in 
arbitration in banking disputes reflected the wider scene of daily life in the continuous 
conflict between the different schools of thought, nepotism, slow procedures, etc.    
 
The application of the Saudi Arbitration law on banking disputes contradicts with the 
main objectives behind resorting to arbitration as a reliable, independent, swift and 
cheap dispute settlement mechanism. Unlike many arbitration rules, the arbitration 
agreement should be sent to the Diwan in order to obtain approval before the 
commencement of the arbitration. According to some officials at the Diwan, the 
ratification may take a period of between one and three months and in some cases it 
may take years! Furthermore, the law did not give a clear answer to the question of 
whether banking interest is prohibited; however, as a final conclusion, we can say that 
interest is prohibited in Saudi Arabia but the prohibition is unenforceable in the sense 
that the prohibition will only apply if there is a dispute before a Shari’a court. There 
are some other alternative remedies in case arbitration fails to serve its objectives, 
such as resorting to the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes of the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, which would be the best solution in a case where 
the party is claiming the payment of interest; nonetheless, the decisions of this 
Committee are not binding on the party that rejects them. The avoidance of the 
jurisdiction of the Saudi judiciary have been proved to work on such occasions; 
however, if the enforcement is sought in Saudi Arabia, the Shari’a rules will apply 
and such steps of jurisdiction avoidance will not work.704  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
704 For more details on the mandatory application of Shari’a rules and Saudi public policy, please see p. 
175-180 above.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
As a necessary part of the main argument of this study, chapter 1 gave a brief history 
of arbitration under Shari’a as well as the development of the Islamic Shari’a law and 
the different schools of thought. It was noted in this chapter that the arbitration of the 
early times of Islamic history does not fundamentally differ from modern arbitration 
rules in many aspects, such as the formation of the arbitration agreement and its 
essential components as well as the applicable law and its sources. The chapter also 
includes the important elements needed to understand the Islamic law and the 
evolution of the four schools of thought. The chapter also showed how Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions employed arbitration in the settlement of different 
kinds of disputes, from financial claims to political conflicts regarding the leadership 
of the whole Muslim nation.        
 
Chapter 2 discussed arbitration law under the fully developed Islamic law. The 
chapter started by drawing the difference between arbitration and litigation in Shari’a 
as a first step before comparing the teachings of the four schools on arbitration, from 
the formation of the arbitration agreement to the enforcement of the final arbitral 
award. The rulings discussed in this chapter are the foundations of the current 
arbitration law in Saudi Arabia, which can be seen if this chapter is looked at in 
conjunction with chapter 4, which is an analysis of the Saudi arbitration regulations of 
1983 and 1985. It was seen that the differences in the legal status of arbitration led to 
different interpretations of the same legal texts in various areas, such as the 
revocability of the appointment of the arbitrators, the qualifications of the arbitrators, 
the finality of the arbitral award and the enforcement of the arbitral award. The 
chapter also showed that there is no substantial difference between the arbitration 
rules that Shari’a has been applying since the 7th century and the current arbitration 
rules of Saudi Arabia.      
 
At first, chapter 3 gave a brief overview of the structure of the Saudi judicial bodies. 
The chapter also showed the influential factors of the law of Saudi Arabia, both 
external, like the French, Turkish and the Egyptian law, and internal factors, like the 
official Mufti. The chapter also demonstrated the shift in the governmental attitude 
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toward arbitration, which has gone through three different stages. Until the late 1950s, 
the Saudi government welcomed arbitration, as shown in the enactment of the Code of 
Commercial Courts of 1931, the participation in Wahat Alburaimi arbitration and the 
acceptance of the arbitration agreement in the Aramco dispute of 1955. The results of 
the Aramco Award changed the attitude toward arbitration and the Saudi government 
introduced a set of regulations to eliminate the use of international arbitration, at least 
in governmental contracts. However, it was shown that the openness of the economy, 
especially after the 1970s, forced the Saudi legislator to reactivate the use of 
arbitration again and the government had to reform its regulations and policies with 
regard to arbitration, which resulted in the enactment of the arbitration act in 1983, its 
implementing rules in 1985 and the ratification of the New York Convention in 1994. 
It was also shown that, although Saudi Arabia joined the ICSID Convention, it 
reserved the right to protect its petroleum industry as the main national wealth and as 
an important element of its national sovereignty and security. The chapter also 
showed the change in the way of dealing with foreign parties in oil concessions after 
achieving a degree of economic and political power greater than what it had in the 
1933 concession. The increasing negotiation power was shown in the provisions of 
the later concession agreements from the Agreements with Japan Petroleum Trading 
Co. of 1957, the Auxirap Agreement of 1965 and the recent gas concessions of 2004.  
 
Chapter 4 was an evaluation of the Saudi arbitration law and the judicial practice. The 
chapter examined the provisions of the Arbitration Implementing Rules of 1985 with 
reference to the available case law and the relevant regulations in effect in Saudi 
Arabia. The chapter also examined the public policy of Saudi Arabia, its sources, and 
its application and effect on arbitration practices, which proved to be fundamentally 
different to the types of legal systems that Western lawyers are used to. The scope of 
public policy in Saudi Arabia is too vast compared to its neighbouring countries. 
 
Chapter 5 examined the issues relating to arbitration as a mechanism for the 
settlement of conventional banking disputes in Saudi Arabia. The chapter started by 
answering the question of arbitrability of banking disputes, which required a reference 
to the law on conciliation as provided by article 2 of the arbitration law of 1983. After 
that, the legal status of interest was examined both under Shari’a and under the Saudi 
banking regulations. That part of the chapter showed that, unlike Shari’a, the Saudi 
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statutes are silent regarding banking interest. Both banks and clients are facing losses 
because of this silence because, logically, if interest is prohibited, banks should not be 
allowed to charge it and if it is not prohibited, why do Shari’a courts dismiss it from 
any dispute brought before it? However, it was proved that arbitration is not the best 
mechanism to use in the settlement of banking disputes in Saudi Arabia for the reason 
that banking interest contradicts with the public policy of Saudi Arabia i.e. the Islamic 
Shari’a. This fact left some Saudis with two options to find other ways of financing in 
which the Saudi law has no effect on the transaction or at least move toward Shari’a-
compliant financial instruments. The first trend was evidenced by the cases Islamic 
Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems NV and others 
and Midland International Trade Services Ltd v. Al-Sudairy. The second option led to 
the development and the spread of Islamic banking as a reaction to the illegality of 
conventional banking in case of a dispute. The alternative remedies, in case arbitration 
failed to serve its purpose, varied depending on the parties in the disputes. Despite the 
non-binding nature of the decisions of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking 
Disputes of SAMA, it provides a better settlement in a case where all of the parties 
are of Saudi nationality. On the other hand, the existence of a foreign element in a 
dispute expands the variety of choices for the parties and international arbitration can 
be a possible solution. In all events, the Shari’a law will apply to any case if an 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is sought in the Kingdom. The chapter also 
compared the treatment of conventional banking disputes under the Shari’a, the 
Statutes and current practices in the Saudi banking industry with the laws of some 
neighbouring countries of Saudi Arabia, namely Egypt and the UAE. It was also seen 
that Saudi Arabia is the only place where the recovery of interest is not guaranteed at 
all.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 238
Main Findings 
 
The following are the main findings of this thesis: 
 
• The Shari’a regulates arbitration tightly compared to its time. There is no 
fundamental difference between the classical Shari’a arbitration rules and the 
Saudi Arbitration regulations, which are the codification of the Hanbali law on 
arbitration. 
• Although the Shari’a established adequate methodologies for updating its 
teachings, Muslim states are not employing them as they really should. 
• Under the Hanbali law on arbitration, there is no substantial difference 
between arbitration and litigation.  
• The Saudi law in general heavily depends on some very traditional Shari’a 
treatises and methods that need some revision.    
• Arbitration has existed in the Saudi law since the 1930s but it was not 
activated until the 1980s. 
• There is a difference between Islamic law and Saudi law. The latter one is 
more comprehensive as it includes Islamic law and the borrowed codes and 
acts of other laws.  
• The Saudi law is silent on some controversial issues that were left without 
clear answers and the legality of banking interest is one of them.  
• The legal impacts of the Aramco Award of 1958 are still in effect today. The 
regulatory impacts are represented in the restriction on resorting to 
international arbitration by the Saudi government and its entities under Article 
3 of the Arbitration Act of 1983 and the reservation made on the ratification of 
the ICSID agreement.  
• Unlike other arbitration laws, almost all kinds of disputes can be settled by 
arbitration in Saudi Arabia, and these include family and some criminal 
disputes such as murder and personal injuries.   
• The legal status of banking interest under the Saudi law is not clearly defined 
and it is not clear whether riba contradicts with the public policy of Saudi 
Arabia. 
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• Banking interest is not likely to be recovered in the case of a dispute.  
Arbitration is not effective in the settlement of domestic conventional banking 
disputes in Saudi Arabia. 
• Although resorting to the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes 
of SAMA might provide a better solution, the decisions of the Committee are 
not strong enough to be enforced completely.    
• The best way of recovering interest claims is to avoid the jurisdiction of the 
Saudi law in the underlying transaction and when drafting the arbitration 
agreement.   
• The scope of public policy is too wide in Saudi Arabia as, in addition to the 
normal public policy restrictions, Saudi Arabia has conservative social 
traditions. 
• Saudi regulators protect arbitration in Saudi Arabia from any possible 
regulatory competition through the compulsory application of the Saudi 
arbitration law on all disputes occur between Saudi parties. 
 
 
Recommendations for Reform 
 
The Saudi law of arbitration needs some reforms to enable it to serve as a real 
alternative dispute mechanism. Generally, there are many obstacles in the way of 
radical regulatory reform such as: 
• The great influence of Diwan Almazalim on the arbitral proceedings. 
• Problems relating to the enforcement of final arbitral awards. 
• Lack of updated regulations. 
• Lack of judges. 
• Insufficient specialised training for judges and judicial staff. 
• The existence of many elastic principles and regulations. 
 I will draw some recommendations for removing these obstacles and for reforming 
arbitration regulations in Saudi Arabia that I personally recommend and I expect it to 
take place in the coming reform to the arbitration act, which is expected to take place 
some time before 2010. 
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First, the influence of Diwan Almazalim should be restricted in the sense that Saudi 
Arabia should establish independent commercial arbitration centres to get rid of the 
time-consuming procedure of Diwan Almazalim, which might be due to the fact that 
the Diwan as well as the Ministry of Justice suffers from the lack of judges. 
 
Second, the issuance of the final award or judgment is not the most important step in 
the process of settling any dispute; the full enforcement of the final award needs more 
strictness. Although the enactment of the Enforcement Code might improve the 
enforceability of court decisions and arbitral awards, I suspect it will not stop the 
selectivity in enforcement that the Saudi legal system generally suffers from. 
      
Third, the application of the Shari’a principles should be developed to accommodate 
the current circumstances i.e. the ruling of the Shari’a should be codified without 
prejudice towards the established values of the Shari’a. Despite their weaknesses, the 
arbitration act of 1983 and its Implementing Rules of 1985 can be good models that 
should be followed in modernising the Shari’a. 
   
Fourth, judges dealing with commercial matters should be specialists. The recent 
reform to the judiciary law was a good step forward, but Saudi judges need intensive 
training.  
 
Fifth, the number of judges should be increased. The lack of judges contributed to the 
severe delay in the legal proceedings. The number of judges does not match with the 
workload placed on them, as recent statistics show that in 2006, only 690 judges 
decided on more than 691,000 cases, which explained the length of the procedure.705I 
could not find official statistics for Diwan Almazalim as the supervisory body for 
arbitration proceedings in Saudi Arabia, but it is suffering from the same problem as 
well. The solution might come with the employment of some non-Shari’a degree 
holders, such as the graduates of the civil law departments. Such graduates can be 
appointed as judges after receiving enough training in Shari’a law.706 
                                                 
705 Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, Annual Report of 1426/2006, p. 13. 
706 Article 31.d of the Judiciary Law of 2007: a judge must hold a bachelor degree from a Shari’a 
faculty in Saudi Arabia. The law means that holders of civil law degrees are not allowed to be judges.   
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Sixth, the Saudi society has a kind of identity crisis, which should be resolved. The 
conflict occurs between the stereotypes of the Saudis as relatively religious 
individuals with strong conservative cultural traditions and the reality that indicates 
that they are like anyone else around them. For instance, unlike the reality, Islam 
strongly encourages Muslims to deal with all human beings in good faith regardless of 
their race, faith, gender, etc. Banking interest is a clear example of such conflict as 
interest is prohibited in Islam, but it becomes a socially acceptable anti-Islamic 
practice. The legal reform must be coupled with curriculums reform that makes 
everyone understand that good faith in any dealing is as important as Friday prayer, 
for example.  
 
Seventh, as a part of the comprehensive legal reform, the issue of arbitrability of a 
dispute should be codified precisely. It is not enough to refer the question of 
arbitrability to the elastic rules of conciliation, which are not clearly defined even in 
classical Shari’a texts.    
 
Eighth, the standards of transparency and publicity should be improved. Transparency 
is one of the most important elements of any successful legal system, which Saudi 
Arabia lacks. With the exceptions of protecting family and national security, all cases 
should be published and the relevant provisions of the law of judiciary with regard to 
the publicity of court proceedings should be activated.    
 
Ninth, the banking control act of 1966 needs some fundamental reforms, as it seems 
to be quite out of date. Similar to other 1960s Acts, which were copied directly from 
similar Egyptian codes, the Act lacks many essentials such as a clear definition for the 
scope of “banking business” which ignores money lending, which is the heart of the 
banking industry.  
 
Tenth, article 25 of the Implementing Rules, which provides for the Arabic language 
to be the official and the exclusive language before the arbitration panel, should be 
reviewed. According to that article, all communications should be made in Arabic, 
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and in the case of non-Arabic speakers, they should be provided with a translator. 
Despite communications with official authorities, this condition should be amended 
and left to the will of the parties to the arbitration agreement, as the application of this 
article might restrict the use of arbitration in Saudi Arabia for domestic disputes 
between nationals only.  
 
Eleventh, the arbitration act should define some important procedural issues such as 
the term “days”. The Act did not determine whether the word days refers to working 
days or calendar days as in article 18, for instance, the period in which the Diwan 
accept appeals against arbitral awards is 15 days for the reason that public holidays in 
Saudi Arabia are too long.707 
 
Twelfth, judges and officials in general should change their attitude toward the public 
as it is noticed that judges in particular lack professionalism. It is common in Saudi 
Arabia for judges to leave at any time before the hearing or work from 9 a.m. to 12 
p.m. only when they should work from 8 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., which is another form of 
corruption.  
  
Thirteenth, public policy should be defined and codified clearly and precisely to 
enable everyone to know the limitations imposed by the law, culture and religion. 
Such rules should be reviewed regularly in accordance with the changes in daily life.  
  
Fourteenth, Saudi legislators should answer the question of whether banking interest 
is prohibited, because if it is not prohibited, why do courts not settle its disputes? On 
the other hand, if interest is prohibited, why do banks practice it under the supervision 
of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency? And who is responsible for the loss suffered 
by both the banks and clients?  
 
Fifteenth, the regulatory mechanism should allow swifter actions to be taken to deal 
with new events, especially when Saudi Arabia is working on its new economic cities 
                                                 
707 According to article 2 of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, the country has two national holidays, 
which are Eid Alfitr and Eid Aladha, and for each of them, public authorities have a holiday of around 
10-12 days. 
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where banks will have a major part to play in its establishment and development and 
after the accession to the WTO. 
 
Sixteenth, Saudi Arabia should regulate the elastic principles under its law and 
replace them with more firm and precise rules. Many examples were shown 
throughout this thesis such as contract law, conciliation law and, to a lesser degree, 
banking regulation.  
Limitations of the Research 
 
Similar to any study on any topic on Saudi Arabia, the author struggled with many 
issues, notably bureaucracy and the lack of publicity of information, arbitral awards, 
court decisions and other official documents. Although Diwan Almazalim is obliged 
to publish all arbitral awards ratified by him, the Diwan treats all his decisions as 
secret material. There are no published arbitral awards, and even when visiting the 
Diwan in person, a researcher will be faced with many obstacles such as the 
complicated process of obtaining permission from the head of the Diwan, the poor 
retrieval system where a researcher has to search through thousands of documents, 
and after that, many related information cannot be published. All these obstructions 
led the author to seek assistance from the private sector directly and this thesis would 
have never been completed without the assistance of the members of staff of one of 
the commercial banks in Saudi Arabia, who allowed the author access to their 
sensitive material, provided that all kinds of information that gave any indication of 
the identity of all the parties to the dispute remained confidential. Other problems like 
the lack of literature on the Saudi law in general and on Saudi arbitration and banking 
law in particular; and the small number of arbitration awards were of obvious 
difficulty on many occasions. I would like to remind the reader that although some 
Arabic books in addition to some PhD theses have referred to this topic, they are in 
fact shallow and mainly descriptive.  
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